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




**Leading Opinions
Both For
and
Against
National Defense**



**Compliments of
Hudson Maxim**



LEADING OPINIONS

BOTH FOR AND AGAINST

NATIONAL DEFENSE

A SYMPOSIUM OF OPINIONS OF EMINENT LEADERS
OF AMERICAN THOUGHT ON THE SUBJECT OF
OUR NEEDS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED BY
HUDSON MAXIM

A HANDBOOK AND GUIDE FOR DEBATERS AND PUBLIC
SPEAKERS PRESENTING BOTH SIDES OF THE QUES-
TION WITH ABSOLUTE IMPARTIALITY



COMPLIMENTS OF HUDSON MAXIM

1916

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GIFT
T. W. KOCH
SEP 8 1919

FOREWORD

At this time, when the people of the other great nations of the world are destroying one another's property, robbing one another and cutting one another's throats, it is only natural that the people of this country should begin to inquire about our ability to protect our homes from destruction, our property from plunder, and our throats from being cut, in the event of our being drawn into this war, or into a war with any of the belligerent nations after the present war is over.

The people are asking questions of those in whom they have confidence—asking questions of those who are supposed to know what our needs actually are for national defense.

The persons of whom the people are inquiring are divided into two main classes, namely, the pacifists or advocates of unarmed preparedness, and the martialists, who believe in armed preparedness against war.

The pacifists differ widely among themselves. Some hold the extreme opinion that we should wholly abandon all armed preparation, that, in fact, we should disarm to set the other nations a great moral example, and seek to maintain peace in that way, while others believe that we should have some armed preparedness, but not much. The martialists also differ among themselves, from the extreme opinion that we should have only a little armed preparedness to the opinion that we should have such adequate armed protection as would insure the country against war.

While the pacifists and the martialists differ widely from each other, and among one another, regarding the matter of armed preparedness, they are, however, all in perfect agreement that we want peace and that we should take such measures as shall best insure the country against war.

Therefore, there is but one question at issue, and it is as to the best and most practical insurance that should be sought against war.

This country being a democracy, the destiny of the nation rests upon the opinions of the people. That thing and only that thing will be done, or can be done, which the majority of the people believe ought to be done. It is, therefore, the plain duty of the people—and happily they are seeing more and more that it is their duty—to give the necessary attention and study to this subject to inform themselves upon it, and shape their opinions according to the evidence.

Consequently, the essentials of the reasons and arguments of both the pacifists and the martialists should be laid before the people for their examination and appraisal, and for their guidance according to the evidence as they may see and understand it.

It is for this purpose that I am sending this booklet, together with my book, "Defenseless America," to a certain number of men and women among the leaders of American thought and shapers of public opinion.

To this end I have asked some distinguished persons throughout the country to write me a letter expressing their opinions upon the subject of national defense by answering the three following questions:


- I. Do we need any armed preparedness for our protection in the present state of armed preparedness of other nations, in the absence of an international tribunal for the judicial settlement of disputes, and in the absence of an international armed police force to compel international good behavior?
- II. If you think that we need any armed preparedness, what measures of preparedness do you think would be adequate?
- III. If you think that we should have adequate armed preparedness, how soon should we try to have it, and at what expense?

In presenting these letters to the reader, I have made no criticisms or other comment upon them, in order that the reader may read them with an unbiased mind, and arrive at an impartial decision according to the evidence as he may see it.

HUDSON MAXIM.

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LETTERS

FROM EMINENT LEADERS OF AMERICAN THOUGHT WHO BELIEVE IN NATIONAL DEFENSE—ARMED PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR.

From HON. OSCAR S. STRAUS, Noted Statesman, Philosopher, Philanthropist and Author; Member Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

5 West 76th Street, New York City,
March 17, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I have your letter of the 17th instant asking certain questions in regard to Preparedness, which I will answer as I understand them.

I am one of those who believes in the domination of reason and in the ideals of justice, not only as between man and man but as between nation and nation. America has been foremost among the nations in promoting peace conferences and in the negotiation of arbitration treaties. I was in the fullest sense a pacifist—and I believe I am one yet—but I confess I have changed my mind as to the best means of promoting peace among nations. The causes that brought on this world war and the trampling down of neutral rights have produced a rude awakening and aroused many of us out of dreams and illusions. We would be blind to facts in not recognizing that this war has let loose throughout the world the spirit of conquest, the hunger for territory and the disregard for neutral rights.

The nations that have lived longest have invariably been the strongest, so long as that strength was used for security and protection, instead of for aggression. But some will say that our country is an exception, that we have unlimited resources and that we need not fear attack by any nation. The answer is: The extent of our opportunities, the vastness of our wealth, instead of being a security, unless we employ it in part to increase our power of defense, will only be a mark of weakness and an invitation for aggression.

But entirely apart from the menace of foreign attack, if America is to be an effective influence either now or hereafter in the promotion of the peace of the world, we must be strong and we have no right to shirk our duty and cast upon weaker nations the burden of responsibilities of advocating neutral rights, the sanctity of international obligations and the rights of humanity, and that too at a time when international influence is measured by the power to enforce respect, not only for its own security but also for its potency in the council of nations.

But it will be said that armaments are provocative of war, that they promote the spirit of militarism. That is true where armaments are piled up for the sake of domination, but armaments for defense, dominated by the civil spirit, is not militarism but a bulwark for the maintenance of the reign of law and justice in the world.

During three periods of my life, in the past twenty-eight years, I represented our country at Constantinople and saw at close range the play of diplomacy of the Great Powers and I invariably found that where questions of vital importance were at stake the diplomacy of the stronger powers won out.

It is a mistake to believe that armies and navies are of no value when not in use. Their greatest potency is often shown in times of peace and in promoting peace as the background of effective diplomacy.

Whether this war will end by the victory of one side or the other or by exhaustion, no one at this time can definitely foretell. At any rate our country should be prepared for every contingency, and by preparation I mean should have at its command adequate power for its security.

Parents who simply love their children but are not willing to make sacrifices for their bringing up and education and to safeguard them in health and in sickness may be very affectionate, but they are not good parents. So it is with patriotism. It is not enough to love one's country, we must do more, we must be willing to make sacrifices for it and take forethought and protection to safeguard her interests and to protect her under all contingencies from dangers without as well as from dangers within.

Further answering your questions, I am not able to state what amount of preparedness we should provide for. I would leave that to the military and naval experts, but certainly the amount should be sufficient and adequate to insure security. We should go forward in securing that preparation at once. The delay has already been too great and had we followed the urgings and warnings so forcibly put forward for years past by Theodore Roosevelt, we would today be a much more potent force for peace than we are now in our comparative weakness.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) OSCAR S. STRAUS.

From HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE, Ambassador to Great Britain, 1899-1905; Ambassador and first delegate United States to International Peace Conference at the Hague, 1907; Vice-President American Society for Judicial Settlement International Disputes.

8 East 63rd Street, New York,

March 17, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I can only say in answer to your letter of March seventeenth that in my opinion in the present state of armed preparedness of other nations we need a vast deal of addition both to our army and navy, and to our national reserves, but as to what form these additions should take, I must refer you to the expert reports of the Army Board and the Navy Board, and whatever is done ought to be done without any delay that is possibly avoidable.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

From ELBERT H. GARY, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer United States Steel Corporation.

71 Broadway, New York,

March 20, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I have your letter of the 17th instant.

1. Yes, I think we should have a navy fully equal to that of any other nation.

2. I think we should have a standing army of at least 250,000 well-trained men and a reserve force, subject to Federal control, which could be mobilized and equipped on short notice; a large stock of military equipment should be available at all times; also we should have, removed from the seacoast, adequate facilities for keeping the army and navy well supplied with their necessities.

3. We should complete preparedness as soon as practicable and at an expense of \$1,000,000,000, or more, per year until we are prepared and after that a sufficient amount to keep the country in a state of preparedness.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) E. H. GARY.

From CORNELIUS VANDERBILT.

30 Pine Street, New York,
March 17th, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—In reply to your letter of even date asking me for an expression of opinion on the subject of national defense, I beg to reply to your questions as follows:

1. Yes.

2. The sentiments expressed in the resolutions unanimously adopted at the conference of Mayors and Mayors' Committees in St. Louis on March 4th, 1916 (copy of which I enclose), express my views.

3. At once and at almost any expense.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) C. VANDERBILT.

Enclosure mentioned in Mr. Vanderbilt's letter:

NATIONAL DEFENSE

CONFERENCE OF MAYORS AND MAYORS' COMMITTEES

Resolutions Unanimously Adopted at St. Louis, March 4, 1916.

WHEREAS, The purpose of the establishment of the Republic was, among other things, to provide for the common defense, and thereby to secure to ourselves the blessings of liberty and peace, and

WHEREAS, This nation is today without adequate defense by sea or land, and is almost wholly without the means to protect its territory, defend its people or safeguard its institutions against possible aggression, and

WHEREAS, For the common national defense there are required:

An adequate navy,

Ample coast defenses,

A mobile army, and

A mobilization of the organized physical resources of the nation, and

WHEREAS, The General Board of the Navy has reported to the Secretary of the Navy that "our present Navy is not sufficient to give due weight to the diplomatic remonstrance of the United States in peace nor to enforce its policies in war," and

WHEREAS, We believe that the navy should be increased with all speed until we shall have become the first naval power of the world, with strength

on the Atlantic equal to that of any other power upon that ocean, and with additional strength upon the Pacific such as to make of us the first naval power upon that ocean, and.

WHEREAS, The general staff of the army has submitted to the War Department a plan for a moderate increase of the regular army and for the organization, distribution and equipment thereof, and for the increase and complete manning of coast defenses; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT

Resolved, That we, the mayors and members of Mayors' Committees upon National Defense of the Cities of the United States, in convention assembled, do hereby demand the immediate authorization by Congress of the building program of the General Board of the Navy of July 30, 1915, together with such additions and modifications as their expert knowledge and experience may indicate to be necessary at this time. And we do further demand that the personnel of the navy be increased in conformity with the requirements of the service as interpreted by the General Board.

Resolved, That we demand the increase and complete manning of coast defenses as recommended by the General Staff.

Resolved, That we demand the immediate increase, organization and disposition of the regular army as recommended by the General Staff.

Resolved, That recognizing the military obligation equally with the civic obligation as a fundamental duty of Democratic citizenship in a Republic, and to establish a system which will affect alike every man in the Republic, we approve and recommend the adoption of universal military training under Federal control throughout the United States.

Resolved, That we approve and recommend the immediate formulation of plans by the Federal Government for the organization and mobilization of the physical resources of the country, and to that end, among other things, we specifically recommend:

That all arsenals, ordnance, rifle and other munition-producing plants supported by Federal appropriation be located at a distance from the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard and from the Canadian and Mexican borders as recommended in the recent report of the General Staff of the Army.

That steps be taken by the Federal Government to effect in time of peace a standardization of all material which may be required by the Government in time of war.

That the transportation facilities, industries and general resources of the country be so marshaled and organized as to make them promptly available for service upon the outbreak of war.

That Federal legislation to effectuate the foregoing be enacted by the present Congress.

And be it further Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be at once transmitted to the Senate and to the House of Representatives, and that a copy thereof be transmitted at once to each senator and representative of the national Congress.

From Professor GARRETT PUTNAM SERVISS, one of the most noted American scientists and litterateurs.

Closter, New Jersey,
March 17th, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—I am very glad to answer your questions, to the best of my ability, as follows:

1. We do, most emphatically, need armed preparedness. We should

need it in any case, but, as things now are, we need it in the fullest measure, and we need to get it in the shortest possible time.

2. We should have a million thoroughly trained soldiers, exclusively under the national colors, and national control, ready to take the field *instantly*, and, in addition, we should have four million more sufficiently instructed and trained to need but a few months to make them available for the front. We should have professionally educated and trained officers, under the national, and not state, government, sufficient to command in the field, at the first call, a million men; and there should be a reserve of officers equal to say four times the number actually needed at one time in the field. It is the officers that the enemy try to kill. We should have, on hand, equipment in arms, munitions, provisions, machinery, transportation service, etc., sufficient to keep a million men fighting, from the start, and we should have, in suitable and safe locations, arms and munition factories, under the management and control of the national government. We should not fritter away any of our energy and money on state militias in any form. They are a source of weakness, jealousy, distrust, disunion, and potential disaster. Let the national government take care of war.

3. I would say "tomorrow," if that were possible. Let us have an energetic beginning at once. There is not an instant to lose. The ultimate limit of expenses should be the bottom of Uncle Samuel's pocket; the immediate limit should be determined by a summation of the contents of all the "pork barrels" trundled by professional Congressmen—a battalion for every barrel!

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) GARRETT P. SERVISS.

From COLONEL WILLIAM CONANT CHURCH, Editor *United States Army and Navy Journal*.

20 Vesey Street, New York,

March 20, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—The law of the United States adopted in 1792 and re-enacted in 1903 and 1908 in what is known as the Dick bill provides that every citizen of the United States included in the ages from 18 to 45, with the exception of certain statutory exemptions, is subject to a call to military service whenever, in the sole discretion of the President of the United States, he is needed for the public defense. The adoption of the original act of 1792 was the result of the revelation of our military inefficiency during the war of the Revolution, and it was sought to establish an Army of the People such as was then unknown but has since been adopted by Germany and other European states. No pay was provided under this law for the American citizens enrolled in what were named the "Militia" and they were even required to furnish their own arms and ammunition, under the law of 1792, but this law was changed in 1903 to provide arms for the Organized Militia.

The maxim of Washington, Knox and other militant patriots of that early day was that the best protection for the Republic was a well-trained militia. Congress accepted the principle of universal service but has neglected up to this time to provide any training for the young men who are subject to a call to arms whenever the country is in danger.

What is needed for preparedness is, therefore, primarily the carrying out of the idea of our Revolutionary forefathers with reference to universal military training as the accompaniment of the obligation of universal

military service. It follows that the country should also make provision for arming our young men to do efficient service as soldiers and should further provide for the security of our coasts by the adoption of the most complete measures of defense by land or by sea, according to the teachings of the latest experience in war. In connection with this we should have a systematic co-ordination of the great manufacturing and industrial resources of the country and its transportation facilities so that these could be made promptly effective to sustain and assist the men on the firing line.

"He who hesitates is lost," and having once admitted the necessity for preparedness there should be no delay in commencing the work of preparation and pushing it to a completion as rapidly as possible. Our resources in men, money, mechanical construction and the facilities for rapid transportation are ample. It needs only that we co-ordinate them so that they can be promptly directed on any danger point.

Such preparation as is here suggested in no way interferes with the consideration of the theories of arbitration and the formation of international agreements to compel peace. But "to be weak is to be miserable" and it is only by developing the spirit of nationality, through a union for public defense, that we can make ourselves respected in the Congress of Nations and insure the peaceful control of our affairs without fear of foreign interference or aggression.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) WM. CONANT CHURCH.

From Commodore J. STUART BLACKTON, President The Vitagraph Company of America, Author "The Battle Cry of Peace."

The Vitagraph Company of America,
Locust Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y.,

March 20, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Replying to your letter of March 19th regarding an expression of my opinion upon the subject of national defense, answering question No. 1, I would say:

That we not only need armed preparedness for our protection in the present state of armed preparedness of other nations, but we would need it if there existed an international tribunal for the judicial settlement of disputes; for without armed preparedness we would not be sure of our place in that international tribunal; and we would need armed preparedness even if there existed an international armed police force to compel international good behavior. The very term "international police force" would make it necessary for us to have our share of armed preparedness in order to contribute our share of police to that international armed police force.

Answering question No. 2: I think that our first line of defense, the Navy, should be brought up to at least second place instead of fifth and that this navy should be of such weight, power and equipment as to safeguard both our Atlantic and Pacific coasts at one and the same time. Protected in this manner by our navy and with a regular army of five hundred thousand men properly equipped with modern arms and ammunition, America could uphold the Monroe Doctrine and safeguard her interests and her citizens not only in the United States, but everywhere on the face of the globe.

Answering question No. 3: I feel that as a year and a half has already been wasted, during which time the defenses of this country could

have been greatly improved, every effort should be put forth to remedy this criminal negligence and provide for adequate armed preparedness at the earliest possible moment and without regard to expense. When this is accomplished, then, and then only, will our country, our lives, our families and our properties be safe from the Modern Madness of War.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) J. STUART BLACKTON.

From Hon. JAMES F. FIELDER, Governor of the State of New Jersey.
State of New Jersey,
Executive Department,
March 18, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I reply to the questions propounded in your letter of the 17th instant, as follows:

1. In my judgment we do.

2. An increase in the regular army and navy; facilities for West Point and Annapolis training of a greater number of young men each year; building up the State Militia as a reserve army, through increased Federal appropriations, a small amount of pay for the officers and men, stricter federal supervision and requiring the militiamen to enlist in the federal, as well as state service.

3. We should commence at once and incur any expense necessary to make a good job of it.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) JAMES F. FIELDER.

From Rev. Dr. CHARLES H. PARKHURST.

Hotel Ansonia, New York City,

March 18, 1916.

My dear Sir:—Unlike many of my clerical brethren I believe in thorough "preparedness," for self-protective purposes. It is not an ideal policy, but we are not living in an ideal world. Now that international pledges have ceased to be binding, we have to accept something as substitute. Our country, with its beneficent institutions, we hold in trust, and are charged with the responsibility of using our stewardship wisely and therefore of conserving the assets which it devolves upon us to make available for the world's benefit. How extensive our preparedness requires to be in order to serve this purpose is a question to be answered by those who have the requisite information and who are experts in military and naval matters.

Yours with great respect,

(Signed) C. H. PARKHURST.

From LIEUT. BARON HROLF VON DEWITZ, Danish Military Engineer,
Author "War's New Weapons."

Atlantic Beach Hotel,

Atlantic Beach, Florida,

March 18, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—In answer to your favor of 17th instant, in which you do me the honor of asking me to contribute my opinion to a symposium on preparedness, I think I can answer the three questions you put in a single statement, to wit:

Nothing short of a good licking by a first-class power will teach you

Americans the lessons of preparedness, for what you need to maintain your sovereignty as a nation on a basis of permanency is not a large army and navy so much as national discipline and practical patriotism so that the individual citizen will gladly sacrifice a part of his time and strength for the paramount needs of the nation and the defense of the country. No American has a right to consider himself a true American who is not willing to serve as a conscript under the colors in times of peace in order that his country may be properly prepared in times of war.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) DEWITZ.

From CLEVELAND MOFFETT, Noted Writer, Author of "Saving the Nation" and many other important works.

153 East 56th Street, New York City,

March 18, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—Answering your letter of March 17th, I would say, with all possible emphasis, yes, we certainly do need armed preparedness, in view of present international conditions. We need a lot of it and we need it at the earliest possible moment.

I believe that, for centuries to come, war must be regarded as an inevitable part of human existence, and there is only one way in which the United States can be assured against the horrors of armed invasion, with the shame of disastrous defeat and possible dismemberment, and that is by developing the strength and valiance to meet all possible assailants on land or sea.

Whether we like it or not we are a great world power, fated to become far greater, unless we throw away our advantages; we must either accept the average world standards, which call for military preparedness, or impose new standards upon a world that concedes no rights to nations that have not the might to guard and enforce those rights.

Why should we Americans hesitate to pay the trifling cost of insurance against war? Trifling? Yes. The annual cost of providing and maintaining an adequate army and navy would be far less than we spend every year on tobacco and alcohol. Less than fifty cents a month from every citizen would be sufficient. That amount, wisely expended, would enormously lessen the probability of war and would allow the United States, if war came, to face its enemies with absolute serenity. The Germans are willing to pay the cost of preparedness. So are the French, the Italians, the Japanese, the Swiss, the Balkan peoples, the Turks. Do we love our country less than they do? Do we think our institutions, our freedom, less worthy than theirs of being guarded for posterity?

Why should we not adopt a system of military training something like the one that has given such excellent results in Switzerland? Why not cease to depend upon our absurd little standing army, which, for its strength and organization, is frightfully expensive and absolutely inadequate, and depend instead upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms, with a permanent body of competent officers, at least 50,000, whose lives would be spent in giving one year military training to the young men of this nation, all of them, say, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three, so that these young men could serve their country efficiently, if the need arose? Why not accept the fact that it is neither courageous nor democratic for us to depend upon hired soldiers to defend our country?

Does any one doubt that a year of such military training would be of lasting benefit to the men of America? Would it not school them in much-needed habits of discipline and self-control, habits which must be learned sooner or later if a man is to succeed? Would not the open air life, the physical exercise, the regularity of hours tend to improve their health and make them better citizens?

Suppose that once every five years all American men up to fifty were required to go into military camp and freshen up on their defense duties for twenty or thirty days. Would that do them any harm? On the contrary, it would do them immense good.

And even if war never came, is it not evident that America would benefit in numberless ways by such a development of the general manhood spirit? Who can say how much of Germany's greatness in business and commerce, in the arts and sciences, is due to the fact that *all* her men, through military training, have learned precious lessons in self-control and obedience?

The pacifists tell us that after the present European war we shall have nothing to fear for many years from exhausted Europe, but let us not be too sure of that. History teaches that long and costly wars do not necessarily exhaust a nation or lessen its readiness to undertake new wars. On the contrary, the habit of fighting leads easily to more fighting. The Napoleonic wars lasted over twenty years. At the close of our civil war we had great generals and a formidable army of veteran soldiers and would have been willing and able immediately to engage in a fresh war against France had she not yielded to our demand and withdrawn Maximilian from Mexico. Bulgaria recently fought two wars within a year, the second leaving her exhausted and prostrate; yet within two years she was able to enter upon a third war stronger than ever.

If Germany wins in the present great conflict she may quite conceivably turn to America for the vast money indemnity that she will be unable to exact from her depleted enemies in Europe; and if Germany loses or half loses she may decide to retrieve her desperate fortunes in this tempting and undefended field. With her African empire hopelessly lost to her, where more naturally than to facile America will she turn for her coveted place in the sun?

And if not Germany, it may well be some other great nation that will attack us. Perhaps Great Britain! Especially if our growing merchant marine threatens her commercial supremacy of the sea, which is her life. Perhaps Japan! whose attack on Germany in 1914 shows plainly that she merely awaits favorable opportunity to dispose of any of her rivals in the Orient. Let us bear in mind that, in the opinion of the world's greatest authorities, we Americans are today totally unprepared to defend ourselves against a first-class foreign power.

As to our immediate defense requirements, we should have a strong and fully manned navy with forty-eight dreadnoughts and battle cruisers in proportion. We should have scout destroyers and sea-going submarines in numbers sufficient to balance the capital fleet. We should have an aerial fleet second to none in the world. We should have a standing army of 200,000 men with 45,000 officers, backed by a national force of citizens trained in arms under a universal and obligatory one-year military system. We should have, finally, adequate munition plants in various parts of the country, all under government control and partly subsidized under conditions assuring ample munitions at any time, but absolutely preventing

private monopolies or excessive profits in the munition manufacturing business.

This would be—and God grant it prove to be—America's insurance against future wars of invasion, against alien arrogance and injustice, against a foreign flag over this land.

Wishing you all success in your patriotic efforts to save this nation from disaster, I am,

Very sincerely,
(Signed) CLEVELAND MOFFETT.

From J. B. WALKER, Editor-in-Chief, *Scientific American*, Author
"America Fallen."

233 Broadway, New York,
March 20, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Answering your favor of March 19th, I beg to submit the following answers to the questions therein proposed:

1. In view of the present state of armed preparedness of other nations, and in the absence of an international tribunal for the judicial settlement of disputes, I am of the opinion that it is among the very first duties of the United States adequately to arm itself both on sea and land.

2. The first and logical line of defense should be found upon the high seas, and I believe that in the upbuilding of our navy we should act upon the cardinal principle that our whole fleet should be sea-going in every unit, of the largest size, and the widest radius of action compatible with the class to which it belongs.

As to the size of this navy, I believe it should always stand second in strength among the navies of the world, being exceeded only by that of Great Britain.

Our fleet should be composed of battleships whose armament and speed should always be maintained abreast of contemporary practice—and preferably ahead of that practice. Since the ultimate issues of a naval campaign will be decided in favor of the nation having the heaviest battleship line, I believe that the bulk of the appropriations by Congress should be put into capital ships, battleships and battle-cruisers, the ratio for the present being one battle-cruiser to every two battleships.

I believe that our navy should possess a fleet of thirty-five-knot scouts in the ratio of one scout for every capital ship; that we should possess a fleet of twelve-hundred-ton, thirty-five-knot destroyers in the ratio of four to every capital ship; and that we should possess a fleet of sea-going twelve-hundred-ton submarines of not less than twenty-knots' surface speed, in the ratio of one to every capital ship.

With the fleet as above indicated, should go, of course, a complete quota of auxiliaries—fuel, ammunition, provision and general supply ships, together with the proper ratio of "mother" ships, tenders and other auxiliaries.

In addition to the provision of government gun, armor and ammunition factories, I believe that the interests of naval defense would be greatly enhanced if the private ship, gun, armor and shell factories were mobilized for defense, and if they were provided with sufficient work in peace time to enable them in the stress of war to bend their whole energies at once to the supply of naval war material.

As regards the defenses on land, I believe our forces should consist of a regular army of 250,000 men, recruited under a six-year enlistment

(one or two years with the colors and the balance in reserve) so that in time we would possess a trained regular reserve of 500,000 men. The National Guard should be taken into Federal control, without pay, and should be subjected to army drill, discipline and methods of promotion. Back of these forces there should be a volunteer army of 250,000 men under control of the officers of the regular army. There should be a reserve of officers created of not less than 50,000 men.

As soon as the country is ready for it, the United States Government should impose universal training and service.

3. The United States should put itself into the state of adequate armed preparedness, above outlined, without the loss of a moment of time, and with the understanding that, in view of the tremendous emergency which confronts us, the question of "expense" should be the last to be considered.

The above has been rather hastily dictated, but I think that it will give you a fair idea of my views on preparedness.

Yours very faithfully,

(Signed) J. BERNARD WALKER.

From DR. L. H. BAEKELAND, Noted Inventor and Scientist, Member of Naval Consulting Board of the United States.

Yonkers, N. Y.,

March 20, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—1. I am in favor of armed preparedness for our protection.

2. I believe in an excellent navy, second only to that of England, and in a regular standing army of 200,000 men. I am against any militia or National Guard system, unless its officers be *professionally* trained men.

3. I am against any system of preparedness which tries to raise funds otherwise than by *direct taxation*, preferably a rapidly increasing tax on incomes, so that the burden should be shifted where it belongs, and so that every man who pays taxes should realize what "preparedness" costs him.

Truly yours,

(Signed) L. H. BAEKELAND.

From CHARLES A. MUNN, President Munn & Co., and Editor *The Scientific American*.

233 Broadway, New York,

March 20, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—My opinions in regard to the necessity for national defense, both on land and sea, are too well known to need any very special comment. As you are aware, the *Scientific American* has been preaching the doctrine of adequate defense for a great number of years, and is one of the first publications in this country, if not the first, to take up this problem.

In answer to your queries:

No. 1. Yes.

No. 2. I believe that the Chamberlain Bill now before the Senate is a fair basis for the degree of preparedness necessary.

No. 3. I think we have already lost a precious year and a half in the way of preparedness, and steps should be taken at once to remedy

our present nakedness. As to the expense necessary, I cannot answer such a question off hand.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) CHARLES A. MUNN.

From GENERAL A. R. BUFFINGTON, United States Army, Retired,
Ex-Chief of Ordnance.

Madison, New Jersey,

March 17, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Yours of this date received this a. m., and herewith enclosed I send you my answers to the three questions.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) A. R. BUFFINGTON.

Answers to Questions:

1. Yes, *adequate* preparedness, particularly of the Navy: that is, a Navy equipped with all the appliances of offensive warfare on the high seas now used by the belligerents in the present European War, not for offensive purposes but for defensive—offensive protection.

Defensive preparedness would be inadequate for defense unless the offensive could be taken at any moment of conflict with would-be invaders of the United States.

2. The measures of preparedness for the Navy—which must necessarily be the first line of defense—are stated in above answer to question No. 1. Respecting those for an adequate Army, it matters not whether it be called “Continental Army” or “Militia” composed of the National Guards of the States, provided the appointment of its officers, command and organization of it, as a whole, be exclusively under the control of the War Department both in times of peace and war: in short, the adoption of the most advanced project advocated by Army officers who know what they advocate *to be necessary* and not less than 1,000,000 men all told.

3. For adequate preparedness of both Army and Navy, time is the factor that must control. It is already too late for the extent of preparedness we should have, and for what we can have not a moment should be lost to begin it. Compromises of any kind won't do, and it should be begun now at whatever cost of energy and money in the use of both existing government and private plants and facilities. The preparedness must now of necessity extend over several years and the cost of it would be no more than an insurance for National protection, similar to life, property, burglary and marine insurance, and the cost for police protection and permanent paid fire departments.

Cut off the “Pork Barrel” (local patriotism) and substitute *National* patriotism for it and reduce “Politics” to a zero quantity in all legislation. The United States is rich enough to afford it, and if the nation, as a whole, must live less expensively to do it, the gain in national vigor and patriotism cannot be estimated in dollars and cents.

(Signed) A. R. BUFFINGTON.

From REV. DR. CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY, Noted Author.

Yonkers, New York,

March 17, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—I answer your three questions gladly:

1. Yes, decidedly so.

2. A force great enough to cope with any possible expedition that

could be launched against us, to hold it in check long enough for us to mobilize our resources and render available the vast potential energies which we should be already organizing to meet such demands. In round numbers, I should say a fleet strong enough to defend the sea-board against any European or Asiatic country, excepting England, and a regular army of at least 250,000 men. Even against any combination of non-English speaking people such a force would make it exceedingly difficult for an enemy to land an expedition on our shores or to maintain it there. And such a force would give us time to rally behind it. I am not an expert on those matters and if the suggested numbers are not great enough I would cheerfully advocate their increase.

3. We should commence our preparation at once without regard to the expense, taking care to use our income to the best advantage and with provident care and without reckless waste, and the money should be raised by taxes or duties, not by loans or bonds. We must not mortgage the future to defend the present.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY.

From S. STANWOOD MENKEN, President National Security League.

52 William Street, New York.

March 20, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I take pleasure in saying that my answer to the first question in your letter of March 17th is decidedly "Yes."

As to the second, my answer is "The full measure of Preparedness advocated by the general staff of the Army and the Navy Board."

As to the third, I think expense in the matter of safety to America is a negligible question and should not be considered.

The whole issue may be summed up in the proposition that partial Preparedness is no Preparedness, and that the greatness of the United States is such that in the matter of national safety, cost is a mere incident.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) S. STANWOOD MENKEN.

From DR. MILLER REESE HUTCHISON, Inventor, Chief Engineer Edison Laboratories, Member Naval Consulting Board of the United States, Personal Representative of Thomas A. Edison.

Orange, New Jersey,

March 17, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—No. 1. Yes.

No. 2. Such as will enable us to prevent invasion by any existing nation.

No. 3. Immediately—and at such expense as may be necessary and adequate.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) MILLER REESE HUTCHISON.

From DOROTHY DIX, Well-known Author and Journalist.

New York City,

March 20, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—In reply to your first question, I should say "yes," unequivocally.

To my mind, the idea of a great rich nation being unprepared to defend itself is as silly as the idea of a big rich jewelry store being left with all its treasures spread out on the shelf, and the doors wide open. All of success in life, all of safety, depends upon the measure of our preparedness to meet the dangers and difficulties we must encounter. We fail or succeed in business, or in our professions, according to the measure of our preparedness for our enterprise. We live or die according to how we are prepared to meet strain or disease. And what is true of the individual is a thousandfold true of the nation.

I think that we need armed preparedness. We need the best that intelligence and money can give us. And we need it now.

It seems to me that the history of German efficiency in this war, and our unpreparedness for the present difficulty in Mexico should settle the question of national preparedness beyond the possibility of argument.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) DOROTHY DIX.

From CHARLES BASKERVILLE, Ph. D., F. C. S., Professor of Chemistry,
College of the City of New York.

New York,
March 20, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—Par. 1. Yes.

Par. 2. Should have to depend upon advice of experts in that field to arrive at any conclusion as to what would constitute "adequate."

Par. 3. Should begin at once and spend whatever may be necessary.

Par. 4. I am adding this: That of equal importance is industrial preparation for times of peace.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) CHARLES BASKERVILLE.

From GEORGE SYLVESTER VIERECK, Editor, *The Fatherland*.

1123 Broadway, New York.

March 18, 1916.

Dear Dr. Maxim:—1. Preparedness, like efficiency, should not be debatable. I cannot conceive how anyone can be opposed to either.

2. I believe that we need a navy great enough to protect our shores against Great Britain on the Atlantic, and against Japan on the Pacific. There is no need of a large army, because it is unlikely that the soldiers of Germany will ever march across the ocean. The same is true of the soldiers of Russia and Great Britain. I think we have little to fear from an invasion, but everything from a blockade and from the bombardment of our coasts. I nevertheless believe that our army should be considerably stronger than it is. The inadequacy of our present military status is shown by the Mexican incident. For it certainly is a humiliating spectacle to see the United States compelled to parley with Mexican bandits, and to give the sanction of our Government to the invasion of our country for any purpose whatsoever by the cut-throats of any of the Mexican factions.

3. I have already indicated my answer to the third question in my reply to the second. We must have a navy that cannot be challenged with impunity by Great Britain and Japan combined. We must have an army at least five times its present strength. But this is not sufficient. We must have preparedness and efficiency in our industries and in our railroad systems as well as in military matters. In this we should follow

the great example of Germany. Instead of being Morganized, let us be Organized.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) GEORGE SYLVESTER VIERECK.

From BRIG. GEN. JAMES N. ALLISON, U. S. A., Secretary and Editor,
The Military Service Institution of the United States.

Governor's Island, N. Y.,
March 21, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Condensing as much as possible my reply to the three questions found in your letter of March 18th, the following is submitted for your consideration:

In reply to your first question, it appears to me that events of the past two weeks along the Mexican border should answer this question to convince the most pacific of pacifists, if indeed anything short of disaster can convince, of which I am in some doubt. Surely it would appear that a great nation found powerless to follow and punish a marauding band of 500 until a reluctant Congress shall have passed an emergency measure increasing the national army, is in sore need of something by way of armed preparedness. In a broader view, the months since July of 1914 have shown beyond question that right unsupported by might is like a law presenting no penalty, and sentimentally regarded just so long as no temptation offers towards its violation. Selfish and unscrupulous men observe and obey the law only because the penitentiary looms behind it. And nations are exactly as good as the men composing them.

In reply to your second question: We need a navy equal in power and effectiveness to the best, an army ready at any moment to throw into the field five complete divisions of all arms, fully equipped and with reserve supplies (munitions and field equipment) for a six months' campaign; an organized national guard (not state militia) of twenty divisions of all arms ready to take the field in ten days, armed, equipped, and supplied as indicated for the regular army. Cannon, shells, and small arms can not be manufactured over night.

A reserve consisting of the male citizens of the United States between eighteen and forty-five, trained to a degree of efficiency equal to proper care of self and arms in the field in all seasons, ability to send a rifle bullet through a six-hundred-yard target with reasonable certainty, and a working knowledge of the school of the soldier. These qualifications to be indispensable to the right of suffrage, which should be awarded as a high privilege and honor, and not sown broadcast and indiscriminately as to-day.

In reply to your third question: At the earliest possible moment, and without regard to cost. Better two, three, or five billions, if necessary, for defense, than double the amount for tribute.

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) JAMES N. ALLISON.

From Dr. DAVID JAYNE HILL, Member Permanent Administrative
Council of Hague Tribunal; President Advisory Board, American
Defense Society, New York.

1745 Rhode Island Avenue, Washington, D. C.,
March 20, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—I present the following answers to the three questions asked in your letter of March 19:

1. Unless we are prepared to protect our coasts and frontiers and our citizens, wherever they may be, we fail in the performance of a constitutional guarantee to our people.

2. We require at least an immediately available army of 200,000 trained men, and a trained reserve of seven or eight hundred thousand available upon short notice. The navy should be increased and kept constantly with a full complement of men and ready for action.

3. We need this degree of preparation immediately.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) . DAVID J. HILL.

From REV. DR. MADISON C. PETERS, Chairman Educational Committee,
American Peace and Arbitration League.

225 Fifth Avenue, New York,

March 18, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—In reply to your questions of March 17th, first, we do need armed preparedness. I did not think so two years ago. I am sorry that I have been obliged to change my opinion.

Second, the measure of preparedness I would advocate—reasonable adequacy; but in view of present conditions wholly unforeseen a few years ago, I would put all the emphasis on adequacy, and I would leave the adequacy to be decided by men who know something about the subject, and keep it out of the hands of the grafters who have spent millions on the army and the navy for which we have nothing to show.

In answer to your third question, I would say that we should have preparedness just as fast as we can get it, and get it *good* regardless of expense, only put preparedness in the hands of business men and not inexperienced ward heelers.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) MADISON C. PETERS.

From C. S. THOMPSON, Chairman Executive Committee, The American
Defense Society, New York.

303 Fifth Avenue, New York.,

March 17, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I am sending herewith the answers to the questions included in your letter of March 17th.

Ans. 1. The present state of armed preparedness of other nations, the absence of an international tribunal for the judicial settlement of disputes, and the absence of an international police force to compel international good behavior are to my mind but three reasons for the armed preparation of the United States of America. It is quite apparent that our civilization is still built upon force. I firmly believe the only thing for this nation to do if this nation believes in permanent peace is to arm itself to the teeth, and, with the help of allied nations, if need be, fight for permanent international peace, and then maintain an international police force to keep the international peace established.

Ans. 2. Half measures are useless. No measure of preparedness is adequate unless it provides for universal service and for enough *matériel* in the way of ships, guns, and ammunition, to exceed the supplies of any other one nation.

Ans. 3. If the future of our republic depends upon our armed preparedness, I think steps should be taken at once, and by that I mean to-day. I should take the matter out of the hands of Congress and place it in the hands of the real doctors, the military experts. We should carry out their recommendations, and the question of expense should not be considered in the way of limiting our preparations.

To all those who are still in doubt upon the question, I recommend a reading of "*Defenseless America*."

With best wishes,

Very truly yours,

(Signed) C. S. THOMPSON.

From Rev. Dr. S. PARKES CADMAN, Pastor Central Congregational Church, Brooklyn, New York.

64 Jefferson Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y.,

March 21, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—In answer to your first question, I do believe in armed preparedness. In answer to the second and third questions, I would leave the necessary measures to those who are experts on such subjects, as I am not.

Cordially yours,

(Signed) S. PARKES CADMAN.

From Hon. FRANK B WILLIS, Governor of Ohio.

Executive Department, Columbus, Ohio,

March 20, 1916.

Dear Sir:—Your inquiry received. I think we do need armed preparedness for our protection in the present state of armed preparedness of other nations, in the absence of an international tribunal for the judicial settlement of disputes. I think that our navy should be strengthened very materially and that the National Guard organizations of the country should be doubled and increased in efficiency and equipment and that the standing army should be strengthened. I am not in favor of a "continental army."

Yours very truly,

(Signed) FRANK B. WILLIS.

From Hon. A. P. GARDNER, United States Congressman, Sixth District of Massachusetts.

Committee on Ways and Means,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.,

March 20, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—I beg to reply to your letter of March 17, 1916, as follows:

I think that we ought to have sufficient naval and military strength to make this country safe against attack from any nation on earth, including Great Britain. I think that we ought to have sufficient naval and military strength to maintain the Monroe Doctrine and the policy of excluding Chinese and Japanese immigrants.

Just what naval and military strength is necessary to accomplish those purposes ought to be left to the decision of an expert national board

of some sort. Meanwhile until such a board is created, I think that we ought to adopt the views of the Army War College and the General Board of the Navy.

We ought to hasten our armament to the utmost of the country's capacity. As to the expense, no matter how large, we must grin and bear it. The cost should not be counted.

I think that it would be fantastic to attempt to arm against a combination of nations. We have enough to do to legislate about probabilities and reasonable possibilities without going into the realms of conceivabilities.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) A. P. GARDNER.

From Professor ARTHUR T. HADLEY, President Yale University.

New Haven, Connecticut,

March 21, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I believe that America, like every other democracy, needs to exact an obligation of military service or its equivalent from all voters, if the government is to be safe. But with regard to the armed preparedness needed under existing conditions, or adequate for existing conditions, I had rather not attempt to give answers even for so interesting a symposium as yours promises to be.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) ARTHUR T. HADLEY.

From Dr. J. E. HAUSMANN, Secretary, The American Legion.

10 Bridge Street, New York,

March 21, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—In reply to your letter, dated March 17th, I wish to answer as follows:

1. To this I answer emphatically Yes.

2. To know the degree of preparedness which would be adequate, we must know the degree of armament of other first class powers. Navy—we must equal any first class power. Army—we should have a standing army of at least 250,000 mobile troops with an army service corps capable of making these troops effective, and a *really* trained Citizen soldiery through universal military service to back that Army when necessary.

3. We should have adequate armed preparedness as soon as possible, in fact we should have it now. Had we started at the beginning of this terrible European catastrophe we would at least at this date have a decent nucleus. You ask what expense—no expense. As every good business man insures his property and does not consider that insurance an expense, but rather an asset, so should the United States insure its vast resources and the lives of its citizens.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) J. E. HAUSMANN.

From Rev. Dr. JOHN WESLEY HILL, General Secretary The World's Court League.

Equitable Building, New York,

March 22, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—In reply to yours of the 17th I beg to state:

First: In my judgment we need the most adequate national defense

in the absence of the International Tribunal for judicial settlement to which you refer.

The World's Court League, of which I am General Secretary, is directing a propaganda for the establishment of an International Tribunal, but until that Tribunal is established we believe national defense the duty of the hour and stand for the most thorough and complete preparation against invasion on our national rights or life.

Second: As to the measure of preparedness, I am not a specialist. I believe, however, that our army should be greatly enlarged and that our navy should be the strongest in the world.

We owe such preparedness, not only to ourselves, but to the whole world, especially the smaller nations of this Western Hemisphere which look to us for protection in the assertion and maintenance of their rights.

Third: Believing in adequate army preparedness, I believe we should move for it without delay, for, "one of these days is none of these days."

Nestor said in counseling the great generals in their attack upon Troy, "the secret of victory is in getting a good ready" and the sooner we get a good ready the sooner we will be prepared for our world-wide mission of peace, justice and brotherhood.

As to the cost of all this, I know not, nor would I consider it. The thing paramount is preparedness. The cost should be a secondary consideration.

Finally: I am glad to know of your activities in this cause. True, you are advocating preparedness with all your might, but upon the other hand you are striving for something beyond preparedness, namely The World Court for the Adjudication of World Disputes. In this work I bid you Godspeed.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JOHN WESLEY HILL.

From Hon. FRANK M. BYRNE, Governor of South Dakota.

Executive Chambers,

Pierre, South Dakota,

March 20, 1916.

My dear Sir:—In answer to your letter of the 17th of this month, I have the honor to state as follows:

We should be prepared against aggression, against the possibility of war, for defense against any possible attack, and to uphold our rights. Such preparation should be strong enough to be effective, and it should be made effective at the earliest possible moment.

Yours sincerely

(Signed) FRANK M. BYRNE.

From DANIEL FROHMAN.

Lyceum Theatre, New York,

March 22, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I am one of those who feels firmly convinced that the United States needs at once to adopt a sound, sane, practical method for preparedness with a view to avoiding war. I believe in the mailed hand, which is capable of extending and maintaining friendship, and which can at the same time be raised to defend its honor; and I think that the

preparations for such a condition should be adopted by instant efforts in the way that our statesmen are best enabled to bring about that condition. I beg to remain,

Very truly yours,

(Signed) DANIEL FROHMAN.

From MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, U. S. Army, Commanding
Department of the East.

Governors Island, N. Y.,

March 17, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I enclose herewith a copy of my hearing before the Senate Military Committee which expresses my opinion in detail and with entire frankness on the subject of the amount of preparation needed.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) LEONARD WOOD.

Extracts from Statement of Major-General Leonard Wood at the Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, January 24, 26 and 27, 1916:

The Chairman. General Wood, the committee is ready to hear you on the general subject of preparedness.

Gen. Wood. Do you wish me to make a general statement?

The Chairman. I think that would be desirable.

Gen. Wood. I believe that we need a very material increase in the strength of the Mobile Army, the Coast Artillery, and the Engineers, with an accompanying increase in the auxiliary arms, an increase proportionate to whatever increase may be given in the line.

The principal shortages today are limited not only to the personnel, but they are equally alarming in the matériel. My own recommendations called for a regular establishment of approximately 220,000 men, with proper reserves of matériel for this force, and also a reserve of enlisted men equal in strength to the regular force. They also called for a reserve corps of officers of not less than 45,000, for which we have available matériel which is not being used.

I also recommended that general military training be made a national policy. I do not believe that any other system can be considered as other than a makeshift and a stopgap, a source not of safety, but of delusion. When the critical moment comes it will break down, as it has broken down in every war in which we have been engaged. Any attempt to depend upon a volunteer system, pure and simple, admirable as is the volunteer spirit, will fail. It means the organization for war after war is upon us and the transferring of the burden of war to the time of war, than which no more unwise policy can be conceived.

* * * * *

Mr. McKenzie. General, knowing you to be a practical military man, I want to ask you how large an expeditionary force, in your judgment, could be landed on our shores within six months after hostilities opened.

Gen. Wood. A million or a million and one-half men; there is practically no limit to the number.

Mr. McKenzie. What nation could land that many men on our shores in six months?

Gen. Wood. Germany or England, after this war is over.

Mr. McKenzie. In six months?

Gen. Wood. Oh, yes; any first-class military power, well prepared, can land 250,000 men on our shores in fifteen days, and do it easily, once they secured control of the sea.

Mr. McKenzie. Will you please elaborate on that, so that the people of the country, reading your testimony, will understand how that can be done?

Gen. Wood. Our Navy is easily fourth today in power.

Mr. McKenzie. Right on that point, General, do you think it is the proper thing to assume that our Navy could be driven from the sea, such as it is, within 30 days or 60 days, and that an expeditionary force could be landed on our shores?

Gen. Wood. I do not think our Navy would be driven from the sea until they had done all possible. I think many would be found at the bottom of the sea, and the rest bottled up.

Mr. McKenzie. You mean at the end of 60 days?

Gen. Wood. Within that time. When a condition demanding war comes about, the enemy nation which is going to strike knows when and where it is going to strike. We are not going to get a polite warning saying that we are going to attack you at such a time and such a place. It will come as quickly as the action of Japan against Port Arthur. It is just such an attack as that which is going to catch us.

Mr. Greene. Would not the probable intention of an invader be to go straight to the locality you have indicated and then, say, for instance, occupy that territory and levy tribute on the rich cities in that locality? Would he not be more likely to do that than to try to go into the interior?

Gen. Wood. He would probably hold New York and Boston; possibly the entire arms and munitions area from Boston to Baltimore, and exact such tribute as he wanted; then take whatever action might be necessary to prevent us from longer asserting the Monroe doctrine. He would take anything he wanted. It would be just a question of how much he wanted. If we should be driven out of that comparatively small area, we would go back practically to the condition of prehistoric man so far as arms are concerned.

A great many of the supplies that we need in case of war come from other countries. Take nitrates, for instance. All our nitrates come from Chili. There is not a plant of importance for the manufacture of synthetic nitrogen in this country. We need synthetic nitrogen. We have to have it in huge quantities. All our nitrates come from oversea.

From REAR-ADMIRAL JOSEPH STRAUSS, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Navy.

Washington, D. C.,

March 22, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—In reply to your letter of the 17th instant I beg to state that I do believe in armed preparedness for our protection, and I think the measure of such preparedness is best set forth in the recommendation of the General Board, approved by the Secretary of the Navy.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) J. STRAUSS.

From HENRY A. WISE WOOD, Inventor, Author, Public Speaker, Chairman of the Conference Committee on Preparedness.

25 Madison Ave., New York,

March 23, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I am in receipt of yours of the 18th and hasten to comply with the request contained therein. My belief may be expressed as follows:

1. Until the foremost Powers shall have agreed upon a body of international law, and shall have created an international court having full jurisdiction over every cause which may arise between nations, and until these Powers shall have merged their naval and military establishments in a common force answerable only to such an international court, the United States, having to rely for its defense upon its own military prowess, must be maintained at all times in readiness to defend itself against attack.

2. In view of the obligations imposed upon us in Central and South America and in Mexico by the Monroe Doctrine, and in Central America by our possession of the Panama Canal, and the burdens laid upon us by our Asiatic exclusion policy and the necessity we are under of preserving the open door in China, we must maintain such a force, upon the Atlantic as shall make us thereon the second naval power, and upon the Pacific as shall make us thereon the first naval power.

With respect to our land forces we should immediately adopt universal military training and service, and until the numbers in training and service are sufficient for our protection we should continue to maintain as at present an employed army for the purpose. The National Guard should be merged in the civilian army, first having been divested of its allegiance to and control by the individual States, and in its stead state constabularies should be established.

3. As we have entered a most critical period of international readjustment, in which our likely part is wholly obscure, it behooves us to trim our sails and prepare to care for ourselves in foul weather should it come. This necessitates quick action upon a wide scale, if we are to neutralize in sufficient measure the vast naval and military superiority now possessed by the other Powers.

To achieve this in naval affairs we must first accept the principle that in the last analysis a nation's naval power is based upon its shipbuilding capacity and its wealth. We have sufficient wealth, but not sufficient shipbuilding capacity, while our existing naval force is wholly inadequate, not alone to afford us the naval rank among nations above indicated to be necessary but to protect either coast successfully were we attacked by any one of four other naval Powers. This deficiency should be met promptly by the immediate authorization of every unit necessary to give us proper rank, at a single shipbuilding operation; by providing the shipbuilding and related industries with the incentive to expansion which such a program would give; by sufficiently enlarging our naval institutions of instruction, and by authorizing the necessary increase in personnel.

As a large part of this investment would represent plant, the investment should largely be provided for by the sale of bonds, retirable annually throughout an appropriate period of years. And the expenditure involved in such retirements should be written off as a manufacturer writes off depreciation of plant.

Cordially,

(Signed) HENRY A. WISE WOOD.

From COLONEL O. B. MITCHAM, General Ordnance Officer, Eastern Department, Commanding Officer, New York Arsenal.

Governors Island, New York Harbor, New York City,
March 24th, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—Replying to the inquiry contained in your letter of March 19th, 1916, I take pleasure in giving you my opinion as requested. The questions asked by you will not be repeated here, but will be taken up in the order in which they are mentioned in your letter.

1. There can be no question as to the need of armed preparedness in our country for our protection. The present conditions in Switzerland and Holland, with war on the borders of both states, show the advantages of foresightedness in the matter of military preparation. Although these states are small in size, they have relatively large armies; the neutrality of neither has been invaded during the present armed struggle in Europe.

2. Our navy should be second in strength only to that of Great Britain. With regard to our army, we should have such a force of regulars and of reserves that at least one million men could be put into the field in a relatively short time if circumstances should require armed resistance. Recent facts have shown that wars in the future will not be participated in by a number of men only, but by nations; therefore, some form of universal military service should be enforced in our country.

3. Your inquiry has reference as to how soon we should try to have armed preparedness in the United States. My answer is that this should be begun at once and be carried out independently of all questions of expense. The latter is a minor matter when the protection of one's native land is at stake.

I have tried to give you above, in succinct form, my views of the question which is now so greatly agitating all persons in our country.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) O. B. MITCHAM,

From CAPTAIN RICHMOND P. HOBSON, received through courtesy of Mrs. Hobson.

Tuxedo Park, New York,
March 18, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I am sorry to say that Captain Hobson is at present off on a trip in the interests of National Prohibition and will not get home for some weeks. I am therefore forwarding your recent letter to him in Texas and hope he will have an early opportunity of answering it.

You must know how deep is his interest in the subject of National Defense. I am taking the liberty of sending under separate cover one of his speeches in Congress, the last one on the subject he made last year, and in case you do not hear from him in the next week, I would suggest that you quote from any part of this speech that you see fit to use as you suggest.

Let me tell you that we have your wonderful book, "Defenseless America," and we think there is nothing like it!

Yours in the interests of a great Navy,

(Signed) GRIZELDA HULL HOBSON.

(Mrs. Richmond P. Hobson.)

Extract from Speech of Hon. Richmond P. Hobson before the House of Representatives, February 5, 1915:

"Now, Mr. Chairman, I lay it down, and it cannot be disputed successfully, that as a living policy, a status of defense for this Nation, as a permanent policy, we cannot safely permit any great military nation of Europe that has a great standing army and has a vast merchant marine supplying transportation, and therefore always ready to have what is known as the control of the sea between its shores and ours. We could not strike them back if we had control of the sea, because we would have no Army, and the fleet alone cannot go ashore, but if they have control of the sea they can strike us almost instantly without any chances of resistance on our part. The same principle applies to the Pacific Ocean. We cannot safely permit a nation in Asia that is a great military nation, with a vast standing army available and a merchant marine ready for transportation, to be in control of the sea in that ocean. Now, then, these oceans are so far apart that we cannot permit this condition to exist in either ocean. Therefore a single-fleet Navy will not answer. We must maintain as a living proposition a fleet in the Pacific Ocean superior to the navy of Japan and a fleet in the Atlantic Ocean superior to the navy of Germany, both at the same time."

From HON. EMANUEL L. PHILIPP, Governor of Wisconsin.

Executive Chamber, Madison, Wis.;

March 23, 1916.

Dear Sir:—I am in receipt of your letter of March 17 containing questions in regard to my view of national preparedness. As to whether we need "any armed preparedness for our protection in the presence of armed preparedness of other nations," I take it for granted that a nation should be able to protect itself from any probable invasion of its territory or its rights. But as to laying down the exact measures of preparedness, the cost, and the time in which it should or could be done, that is a question upon which we shall have to take the best advice of our military authorities. It is not for the civilian to answer in an offhand way.

Ours, of course, must be mainly a citizen defense so far as land operations are concerned; and a navy that is not formidable is of little use. In deciding details legislators should carefully weigh the suggestions of military experts because it is purely a military question.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) E. L. PHILIPP.

From HON. ROLLAND H. SPAULDING, Governor of New Hampshire.

State of New Hampshire, Executive Department, Concord, N. H.,

March 24, 1916.

Dear Sir:—Replying to your letter of inquiry of March 17, I do believe that we need armed preparedness for our part in the international affairs of the future. What degree of preparedness we need, what measures should be taken for it and how much it should cost are questions which I am not qualified to pass judgment upon. The work should begin at once, I think, and its first steps should be to build up our navy and our coast defenses. Then we should proceed to put firm flesh and strong muscle upon our army skeleton.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) ROLLAND H. SPAULDING.

From HON. GEORGE A. CARLSON, Governor of Colorado.

The State of Colorado, Executive Chamber, Denver,
March twenty-four, Nineteen Sixteen.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Replying to your letter of inquiry of March 17th:

1. Yes.
2. I believe the measures of preparedness should be left to the military experts of the country.
3. As soon as possible and at any expense necessary.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) GEORGE A. CARLSON.

From HON. JOHN B. KENDRICK, Governor of Wyoming.

The State of Wyoming, Executive Department, Cheyenne,
21 March 1916.

My dear Sir:—I have your letter of the 17th instant and take pleasure in replying to your inquiries as follows:

First. As to the need of this country for armed preparedness I am fully convinced that we should at once carry out the program suggested and supported by President Wilson.

Second. I believe that this program should embrace increase in both the army and the navy, should include government establishments for the manufacture of munitions, and should provide for an adequate aeroplane equipment.

Third. I am confident that this program of preparedness cannot be initiated any too soon. In the present chaotic condition of world affairs the possibilities of our being involved some way or other are great, and the probabilities of an avoidance of conflict would be still greater if we were prepared. As to the expense, I hardly feel competent to make an estimate of that at this time.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) JOHN B. KENDRICK.

From HON. WOODBRIDGE N. FERRIS, Governor of Michigan.

State of Michigan, Executive Office, Lansing,
March twenty-third, 1916.

My dear Sir:—I have your letter of March seventeenth in which you ask three questions.

My answer to the first question is that the United States in the absence of an "international tribunal for the settlement of disputes," and in the absence of "an armed police force to compel international good behavior," does need adequate protection.

Your second question I cannot answer. Military experts who are not deeply interested in the manufacture of munitions of war ought to be able to answer this question. When I want advice on a subject of which I know little, I ask an expert. Then I ask another expert, and so on down the line, because I find that experts are like the majority of human beings, subject to prejudice, and the other weaknesses that human nature possesses. After all, they constitute the best source for advice and plans. I am not in favor, however, of accepting the standard set by other nations. Our preparedness should be with reference to our peculiar situation and our peculiar needs.

In answer to your third question, I would say that we should make our armed preparedness immediately, observing the caution that I have hinted at in my previous paragraph. It would be unfortunate if the United States were to go to the extreme of preparedness and burden the nation with a debt that it would take centuries to pay. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the nations of the world will recover from the present acute attack of insanity. With best wishes, I am

Cordially yours,

(Signed) WOODBRIDGE N. FERRIS.

From HON. WILLIAM C. McDONALD, Governor of New Mexico.

State of New Mexico, Santa Fé,

March 22, 1916.

Dear Sir:—I have your letter of March 17th, and in reply will say that in a general way I am in favor of the right sort of preparedness by the United States for defending our rights as a nation against any undue interference or attempt at aggression.

1st. While preparedness will not prevent war altogether it means protection and under some circumstances might be the cause of preventing war if we were not in a position to protect ourselves.

2nd. I was really in favor of the plan presented by Secretary Garrison rather than the bill which is now before congress, as I believe that control by the federal government would be more effective and that our forces could be used to better advantage at any time they might be needed if they were completely and absolutely under the control of the federal government. I do not believe that a large standing army is really necessary but do believe in a large body of reserves that might be available in case of an emergency.

3rd. Since I have reached the conclusion that preparedness is necessary, I believe it is necessary *now* and that immediate steps should be taken for the purpose of putting this country in such a position that it would be able in case of necessity to defend itself against any nation of the world.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) W. C. McDONALD.

From REAR-ADMIRAL W. W. KIMBALL, U. S. N., Retired.

1757 Q Street, Washington, D. C.,

March 28, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Referring to your letter of March 18, 1916, forwarded to me from Maine, I will answer your questions in regard to national preparedness against war, as best I may.

1. Most assuredly we need armed preparedness if we propose to maintain either our national rights or our national existence, the latter directly and intimately depending upon the former.

Until nations and men become very, very different from what they now are and from what they have been from the dawn of history, the temptation to use force against a rich and helpless country like ours cannot and will not be resisted by strong and efficient nations that have everything to gain and nothing to lose in bringing armed force to bear against us.

Perhaps more especially do we need armed preparedness to resist a possible attempt at enforcing the findings of an international tribunal for

the judicial settlement of disputes by an armed international police force, should such a tribunal ever exist.

While the probability of the coming of such stupendous evils as a practical international tribunal and a practically powerful international armed police is slight, we should remember that the Holy Alliance was prevented from bringing these very evils upon the world by the facts that the program of the Alliance interfered with British trade and that, therefore, the British fleet interfered with the program of the Alliance.

Our own ridiculous failure in attempting, in the Washington Conference, a little international tribunal for central American countries, is a small but cheerful indication that the danger of a real and practicable world-wide international tribunal is not great.

Should such a tribunal exist there would no longer be any trouble and fuss about preparedness against war by the United States of America, because there would then no longer be any United States of America.

2. We, the people, all know what should be the answer to this question. We all know that there is but one way to adequate preparedness against war and that that way lies through universal conscription.

But since we have neither the pluck nor the patriotism nor the economic common-sense to face the facts, we like to indulge ourselves in silly twaddle about "citizenry trained to arms," which means universal conscription if it means anything, and to try to pretend to ourselves that we might depend upon our National Guard—which, whatever else it may be, is not National and cannot guard the nation against any danger.

We, the people, all know that the personnel of the least possible force that could be considered an adequate preparation against war would consist of three men from every thousand inhabitants in the first line of sea and shore forces; nine men from every thousand inhabitants in the second line; and twelve men from every thousand inhabitants in the third line; all the rest of the men of the country of military age to be organized in the reserves, military, industrial and administrative.

Arms, munitions and equipment for the first three lines should be available on mobilization, with reserve stores for the reserves.

3. We should begin to try to get it tomorrow morning, early, since we cannot possibly be prepared against war within fifteen years if we begin our preparations tomorrow and work for them earnestly and continuously. There is a bare possibility that if we begin our preparations now we may not be too late.

The expense in dollars from the National Treasury should be that sufficient to pay the professional first line men and to furnish all the necessary war tools for all the personnel.

The expense in time and industry would be measured by the time given by all the individuals for the defense of their country's rights.

After all, is it not "all leather and prunello" to answer your three questions?

We, the people, all know the correct answers and we, the people, will continue to shirk facing the facts brought out by these questions as we of the present and passing generations, our forbears for the last hundred and twenty-five years and our truly representative legislative and executive servants have always shirked facing any facts bearing upon real preparedness against war.

For nearly a century, or, more exactly, ever since the Canning Doctrine was promulgated by Monroe, we have depended for the protection of our

international rights upon the goodness of the Good Lord in combination with the power of the British fleet.

All present indications point to our continuing our dependence upon that same combination.

Faithfully yours,
(Signed) WM. W. KIMBALL.

From HON. EMMET D. BOYLE, Governor of Nevada.

Executive Chamber, Carson City,
March 22, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I am in receipt of your letter of the 17th instant requesting an expression of opinion upon the subject of national defense. Replying to your inquiries in order, I give as my opinion:

1. That we do need armed preparedness for our protection and probably will continue to need such preparedness for many years to come.

2. I regret my inability to comment intelligently regarding the size of the army which the United States should have. I do believe, however, that none of the schemes yet proposed in Congress provide for adequate force.

3. We need armed preparedness at once and should procure it practically at any cost.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) EMMET D. BOYLE.

From THOMAS ROBINS, Secretary of the Naval Consulting Board of the United States.

13 Park Row, New York,
March 30, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—1. Unless we quickly prepare for defense, our learned President will be in a position to add the final chapter to his excellent history of the United States.

2. a. Universal military service.

b. A Navy that will rank a good second in the navies of the world.

c. An alliance with England and France.

3. As fast as the necessary money can be provided without stressing the country's financial resources beyond the elastic limit. In the meantime, no Federal monies to be appropriated for public buildings, rivers or harbors.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) THOMAS ROBINS.

From REAR-ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. N.

Stoneleigh Court, Washington, D. C.,
Mar. 31, 1916.

My dear Sir:—Thank you for your letter of Mar. 27, which did not reach me until today.

1. My answer to your first question is Yes.

2. My answer to your second question is, A fleet on each coast equal to the fleet of any nation on that side of the United States with whom it is reasonably possible that we may get into war within the next ten years.

3. As soon as possible, and at the expense necessary to attain it.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) BRADLEY A. FISKE.

From DAVID BISPHAM, Noted Singer.

The Royalton, 44 West 44th St., New York,
April 1, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—In reply to your letter, I may say in general that I am decidedly of the opinion that as a nation we stand in the greatest need of armed preparedness for our protection against foes within our borders, at the present moment, and enemies from without who may, at any time, loom menacingly upon our horizon.

What measures of preparedness would be adequate, or at what expense, I am not able to say, but that we should prepare individually and collectively, and set about doing so at once, I am absolutely sure.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) DAVID BISPHAM.

From HAMILTON HOLT, Author and Lecturer on International Peace;
Editor, *The Independent*.

119 West 40th St., New York,
March 31, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Your letter of March 17th I find on my desk after returning from my Western lecture trip, where I spoke for four weeks on the League to Enforce Peace.

In response to your questions, I wish to say:

1. We do need armed preparedness at the present moment.
2. I should increase our naval and military forces about the same as suggested by the President of the United States.
3. We should have it as soon as we can, but I think that with proper efficiency methods introduced into our army and navy, and the useless posts and yards cut down, etc., we probably could save nearly a hundred million dollars a year, which is the extra amount asked for by the President in order to carry out his program. Therefore I believe we could carry through this new program if we wanted to on only a little more than the present expenditure.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) HAMILTON HOLT.

From CAPTAIN LAURANCE ANGEL, Distinguished Graduate of Army
School of the Line and Graduate of Army Staff College.

New York,
March 25, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—During the period of my service as an officer of the United States Army, I have had exceptional opportunities of learning what are our real needs for national defense and how actual is our danger at the present time because of our weakness.

The military history of nations proves without exception that a nation both rich and weak is certain to be attacked and plundered by nations poor and strong.

When the present European War is over, we shall be at once the richest and the weakest of all the great nations, and our danger will be exactly proportionate to the enticement of our wealth and the lack of fear that may be entertained by our enemies for our measures for defense.

The amount of our preparedness should be determined absolutely by its sufficiency. We need enough, and no more, amply to insure us against

molestation. We need such measures more than any other nation, and we can better afford to have them than any other nation, and there is not a moment to be lost.

We should not be in the least deterred by any expenditure which the necessities of the case make it evident should be incurred, because our national existence is at stake.

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) LAURANCE ANGEL.

From COLONEL ROBERT M. THOMPSON, President Navy League of the United States.

San Francisco, Cal.,
March 28, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Your favor of March 18th, forwarded to me from Washington, has just arrived, and by return mail I answer your questions.

To your first question I answer yes.

To your second question I answer that we should have a Navy adequate to hold the sea against the power of any military nation that might possibly invade us. I do not consider England such a nation. It follows that Germany on the Atlantic and Japan on the Pacific have set the standard to which we must measure up. Our present Navy is ample to give us control of the Pacific, if all of it is put into the Pacific. No one knows what the navy of Germany is today, nor what it will be by the end of the war.

If the English and German fleets come together, both of them will be very seriously diminished, if not entirely destroyed. In my opinion, after the close of the war, when the European nations are once settled down, the building of battleships will be stopped for some time, as all the nations will be heavily strained to pay the interest on their war obligations.

It seems to me, therefore, that we might look forward to additional building to make our Navy equal to the German Navy at the outbreak of the war, that is, 22 dreadnaughts and 4 battle cruisers. Of these 8 are already authorized, so 14 dreadnaughts and 4 battle cruisers, with the proper percentage of destroyers, submarines, aeroplanes and auxiliaries necessary to make a properly balanced fleet should be built as rapidly as possible.

This can be done by an issue of \$500,000,000 4% Bonds, which if sold as required in payment of the vessels as constructed, would average due in about twenty-two years from the date of authorization. If \$14,000,000 a year were paid into a sinking fund, it would provide for the payment of the bonds at maturity, and \$20,000,000 a year would provide for the payment of the interest on these bonds—making a total cost of \$34,000,000 a year.

Today our annual appropriations include about \$65,000,000 for construction. The proceeds of the bonds would replace this, and after covering the interest and sinking fund of \$34,000,000, there would be \$31,000,000 left to apply to the extra expenses of more officers and men, more fuel, more munitions, etc.

If we make large expenditures for submarines and aeroplanes, we might require an additional \$15,000,000 a year, and if the question can be approached without prejudice, and with businesslike common sense, we can have in three years what ought to be a sufficient navy, without any material extra taxation.

If we were going to reorganize the army, I would take every boy when he reached the age of eighteen, who was not disqualified for physical reasons or because his labor was necessary for the support of some person dependent upon him, and train him to be a soldier. This ought to mean somewhere from 600,000 to 700,000 boys called to the colors. Somebody today is educating, feeding and clothing these boys. The Government could do this without any increased economic cost.

In connection with the army drill, if a system of schools were maintained at which the boys could receive the same intellectual training that they would receive at home (and Annapolis and West Point demonstrate that this can be done), there will be no economic cost through either increased consumption or lack of preparation for future citizenship. On the contrary, such training and teaching would undoubtedly elevate the average of citizenship.

In answer to your third question, we should begin at once and complete our preparation as rapidly as we possibly can.

My foregoing answers show that in my opinion this can be done without any material increase in our economic cost. The increase in the annual expenditures of the United States due to their assuming the expense of educating and maintaining the boys would, of course, be large, but if we have any business in us, and if we can keep out politics and grafting, it will be, after all, merely a question of bookkeeping. As to the limit of expense, I am a "peace-at-any-price" man. I am so thoroughly impressed with the horrors of war that I would keep them out of this country at any cost measured in money.

Very cordially yours,

(Signed) ROBERT M. THOMPSON.

From HON. JAMES B. McCREARY, Ex-Governor of Kentucky.

Lexington, Ky.,
March 22, 1916.

Dear Sir:—Your letter of March 17, 1916, was duly received. . . .

The first thing that the people of every nation have a right to demand of the nation's rulers is protection from danger at home and abroad. George Washington said, "If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it." If we desire to preserve peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times prepared for war.

Respectfully,

(Signed) JAMES B. McCREARY.

From POULTNEY BIGELOW, Noted Author.

Bigelow Homestead, Malden on Hudson, New York,
March 22, 1916.

Dear Sir:—You and I agree on essentials. Every American should be a soldier before acquiring the right to vote. That is a self-evident proposition and has been recognized as such from the beginning of things.

Yours,

(Signed) POULTNEY BIGELOW.

From FATHER JOHN T. PROUT, Pastor Church of St. John the Martyr,
New York.

250 East 72nd St., New York.

March 20, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—Ans. No. I. Taking human nature as it is, we will need armed preparedness the same as we need our fire department and our police force.

II. Our preparedness should be with a view to our two only possible adversaries, Japan and Germany.

III. Preparedness should commence at once, and the defense should be actually and unmistakably adequate, irrespective of expense.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) JOHN T. PROUT.

From MRS. GEORGE E. PICKETT, Widow of General Pickett, who led
the famous charge at Gettysburg.

The Ontario, Washington, D. C.,

March 21, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—Your letter of the 17th is received this morning.

The symposium upon national defense will be very interesting and I shall be glad to see it. Of course I believe in preparation for all the events and conditions that may exist, preparation for life, for death, for peace, for war. We have recently had frightful object lessons in the fate of small nations with no opportunity for preparing for defense, and in the inadequacy of larger ones who shut their eyes to the necessity of preparation, under the impression that if for any reason *they* do not see a thing it is positive proof that the thing does not exist.

The details of preparation, however, I must leave for the politicians to quarrel over, and trust the result to that beneficent Power which Mr. Evarts said "takes care of children, fools and the United States," hoping that in some miraculous way the Republic may be kept alive despite her guides and guardians. I could not even venture a conjecture as to the proper or probable expense of an effort at protection, but however high it might be I think that the destruction of our Great Republic would cost more.

With love for you both, earnest and sincere,

(Signed) MOTHER PICKETT.

From MRS. JOHN A. LOGAN, Widow of the famous General Logan of the
Civil War.

Washington, D. C.,

March 31, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—In reply to your questions, allow me to say that it should be apparent to every citizen of the United States that armed preparedness is indispensable for the protection of the American Nation and its institutions and for the perpetuation of this great Republic.

It has been demonstrated that either through maladministration or unpreparedness the United States has failed to protect American citizens in the Republic of Mexico or those living in the State of Texas, just across an imaginary geographical boundary line.

Promptness and unity of action is absolutely necessary to meet the

emergency occasioned by the serious situation in Mexico, where a few hundred revolutionists are holding the United States at bay while our citizens are being murdered.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) MRS. JOHN A. LOGAN.

From CAPTAIN JACK CRAWFORD, the Poet Scout, Former Chief of Scouts, United States Army.

745 Thrall Ave., Woodhaven, L. I., N. Y.,

March 31, 1916.

Dear Mr. Maxim:—In response to the request in your letter of the 17th instant, my answer is, because we have honor, love freedom, and have homes and loved ones, and because most of the world today is on the warpath, and because the present war has demonstrated that modern and enlightened nations are capable of waging war as cruelly, mercilessly and with purposes as predatory as ever, we do need to defend our priceless possessions.

We need adequate defense, and we need to get it in the shortest possible time, without any consideration whatsoever of expense.

When our lives, our property, the sanctity of our homes, the honor of our mothers, sisters, daughters, wives, are at stake, it is not a question which can be weighed with dollars.

I want to say to you, Mr. Maxim, and to all who may read this, that in my opinion your work for national defense is the most unselfish, the most generous, the most able, and altogether the most important, and has had and is having a greater influence to rouse this country to its needs than the work of any other man or group of men who have devoted themselves to this noble cause.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) J. W. CRAWFORD,
"Capt. Jack."

Self-preservation always first—
A law we dare not disobey.
Our motto is, *In God we Trust*,
But build a Navy while we pray.
"God bless you," William Jennings said,
When Wilson's cabinet he rent,
Then stumped where angels dare not tread—
God help you, was what Billy meant.
"CAPT. JACK."

From REAR-ADMIRAL F. F. FLETCHER, U. S. N., Commander of the Atlantic Fleet.

U. S. S. *Wyoming*, Flagship, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,

April 2, 1916.

Sir:—Referring to your letter of March 17, 1916, containing certain questions on the subject of preparedness, I am of the opinion that:

1. A nation should be prepared to defend its policies and its interests; and that a nation of the wealth of the United States should be as well able to provide for the cost of preparedness as are other nations.

2. Preparedness, to be adequate, should be such as to permit defense against all those likely to threaten our interests, or to challenge our policies.

3. If adequate preparedness is decided upon it is logical to obtain this preparedness at the earliest practicable moment.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) F. F. FLETCHER.

From HON. GEORGE VON Lengerke Meyer, Former Secretary of the Navy.

Aiken, S. C.,

April 1st, 1916.

Dear Sir:—In answer to your letter dated the 21st of March, it is very important that we should have immediate armed preparedness to insure our Coast from attack and safeguard the interests of our people. Millions spent at once would be worth more than billions after the War has started. We should not lose sight of the fact that a weak threat of a well-prepared nation is worth far more than a strong threat of a weak nation. The navy should be the strong right arm of the Government, and with an adequate fleet, well balanced and thoroughly prepared, no troops will be landed in this country for foreign invasion until the fleet is destroyed. Therefore, our fleet should be increased by the building of four battle-ships and four battle cruisers at once and a building program of auxiliaries such as the General Board has recommended in the report which was originally smothered by Secretary Daniels. We should increase the enlistment of blue jackets by 25,000 and have a National Reserve of the same number. We should have an army of 250,000 regulars and compulsory service based on the Swiss system, all of which should be authorized by the present Congress, and should they fail to do so, the people should make themselves heard in the November election.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) G. v. L. MEYER.

LETTERS

FROM EMINENT LEADERS OF AMERICAN THOUGHT WHO DO NOT BELIEVE IN NATIONAL DEFENSE—ARMED PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR.

From REV. DR. CHARLES E. JEFFERSON, Pastor Broadway Tabernacle Church, and a leading writer and speaker against National Defense by force of Arms.

March 18, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—In my judgment this is not the time for the United States to make any substantial addition to its military and

naval equipment. My reason for thinking this is that we have something far more difficult and important on our hands. The theory of military preparedness as a guarantee of international justice or peace has been exploded. The philosophy of Armed Peace has been shot to pieces before our eyes. Military preparedness as a world policy has been found to mean war. Nations cannot run races in naval tonnage and howitzers without fighting. Governments cannot pile up explosives without sooner or later a world-shattering explosion.

We must try a new way. The world must be organized. There must be an international tribunal, and an international police force. To get these the United States ought to lead the way. She will come to her task with greater influence if she shows her faith by her works. If she has faith in the reasonableness of men and of nations, let her throw her whole strength just now into the elaboration of a plan of world organization. Let all our greatest men set to work upon this. Let the President and Congress give it their earnest attention. Let large appropriations be voted to carry it through. Let our government say boldly that it believes the time has arrived for a league of nations to safeguard the peace of the world. No additional enginery of war should be provided by us until this European war is over. We shall know better then how to take hold of the enormous world problem which the war has created. We shall have a clearer brain, and a more quiet heart and a more sensitive conscience if we come into the council chamber of the nations without a big club. Some men say, Let us build up a mighty army and navy, and then work for the international tribunal. That method has been tried in Europe, and it does not work. Big armaments block the way to tribunals of reason. Let us try a different method. Let us work with all our might for at least five years to bring about a world court and a world police force, and if any nation refuses to coöperate in the great enterprise, let the United States and the other nations then take whatever precautions may be necessary to curb the power of the recalcitrant nation for mischief.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) CHARLES E. JEFFERSON.

From REV. DR. JOHN HAYNES HOLMES, Pastor, Church of the Messiah, New York City, and a leading writer and speaker against National Defense by force of Arms.

March 17, 1916.

Dear Sir:—I thank you for the honor which you do me in asking me to give answer to your questions on the subject of preparedness. I send you, herewith, a statement. You may feel free to use it in your symposium, on the single condition that you print it *complete*. May I also add the request that you permit me to see your symposium when it is published.

Believe me, Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) JOHN HAYNES HOLMES.

Statement:

Your questions involve two problems—(1) that of the specific problem of military policy now before Congress; and (2) that of the general philosophy of "preparedness" as a means of national security.

As regards the first question, let me say that I am unreservedly op-

posed to the increase of our army by a single soldier, our navy by a single torpedo-boat, our equipment by a single rifle, at this moment of world-disaster. Such increase is unnecessary, in view of the fact that the present conflict is speedily bringing exhaustion to all great powers of the earth; it is unwise, in view of the fact that it would inevitably be interpreted as a hostile act and therefore be made the source of endless suspicions and hatreds by peoples seeking sympathy and not fresh menace in their distress; and it is immoral, in view of the fact that an armed or arming America is the one thing best calculated to defeat the prospect of immediate or progressive disarmament by all the belligerent nations at the close of the Great War. Even though "preparedness" were necessary for our security, I should still oppose it on the plea that, at such an hour as this, we must venture the hazard of insecurity, for the sake of the larger good of humanity. In place of "preparedness," I venture to plead for a rigid investigation of the expenditures of moneys appropriated for armament in recent years, which, if honestly and effectively used, should have given us an army and navy more than adequate for even extreme conditions of national defense.

As regards the second question, let me say that I regard the whole philosophy of "preparedness" as essentially futile and vicious. The present War is proof of the fact that "preparedness" means war and not peace, insecurity and not security. Europe has tried to the full the policy of "armed preparedness for . . . protection in the present state of armed preparedness of other nations, in the absence of an international tribunal for the judicial settlement of disputes, and in the absence of an international armed police force"—and the Great War is the perfect demonstration of its failure. For America now to adopt this policy, would be only to make inevitable a like calamity for herself in the not distant future. With preparation for peace, as with the resumption of specie payments, "the way to begin, is to begin." I therefore plead for America at this moment to disarm as a pledge of her faith in the good will of other nations, to appropriate the millions now contemplated for war expenditures to works of beneficent and constructive relief in Europe as evidence of her own good will, and to organize at once the high and intricate task of statesmanship involved in bringing order to a disordered world. For this achievement, the United States, by reason of her geographical security, her immunity from international jealousies and suspicions, her mingled population, and her democratic ideals, is the appointed nation; and now, by reason of the Great War's hourly demonstration of the hideous futility of arms, is the appointed hour.

(Signed) JOHN HAYNES HOLMES.

From DR. DAVID STARR JORDAN, Chancellor, Stanford University, California, Chief Director World Peace Foundation, and most noted of the opponents of Armed Preparedness in America.

March 22, 1916.

My dear Sir:—In answer to your kind letter of March 17, 1916, let me say:

1. In view of the disorganized condition of Europe and in view of the overreaching of nations in desperate straits, it seems to me proper that we should immediately look to our defenses in case we should become suddenly entangled in the conflict. It seems to me that such

danger as may exist, whether from our own hysteria, from foreign plotters in our country, or from disregard of neutral rights on the part of other countries is immediate, a present and not a future matter. After the war ends I do not think it possible that any nation would have the desire or the power to attack us. "A nation is like a bee, as it stings, it dies." The experience of other great wars allows us to expect a strong desire in every quarter that such a catastrophe shall not happen again. The religious wars which had raged for centuries were closed forever by the Treaty of Münster. Everybody was sick and tired of the ordeal of battle in religion. The treaty which closes this war is likely to do away with the principle of unbridled sovereignty and of the "Anarchy of Armament."

2. I have no special knowledge as to degrees of "preparedness." The more officers trained for war, the stronger will be their influence towards war. This statement does not apply to all cases, but the world over the determination of the military groups is the strongest war incentive. A great navy is less to be feared than a great army, but all needless expenditure is a source of corruption. It seems vitally necessary that the nations of Europe should reduce their armament, and perhaps place it at the service of an International Commission of some kind. There is danger that a great navy on our part would operate against this result.

3. The arguments for the necessity of a greater navy do not seem convincing. Certain additions or reforms are doubtless reasonable, but rather than a more powerful naval defense we need a national disposition to remove points of differences with other nations, and especially we need some provision, judicial or constitutional, which shall deter any individual state from legislation likely to have international results. I am opposed to military preparedness on any grand scale as inherently dangerous. I am opposed to any increase of national debt for such purposes, and I approve of the Shafroth amendment to the general appropriation bill as follows:

That if at any time before the appropriations authorized by this Act shall have been contracted for, there shall have been established, with the co-operation of the United States of America, an international tribunal or tribunals competent to secure peaceful determinations of all international disputes, and which shall render unnecessary the maintenance of competitive armaments, then and in that case such naval expenditures as may be inconsistent with the engagements made in the establishment of such tribunal or tribunals shall be suspended, if so ordered by the President of the United States.

The main question does not concern the number of ships we shall build, but the general attitude of the nation towards the problems of unchecked sovereignty and the aggressive use of force and intimidation in diplomacy as opposed to "international good behavior" and an international tribunal for the adjustment of differences.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) DAVID STARR JORDAN.

From THE ANTI-"PREPAREDNESS" COMMITTEE.

Headquarters, Munsey Building, Washington, D. C.

March 25, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—We are enclosing you manifesto of our Committee in which Miss Addams concurs.

Very sincerely yours,

ANTI-"PREPAREDNESS" COMMITTEE.

THE ANTI-"PREPAREDNESS" COMMITTEE.

Headquarters, Munsey Building, Washington, D. C.

We are a committee of American citizens formed to protest against the attempt to stampede this nation into a dangerous program of military and naval expansion. We believe that *no danger of invasion* threatens this country and that there is no excuse for hasty, ill-considered action. We protest against the effort being made to divert the public mind from those *preparations for world peace* based on international agreement which it might be our country's privilege to initiate at the close of this War. And we protest no less against the effort being made to *divert public funds*, sorely needed in constructive programs for national health and well-being, into the manufacture of engines of death.

We are against the "preparedness" program, so called, *because it is unnecessary, because it endangers our most precious institutions, and because it is contrary to all that is best in our national traditions.*

Believing that this statement represents the thoughtful conclusions of a large number of patriotic Americans, we urge them to support us in the following program:

GO SLOW ON PREPAREDNESS. Our immediate purpose is to prevent any unusual expenditure for armament during the present session of Congress.

STOP THE WASTE ON PREPAREDNESS. We demand public investigation of our present huge war budget so that every dollar now spent for the Army and Navy may bring 100 per cent of efficiency.

WHO WANTS PREPAREDNESS? We stand for a Congressional investigation of the sources of the demand for a large increase in Army and Navy appropriations.

TAKING THE PROFIT OUT OF PREPAREDNESS. We stand for taking all possibility of private profit out of armament manufacture.

WHO IS TO PAY FOR PREPAREDNESS? We hold that any increased expense for armament should be met by income and inheritance taxes, and not by taxes which place additional burden on the poor.

A NEW FOREIGN POLICY INSTEAD OF PREPAREDNESS. We hold with the President that the time has come to develop the Monroe doctrine, with its inherent dangers and difficulties, into a real Pan-American union, and therefore urge that a fifth Pan-American conference be called early in 1916, and that our delegates be instructed to recommend a federation of the twenty-one American republics in the interests of peace and democracy.

THE "YELLOW PERIL" AND PREPAREDNESS. Since the questions at issue between America and the Orient are serious and complex, we urge, as a rational approach to their solution, the appointment of an expert commission, representing Japan, China and the United States

to study these questions and make recommendations to the various countries involved, after considering all interests concerned, local, **national** and international.

Signed:

LILLIAN D. WALD, Chairman.

PAUL U. KELLOGG, Vice-Chairman.

L. HOLLINGSWORTH WOOD, Treasurer.

CRYSTAL EASTMAN, Secretary.

CHARLES T. HALLINAN, Editorial Director.

JANE ADDAMS,

ALLAN L. BENSON,

SOPHONISBA BRECKENRIDGE,

MAX EASTMAN,

MRS. GLENDOWER EVANS,

ZONA GALE,

JOHN HAYNES HOLMES,

MRS. FLORENCE KELLEY,

ALICE LEWISOHN,

FREDERICK LYNCH,

JAMES P. WARBASSE,

STEPHEN S. WISE.

This is a National Crisis. If you are with us wire or write to your Congressman to Go Slow on "Preparedness."

From ELBERT HUBBARD II.

East Aurora, Erie Co., N. Y.

March 23, 1916.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I received your letter a few days ago, asking my opinion about the preparedness proposition. Frankly, Mr. Maxim, I cannot understand how a man in my position, having nothing but some general ideas and never having made a study of military or naval situation, could in any way make any kind of an adequate estimate of what is the right thing to do.

Undoubtedly I would be just as quick to join the army myself as anyone in case of the invasion of our land by a foreign army; but when it comes to a question of telling just how far this country should prepare against such a possibility, I must beg to be excused. Really, I do not know.

I do not believe in war, anyway, and I am strongly opposed to methods that would precipitate a war. My viewpoint, and I might say the viewpoint of The Roycrofters, is expressed plainly and broadly in the two sheets I am enclosing. I do not think it answers the proposition the way you would like to have it answered, but—them's our sentiments!

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) ELBERT HUBBARD II.

The Enclosure Referred to in Mr. Hubbard's Letter:

ANSWERING MR. HUDSON MAXIM'S THREE QUESTIONS.

A—I believe that war both offensively and defensively has successfully demonstrated itself a FAILURE. Aye, worse, the murderer of men's bodies and the corruptor of men's minds, and in so far as we Americans are concerned, the father of FEAR.

B—I believe that Preparedness now, as always, is only a name for Preparation for War,—however righteous the intentions. (I believe History proves this statement.) I believe that an UNARMED Country *may* survive but I know that an ARMED Country *will not* survive.

C—I believe that it takes more COURAGE to stand UNARMED for RIGHT in the light of day, than to skulk inside Fortresses with a dagger in your boot and a pistol in your hip pocket, and dare some one to stick his head up over the wall.

D—I believe that disarmament will come when some one Great Nation risks everything “on one turn of pitch and toss”; abolishes its Ammunition Factories, razes its Forts, or makes of them Export Trade Depots; turns its Army and Navy Academies into Agricultural and Commercial Institutes; gives its Soldiers and Sailors a CONSTRUCTIVE job, and says to the World: “War is murder, and to save the lives of millions of men to come, *we* will disarm *now*; we will take the *chance*; we invite you to join us! We are Americans, and we stand for ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness!’”

E—I believe that Opportunity is pounding on the door and calling to America “Come! You shall do more for civilization than did Ancient Greece!—to you is the honor and glory of eliminating bloody, brutal War!”—And we in under the bed toy with our cap pistol and our honor and hesitate.

F—I believe, “Thou shalt not kill.”

(Signed) ELBERT HUBBARD II.

OPINIONS AGAINST NATIONAL DEFENSE— ARMED PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR

EXPRESSED IN THE WRITINGS AND PUBLIC
SPEECHES OF THE MOST NOTED OPPO-
NENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

In the foregoing pages I have presented some letters from leaders of American thought upon both sides of the question of our needs for preparedness for national defense against war.

As I have already pointed out, these letters have been printed without any criticism or comment by me or by anyone else, in order that the reader may, upon reading them, form his opinion according to his own understanding of the evidence presented, and from his confidence or lack of it in the ability and sincerity of those who have written the letters.

In the following pages I have given at considerable length the opinions of some of the most noted pacifists, both those who take an extreme position against all forms of armed preparedness and those who occupy a middle ground; and I have followed these opinions with some comments of my own, merely when and where necessary to provide the reader an opportunity of seeing the subject in its various aspects.

MR. BRYAN'S OPINION

I here reproduce in its entirety a booklet issued and circulated by the pacifists, under the title "Do You Advocate Peace or War?" which contains a long speech by Hon. William Jennings Bryan.

The booklet also contains a Statement given to Press of North Carolina, November 20, 1915, by Hon. Claude Kitchin, which is also reproduced here in its entirety.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

AND ITS LESSONS FOR US

Address delivered by WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN at Johnstown, Pa., November 1, 1915. This address presents the line of argument which he has, during the past four months, followed in urging peace and opposing preparedness.

Mr. Chairman: I appreciate the opportunity which this occasion affords to present to the people of Johnstown a subject which is in their minds and on my heart. I am grateful, too, for the gracious words which have been employed in presenting me to you. If you feel, as I do, that the Chairman has been more than generous, please remember that one in public life must be over-praised by his friends in order to make up for the unjust criticism which he receives from his enemies.

While I have found receptive audiences all over the country, there is no community in which I would expect a more sympathetic hearing than in this, because the distinguished gentleman who represents you in Congress views the subject from the same standpoint that I do. Whenever a new question arises upon which the people have not expressed themselves, it is important that each individual should make known his views in order that public opinion may represent the voters generally and not a portion of the people only. The country would be fortunate if all of our public men were as candid and as courageous in taking a position as Congressman Bailey, who honors you as he is honored by you.

In order that you may follow me the more easily I shall outline in advance the address which I am to deliver to you. It naturally divides itself into three parts: first, the war as it is and its injury to neutrals; second, the false philosophy out of which the war has grown and the natural results of that false philosophy; and, third, the way out, or the road to permanent peace. The subject is presented with a view to emphasizing the lessons which this country can draw from the conflict beyond the ocean.

No matter by what standard you measure this war, it is without precedent or parallel. I will not call it the *greatest* war in history, for the word great implies something more than bigness. When we speak of a great institution or a great movement, we have in mind something more than mere size. There have been, I think, greater wars than this, but none that approached it in bigness. It is the biggest war ever known if we measure it by the population of the nations at war—never before have so many people lived in belligerent nations. It is also the biggest war of which history tells if we measure it by the number of enlisted men who face each other upon its many battle fields. The estimates run from

twenty-one to thirty-one millions. Rather than risk exaggeration, let us take the lowest estimate; it is sufficient to make the war impressive. In fact, the number is so great that the mind can scarcely comprehend it. Let me translate it into everyday language by comparing it with our voting population. We have never cast as many as twenty-one million votes at an election. That means that if all in every State who have on a single day exercised the right of suffrage could be gathered together in one place, the concourse, vast as it would be, would fall several millions short of the number now actually engaged in fighting.

More than two million have been wounded thus far. If on any part of the globe one hundred thousand persons were swept to death by pestilence, or flood, or famine, the world would stand appalled; and yet, in a little more than a year, more than twenty times one hundred thousand have been summoned to meet their God, and everyone owes his death to the deliberate intent and act of a fellowman. More than five million have been wounded—this will give you some idea of the awful toll that this awful war is exacting in life and suffering.

If we measure the war by the destructiveness of the implements employed, nothing so horrible has ever been known before. They used to be content to use the earth's surface for the maneuvers of war, but now they have taken possession of the air, and thunder bolts more deadly than the thunder-bolts of Jove fall as if from the clouds on unsuspecting people. And they have taken possession of the ocean's depths as well, and death dealing torpedoes rise from out the darkness to multiply the perils of the sea. They have substituted a long range rifle for a short range rifle, a big mouthed gun for a little mouthed gun, a dreadnought for a battle ship, and a super-dreadnought for a dreadnought, to which they have added the submarine. And they now pour liquid fire on battle lines and suffocate soldiers in the trenches with poisonous gases. Inventive genius has been exhausted to find new ways by which man can kill his fellowman!

And the nations which are at war are not barbarous nations—they are among the most civilized of the earth; neither are they heathen nations—they are among the Christian nations of the globe. They all worship the same God; and most of them approach that God through the same mediator. They offer their supplications to a common Heavenly Father and then rise up to take each other's lives.

It would be bad enough if the penalties of this war fell only upon the guilty; but a vast majority of the men who die and of the women who weep have had neither part nor voice in determining whether there should be peace or war. It would be bad enough if the burdens of this war fell only upon the nations participating in it, but like a mighty flood, this war has inundated the world, and neutral nations as well as belligerent nations are suffering.

The Latin-speaking Republics are kept busy night and day trying to preserve neutrality; they maintain an extensive patrol over the three mile strip along their coasts to keep big nations from violating their neutrality by fighting within their territorial limits. And all the neutral nations are bearing burdens of taxation which would not be necessary but for the war; they are compelled to resort to new and unusual methods for the collecting of revenue because the war has put their fiscal systems out of joint.

The trade of the world is deranged and our nation, the greatest of the neutral nations and the one with the largest foreign commerce, is

suffering more than any of the others. When the war began we were using the ships of other nations largely for the carrying of our merchandise, when, all at once, the very nations whose ships we employed became involved in war, and then one side drove the ships of the other side into our harbors and compelled them to intern there, and, according to International Law, these ships must remain during the war, idle and useless, while we suffer for lack of ships. And the nations that drove these merchantmen from the seas are not under any obligation, according to International Law, to supply vessels to take the place of the ones of which they have deprived us. On the contrary, they are at liberty to withdraw their own vessels for use in the transport service, and to some extent they have done so, still further crippling the carrying trade of the ocean. Because of lack of ships and because of the increased risks of the sea it has sometimes cost seven times as much to send a bale of cotton across the ocean as it cost in normal times. When on the Pacific Coast a few weeks ago, I learned that it then cost nearly three times as much to transport a bushel of wheat to Europe as it cost in time of peace. These are some of the burdens which neutral nations are bearing; and, in addition to these all of them are in danger of being drawn into this war, although none of them desire to take part in it.

When you understand International Law as now interpreted and applied, you will feel as I do, that International Law seems to have been written for the benefit of nations at war rather than for the benefit of nations at peace. I am hoping that, when this war is over, we shall be able to secure such changes as may be necessary to write International Law upon the theory that peace, and not war, is the normal relation between nations—amendments which will make the rule read, not as it seems to now; namely, that nations at peace may attend to their own business so long as they do not interfere with the fight; but will provide that nations that do fight must not disturb the peace, the commerce, or the prosperity of the nations that prefer to substitute reason for force in the settlement of their international differences.

I have called attention to the outstanding features of this war that you might comprehend its magnitude; and I have mentioned some of the injuries suffered by neutrals that you might understand how earnestly the neutral nations long for the return of peace, but I cannot conclude this part of my address without impressing upon your minds two facts which it is necessary for us to keep in mind. If all the newspapers had obeyed the President and observed neutrality his tasks would not have been so delicate and the people would have been better informed. But while most of the newspapers have tried to be neutral, we have had two unneutral groups—the pro-ally group and the pro-German group. The pro-ally group has emphasized our disputes with Germany, and the pro-German group has emphasized our disputes with Great Britain. We have had disputes with both; we have protested to Germany against the use she has made of submarines, and to Great Britain against interference with our trade with neutrals. If you will read the notes which our Government has sent, you will find that our rights, as we understand those rights, have been violated, not by one side only, but by both sides, and that injuries have come to us from both sides.

This is the first fact which we must keep in mind, and the second is related to it; namely, that while both sides have injured us, neither side has desired to do so. The injuries which we have suffered have not

been intended against us, but have been incidental to the injury which each has intended against the other. They are like two men shooting at each other in the street, who are too much interested in killing each other to pay any attention to the bystanders who get the stray bullets from both sides. In order to deal patiently with the problems presented by this war it is necessary that we should understand both of these facts—I repeat the statement of them—namely, that both sides have injured us, but that neither side desired to do so. It would be unfortunate enough for us to go to war with a nation that hated us and wanted war with us; God forbid that we shall ever compel a nation to go to war with us if it is not an enemy and does not want war with the United States.

And now allow me to ask you to consider the false philosophy out of which this war has grown and the natural results of that false philosophy. Before speaking of the real cause, it is worth while to note that some of the causes which have produced war in the past are not responsible for this war. There have been race wars in history—wars that have been the outgrowth of race prejudices which have sometimes extended through centuries. But this is not a race war; the races are all mixed up in this war. Saxon and Slav are allies; Latin and Frank are allies; Teuton and Turk are allies. And now, since Bulgaria has entered the war, Slav is fighting Slav, and it is not yet known whether the Greek, if he enters the war, will side with Turk or Roman. The races are inexplicably mixed.

And it is not a religious war. There have been religious wars, although we can not understand how a war could arise over a religious difference. We have learned to believe that the right to worship God according to the dictates of one's conscience is an inalienable right, and it would never occur to us that a man would kill another in order to prove that his religion is better than the other man's religion. According to our theory, if a man desires to prove the superiority of his religion, he lives it, for we do not count a religion as worthy of the name if it does not manifest itself in the life. There have, however, been religious wars, but this is not one of them. On the Bosphorus the crescent and the cross float above the same legions; a Protestant Emperor of Germany is the ally of a Catholic Emperor of Austria; and you will find fighting in the same army corps representatives of three great branches of the Christian church, Catholics, members of the Church of England and members of the Greek church. The religions are as badly mixed in this war as the races.

And it is not a family war. There have been family wars—wars that have had their origin in family feuds or in family greed, but in this war the families are mixed. The Emperor of Germany, the King of England, and the Czar of Russia are cousins, members of one Royal family, although you would never suspect from the way they treat each other that they are closely related by ties of blood.

And there was no cause of war apparent on the surface. Within a month of the beginning of the war the rulers who are now fighting each other were visiting each other; they were being hospitably received and royally entertained. When one of them had a birthday, the others all joined in wishing him many happy returns of the day. It would be a libel upon the rulers now at war to say that they knew that a cause existed adequate to produce such a war. For had they known of the existence of such a cause, it would have been their duty to their subjects to lay aside social festivities and the exchange of compliments that they might join together and remove the cause of war. But without a race

cause, a religious cause, a family cause, or any cause visible to the public, this war began, and such a war as history has never known! There must be a cause and it must be a human cause, for no one who loves God would ever blame Him for this inhuman war. It behooves us to find the cause, that, knowing the cause, we may, by avoiding it, avoid the consequences.

I have tried to find the cause of this war, and, if my analysis of the situation is correct, the cause is to be found in a false philosophy—in the doctrine that “might makes right.” This doctrine was formerly proclaimed quite publicly; now it is no longer openly proclaimed, but it is sometimes practiced when the temptation is sufficient. Before you become excited—while you can yet reason, I appeal to you to set the seal of your condemnation against this brutal, barbarous doctrine that “might makes right.” And that you may see more clearly the importance of reaching a conclusion and proclaiming it, I call your attention to the fact that there is but one code of morals known among men and that is the code that regulates individual life. If this code of morals is not to be applied to nations, then there is no moral code which can be invoked for the regulation of international affairs.

If I were an artist, I would carry with me a canvas and reproduce upon it one of McCutcheon's recent cartoons. He represents war and anarchy by two brutal looking human figures. Across the breast of war he has written “might is right,” and across the breast of anarchy the words “dynamite is right.” I challenge you to draw a line between the two doctrines. The nation that takes the position that it is at liberty to seize whatever it has the power to seize, and to hold whatever it has the strength to hold; the nation that plants itself upon the doctrine that might makes right has no system of logic with which to address itself to citizen or subject who, as against his neighbor or as against his government, invokes the kindred doctrine that dynamite is right.

If you will take your Bibles and turn back to the story of Naboth's vineyard, you will find that Ahab violated three commandments in order to secure a little piece of land. The commandments read, “Thou shalt not covet”; “Thou shalt not steal”; and “Thou shalt not kill,” and these commandments are not only without limitation, but they are not subject to limitation.

Take for instance the commandment against covetousness. After specifying certain things that must not be coveted, the commandment concludes with the clause “or anything that is thy neighbor's.” If this has any meaning, it covers everything. There is no process of reasoning by which we can retain that commandment and make it binding upon the conscience of the individual if we hold sinless the nation that covets the territory of another nation. And yet the coveting of territory has been the fruitful cause of war.

And so with the commandment against stealing. It does not read “thou shalt not steal on a *small scale*,” it simply says “thou shalt not steal.” And yet I am not telling you anything new when I tell you that as a rule—not always, but as a rule—it is safer even in this country for a man to steal a large sum than a small sum. If he steals a small sum he is just a common, vulgar thief and nobody has any respect for him; if he has any friends they are careful not to allow the fact to be known. If, however, he steals a large sum, he has two advantages over the petty thief. In the first place, if he steals enough, he can employ the ablest

lawyers, and his lawyers can usually—not always, but usually—keep him out on bail until he dies a natural death while they discuss technicalities in all the courts of the land. And he has a second advantage; if he steals a large sum, he can always find enough people to furnish him social companionship who will be so amazed at his genius that they will never mention his rascality in his presence. If we find it so difficult to visit the same indignation upon grand larceny that we do upon petty larceny we must not be surprised if, when one nation steals a large amount from another nation, there are some who regard it as an act of patriotism.

And the commandment against killing does not read that you must not kill unless a large number join with you. On the contrary, the Bible plainly declares that "though hand join in hand, they shall not be unpunished." And it does not say that if you do kill, you should be gentle about it and use the most approved methods. On the contrary, there is no intimation anywhere that the moral character of the act can be changed by the method employed in putting an end to a human life. It is just a plain, blunt "thou shalt not kill," and yet as we read history we are compelled to admit that it has been easier for governments to hang one man for killing one man than to punish killing by wholesale. And many poets have felt impelled to express themselves much in the language employed by the author of Gray's *Elegy* who speaks of those who "wade through slaughter to a throne, and shut the gates of mercy on mankind."

I have called attention to these commandments for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that if we adopt the doctrine that "might makes right" we must be prepared to repudiate all of the moral code upon which we rely for the protection of individual life and the guarantee of private property.

The nations that adopt the doctrine that "might makes right," are quite sure to act upon the maxim "like cures like," the foundation upon which the law of retaliation is built. The logic of the law of retaliation is like this: If your enemy is cruel, cure him of his cruelty by being more cruel than he; if your enemy is inhuman, instead of attempting to lift him out of his inhumanity by the power of a good example, be more inhuman than he. Nations that enter a war on the theory that "might makes right" are soon in a neck and neck race for the bottomless pit, each nation justifying its own cruelty and inhumanity by the cruelty and inhumanity of its enemy.

I have purposely applied this false philosophy to those far away before applying it at home because I have learned by experience that it is easier to persuade people to endorse a proposition when applied to others than when applied to themselves. But if I may assume that you have followed me and that we are now in agreement, I am now prepared to apply this false philosophy to a matter with which we are compelled to deal whether we desire to do so or not. The issue is upon us and cannot be avoided.

There was a time when some believed that war was a moral tonic—when some actually thought that unless people were kept up to fighting pitch they would degenerate. That seems absurd to us, for we know that, if war were necessary to man's moral development, it would not be left to accident or chance. If war were a necessary thing, we would plan for it as we plan for other things which we consider necessary. We know that food is necessary for the body and therefore we provide that the body shall receive food at stated intervals, the intervals being adjusted to the

body's needs. And so, because we believe the mind in need of education we provide for terms of school. If we believed war to be necessary we would call in experts and ascertain just how long a man could go without killing someone and yet maintain a high standard of civilization, and then we would provide for wars at such regular intervals as, in our opinion, would insure man's progress, and the time between wars would then be like the time between school terms—a time when we could rest and relax and get ready for another war. This we would do if we regarded war as necessary. But, however war may have been considered by some in the past, the world now believes war to be not only unnecessary and undesirable, but a calamity.

If there are any who doubt this I am prepared to furnish recently secured testimony. When this war began the President offered mediation and the rulers of the nations then involved immediately answered and their answers were so much alike that one answer might have served for all. What did they say? Each ruler said in substance: "I am not guilty; I did not desire this war; I am not to blame for this war; some one else began it." They all with one accord denied responsibility. The world is to be congratulated that we have reached a time when no ruler in a civilized land dares to admit that he caused this war or even desired it—this is a long step in advance. It is not necessary, therefore, to waste any time in an effort to prove that war is a curse. That may now be taken for granted, and we are at liberty to devote all of our energies to the prevention of war.

But just when it has become possible to unite in an effort to prevent war we find a radical difference of opinion as to how war can be prevented. A propaganda is being actively carried on which has for its object the establishment of the doctrine that the only way to preserve peace is to get ready for war. The exponents of this theory admit that war is a horrible thing and that it should be avoided, but they contend that the only way to prevent war is to organize, arm and drill, and then stand, rifle in hand and finger on hair-trigger—and preserve the peace. I never expected to hear this theory advanced after the present war began. At each session of Congress, during the past fifteen or twenty years, we have heard some advocating this doctrine and insisting on more battleships and a larger army, but their interest could generally be traced to their business connections—they were anxious to furnish the preparedness themselves and therefore advocates of the theory. But when this war broke out I thought that at least one good would come out of it, namely, that no one would hereafter stand before an intelligent audience and argue that preparedness would prevent war. If war could be prevented by preparedness, there would be no war in Europe today, for they have spent a generation getting ready for this war. They had the kindling all ready; all they needed was a match. When the war broke out those best prepared went in first and others followed as they could prepare, and I believe that, if we had been as well prepared as some now ask us to be, we would be in the war today shouting for blood as lustily as any of them.

This is so serious a matter and it is so vitally important that we should follow the course best calculated to prevent war that I beg you to listen while I present the reasons which lead me to believe that the preparedness which they now propose would not only not prevent war, but would actually provoke war—that with the things that necessarily accompany it preparedness would inevitably lead us into the wars against which

they ask us to prepare. In the first place we can not have a period of preparedness without submitting ourselves to the leadership of those who believe in the doctrine that peace rests upon fear; that we can only preserve the peace by making people afraid of us. This is folly of the ages—the very theory that has led Europe into this present conflict. And more, if we are driven to preparedness by the scares that are now being worked up, we must follow the leadership, not of those who advocate moderate preparedness, but of those who insist upon extreme preparedness. If we must prepare a little because we are told that one nation may attack us, we must prepare more if another group of jingoes warns us against an attack joined in by several nations, and we must go to the very limit if a third group pictures an attack in which the world will combine against us. There is no limit to the amount of preparation that we shall need if we are to provide against every imaginary danger and every possible contingency.

The real question which we have to decide is, What shall be our standard of honor? Shall it be the European standard—which is the duelist's standard—or shall it be a standard in keeping with our aspirations and achievements? The advocates of extreme preparedness are attempting to fasten upon this country the duelist's standard of honor and we know what that standard is because we had it in this country a hundred years ago. When that standard was supported by public sentiment men were compelled to fight duels even when they did not believe in the practice; they were branded as cowards if they declined. The case of Alexander Hamilton is an illustration in point. While I prefer the ideas of Jefferson to the ideas of Hamilton, I recognize, as all must, that Hamilton was one of the heroic figures of the Revolutionary days. He fought a duel and fell, and the last thing he did before he left home for the fatal field was to prepare a statement which he left to posterity, saying that he did not believe in the practice, but that he felt it necessary to conform to the custom in order to be useful in crises which he thought he saw approaching. The duelist standard of honor was this: If a man had a wife and she needed him, he had no right to think of his wife; if he had children and they needed him, he had no right to think of his children; if his country needed him, he had no right to think of his country. The only thing he could think of was that he must kill somebody or be killed by somebody. According to the duelist's standard of honor, it was more honorable for a man to throw his wife and children upon the care of a community than to allow what he called an insult to go unchallenged. It required moral courage on the part of many to effect the change which has been wrought on this subject, but the change has come, and we not only have a law against dueling in every State in the Union, but we now call the man a coward who sends the challenge, not the man who declines it.

About fifty years ago a prominent statesman of Georgia received a challenge from another statesman of that State. Had the challenge been received a century ago instead of a half century the one who received it would hardly have dared to decline. But a change was talking place and the challenge was declined in an answer that has become a part of history. The challenged party said: "No. I have a family to take care of and a soul to save and, as you have neither, we would not fight on equal terms. Therefore, I will not fight." No nation is challenging us; no nation is trying to draw us into war with itself. But if, in a moment of excitement, one of the madmen of Europe were to challenge us, I think we would

be justified in answering in the spirit of the answer of that Georgia statesman: "No. We have the welfare of a hundred millions of people to guard and priceless ideals to preserve, and we will not get down and wallow with you in the mire of human blood, just to conform to a false standard of honor."

Do not allow yourselves to be deceived or misled as to the real issue. The question is not whether this nation would defend itself if attacked. We have a potential power of defense such as no other nation has today—such as no other nation has ever had, and other nations know it. There is no danger that an attack would not be resisted, and we would not depend upon the jingoes. They would be too busy making army contracts and loaning money at high rates of interest to reach the front. If we ever have a war, we will depend, as in the past, upon those who work when the country needs workers and fight only when the country needs fighters.

The question, I repeat, is not whether we would be willing or able to defend ourselves if attacked. The real question is whether we shall adopt the European standard of honor and build our hope of safety upon preparations which can not be made without substituting for the peaceful spirit of our people the spirit of the militarist and the swagger of the bully. The spirit that leads nations to put their faith in physical force is the spirit that leads people into war. It is the spirit that expresses itself in threats and revels in the ultimatum.

If you would know what the dangers of preparedness will be if preparedness becomes a national policy and is administered by those who are leading in this crusade, just imagine what the situation would be today with so many opportunities to get into trouble, if we had in the White House a jingo with the duelist's standard of honor and anxious for a fight. We have reason to be grateful that we have as President a man who loves peace and is trying to find a peaceful solution of all the problems that confront us.

I ask you next to remember that it is an expensive thing to prepare for wars that ought never to come. It cost us \$15,000,000 to build the last battleship launched, and that was only one-tenth of the amount spent on the navy that year. You might think, from the manner in which the jingoes belittle our army and navy, that we are at present spending nothing on preparedness. But we are, as a matter of fact, spending now two hundred and fifty millions of dollars annually, *getting ready for war*. We are spending more than one hundred and forty-seven millions on the navy and over one hundred million on the army; and how much are we spending on agriculture? The Department of Agriculture, which looks after the interests of the largest single group in this, the largest agricultural country in the world—the Department of Agriculture which plants experimental stations throughout our land and sends representatives throughout the world to gather information for the farmer's benefit—this department receives an appropriation of twenty-three millions a year. We are, in other words, spending more than ten times as much getting ready for war as we are spending on the Department of Agriculture. And yet the jingoes are not satisfied. They say that we must now turn over a new leaf; that we must get ready in earnest.

There are two organizations in this country which, together claiming a monopoly of the patriotism of the nation, have taken upon themselves the task of getting the country ready for war. The Security League thinks that we should spend three hundred millions a year on the navy and one

hundred and fifty millions a year on the army—two hundred millions more than we are now spending, or nearly double the present appropriations. The Navy League is older, had more ciphers at its disposal and had the advantage of making its bid after the other bid had been made. It insists that we ought to appropriate five hundred millions for the navy and have an army of a million men. Its programme could not be carried out for seven hundred and fifty millions a year—three times the present appropriation, or an increase of five hundred millions a year.

To show you what a burden this would cast upon our taxpayers let us assume that the appropriations for the army and navy will be kept at what they are now—about two hundred and fifty millions a year—and inquire what we could do with this proposed increase of five hundred millions a year—five billions in ten years—if we spent it for things beneficial. I was in California last summer and learned from a commissioner of highways of the work they are doing in the building of hard roads. They are spending eighteen millions of dollars and their plans contemplate two highways running from the Oregon line to the Mexican line—one down the Pacific Coast and the other down the great central valleys of the State. These two highways are to be connected at the county seats; a splendid system. The commissioner told me that it had been found by experiment that a farmer can haul four times as much with the same team on a hard road as he can haul on a dirt road, and he can haul it any day in the year and any hour in the day, and he does not have to consult the weather bureau when he hitches his team. They are also building hard roads in Oregon. The road between Ashland and Medford has already reduced the cost of carrying freight between the two points 50 per cent. The railroads charge 16 cents per 100; the auto trucks haul for 8 cents and in addition have eliminated drayage charges at both ends of the line.

They are building hard roads in the State of Washington; the road between Seattle and Tacoma is near enough completion to enable auto buses to compete successfully with the steam railways and the electric lines.

I have made a calculation to see how much hard road could be built for five billions—the five hundred million increase would aggregate that sum in ten years. From information furnished by the Department of Agriculture I find that the average cost of a macadam road 16 feet wide and 6 inches thick is a little over \$6,000 a mile. That there may be no doubt about the estimate being sufficient let us arbitrarily raise it to \$8,333.33 1-3 per mile, which will enable us to make the computation in round numbers. If we count the distance from ocean to ocean at 3,000 miles, and the distance from north to south at 1,200 miles, we can with five billions of dollars build enough macadam road, three miles for \$25,000, to make 100 highways from the Atlantic to the Pacific, putting them twelve miles apart, and highways north and south twelve miles apart, so that when the five billions were spent the country would be gridironed with macadam roads twelve miles apart east and west, north and south, and no American citizen would then live more than six miles from a hard road that would take him anywhere in the United States.

If the jingoes insist that we are in danger of attack, let us propose that we get ready by building roads; it will greatly increase our defensive power if we are able to quickly mobilize our army and rapidly transport it to the point threatened. And there is an advantage about this kind of preparedness; if, after we have prepared ourselves, the war does not come, we shall be able to make good use of the preparation in the work of pro-

duction. If, however, we divert the money from useful channels and spend it all on battleships and arms and ammunition, we shall have wasted our money if the war does not come; and if it does come, the chances are that before it comes changes in methods of warfare will very much reduce the value of the preparation in which we have invested.

But as some may be more interested in having the volume of loanable money increased than in having good roads I present another calculation. The total capital and surplus of all the banks of the United States—national, State and private—aggregate a little less than four billions of dollars; with five billions we could duplicate every bank, double the loanable bank capital and surplus of the nation and have a billion dollars left with which to celebrate prosperity.

The taxpayers of the country will not be willing to bear the burdens necessary for the proposed preparation unless they are convinced that some nation is about to attack us. The jingoes understand this and they are, therefore, bearing false witness against other nations. They tell us to beware of Japan on the west, and if that does not frighten us they pick out some nation in Europe and accuse it of having designs against us; and if that does not frighten us they say: "Beware of the fate of Belgium!" How any normal mind can think of Belgium and the United States at the same time passes understanding. Belgium has seven millions and a half of people, while we have a hundred millions. Would not an ordinary mind, working smoothly and without excitement, be able to see the difference between seven and a half and a hundred? And there is a still greater difference. Belgium is separated from the countries roundabout by an imaginary boundary line, while we have the Pacific Ocean on one side and the Atlantic Ocean on the other. If any one is able to see the difference between an imaginary line and an ocean, let him learn what difficulty the nations have had in moving armies across narrow channels and then he will understand the protection of the Atlantic Ocean.

We cannot single out a nation and begin to prepare against it without cultivating unfriendliness toward that nation, and we can not make hatred a national policy for a generation without having our people anxious to fight as soon as they are ready to fight. If the nations at war had spent in the cultivation of friendship but a small percentage of the amount they have spent in stirring up hatred, there would be no war in Europe today. We should not transplant upon American soil this tree of hatred unless we are prepared to eat of the fruits of the tree, for it has been bearing its bloody fruit throughout the years.

The third reason which I ask you to consider is this. The preparedness which we are now asked to make is against nations which are not preparing to fight us. But suppose we get ready to fight them; will they not prepare against us? If they can scare us when they are not prepared, will we not scare them when we do prepare? And then will not their preparation compel us to prepare more, and will we not scare them again and they us again, and we them again, until bankruptcy overtakes us all? This is no new thing. The people who profit by furnishing preparedness have been playing the nations of Europe against each other for a generation. Every battleship that is built in one country is made the excuse for building more battleships in other countries. Let me illustrate the plan of the battleship builder. Suppose three farmers lived around a little lake and a battleship builder wanted to increase his business—how would he go at it? He would go to the first farmer and say: "You are helpless.

If your two neighbors were to combine against you, they could overcome you; your lack of preparedness is an invitation to them. Let me build you a battleship and anchor it here by your land. Then they will see that you are prepared and they will be afraid of you and peace will be preserved." He would then go to the second farmer and say: "Do you see that battleship over there? Do you know what that is for? That is for you. Are you willing to invite attack by being defenseless? Let me build you two battleships and then he will see that you are prepared and will be afraid of you and peace will be preserved." He would then go to the third farmer and say: "Either one of your neighbors is more than a match for you alone; together they can annihilate you. Your only safety lies in the building of three battleships. Then when they see you are ready they will be afraid of you and the peace of the lake will be preserved." By this time he would be able to go back to the first man and say: "Your little battleship is out of date. It is a provocation instead of a protection. Unless you are willing to build more ships you had better sink that one. It shows that you want to fight and everybody knows you can not fight. You must have four battleships of the latest pattern in order to prevent war by being prepared for it." And so on and so on. This is what they have been doing in Europe. Is it possible that they can entice us into this mad rivalry?

If we are urged to depart from the traditions of the past and to enter upon a new policy, there are two answers which can be made, either of them sufficient. First, if we ever intend to change our policy, the change must not be made while this war lasts. If we change now, it will be a confession that we have been wrong and that Europe has been right, and if we make this confession, we shall not only be powerless to assist the belligerent countries by a good example, but we shall, by imitation, encourage them in the course which has drawn them into this unprecedented conflict. If we are ever to change our policy, now of all times is not the time.

We must consider also our influence on Latin America. If we adopt this new policy and turn our energies from the arts of peace to preparation for war, will not our neighboring republics be urged to follow our example? Can we afford to take the responsibility of retarding their progress by encouraging them to divert their money from needed improvements, to expenditures which are not only unnecessary, but a menace to the friendly relations which now exist between them? There is no excuse for the present outburst of war spirit—it is not only without excuse, but contains infinite possibilities for harm.

Second, there never has been a time in fifty years when we were in less danger than now. No nation has any thought of waging war against us and our preparedness is increasing *relatively* more rapidly than ever before. If the warring nations keep on killing each other as they are killing each other now, burning up property as they are burning it up now, and mortgaging the future as they are mortgaging it now, they will not have left enough able-bodied men, enough money or enough credit to threaten a nation like this. No, there is no excuse for the attempt which is now being made to lash the country into a fright over possible wars. Let us do what we can to stop the war in Europe; humanity, as well as our own security, demands it. But if we can not stop the war there—if the dogs of war must fight—we should at least keep hydrophobia out of this country while the war lasts.

And now let us consider the way out or the road to permanent peace. And before making up the real way out let us for a moment look at some of the ways that do not lead out. Some talk of annihilation and argue that the war must go on until one side completely effaces the other. Annihilation is a big word and the annihilation of a nation a very difficult task. Long before they are in sight of annihilation they will be so sick of bloodshed that they will stop. There are already signs of sickness now. They have been striking in the coal mines on one side and in the gun factories on the other. On one side they have been protesting against threatened conscription and on the other against the doctrine of conquest. No, they will not carry the war to the point of annihilation, and if they did it would be a crime against civilization. If they do not know each other, we know them all, for their children have come among us and have helped to make this country what it is. We know that these belligerent nations have reached their present positions through struggles that have lasted for centuries and that each one has a priceless contribution to make to the future of the world. God might have made all the flowers of one color and with a single fragrance, but the world would not have been as attractive had He done so. And so God might have made all the nations with one history and a single language, but I believe that the world is better for their rivalries and their competitions; they together constitute one resplendent political bouquet.

Some think that if the war does not go on until annihilation takes place it must at least go on until one side is so completely triumphant that it can dictate the terms of peace, compel the acceptance of those terms, and thereafter maintain the peace of Europe by the sword. But when we consider the immense masses of men on either side this thought is almost as idle as the thought of annihilation, and it will not brighten the future if as result of this war one nation or group of nations emerges from the conflict master on land or sea.

If there is one lesson which history teaches more clearly than any other it is that nations which aspire to mere physical supremacy have no hope of immortality; the fact that they put their faith in force is proof that they have in them the seeds of death. The pathway of human progress is lined with the wrecks of empires which, when at the zenith of their power, thought themselves invincible.

What the world needs is not a despot to fix the terms upon which the rest shall live; its great need is that these nations shall be brought together in a spirit of friendship and fellowship that they may co-operate in working out the destiny of Europe. If this nation has any influence, that influence must be exerted to bring the warring nations together and not to encourage them in the false hope that a permanent peace can be built on force or fear.

All of the rulers of the nations at war tell us that they did not want the war and did not cause it, but none of them tell us how it can be brought to an end. Have not these neutral nations, all of whom bear burdens, though they are not to blame, a right to know what it is that, being done, peace may be restored? For what are the nations fighting—not in general terms but specifically? Is it territory that they want, then how much and where is it located? Is it blood that they demand, then how much more blood must be shed to avenge the blood already shed? If they will not answer the neutral nations, will they not make answer to their own people? The day will come when this accumulated sorrow will over-

flow—when this pent-up anguish will find a voice—and then, if not before, the rulers must answer that stern question which shakes thrones and fixes the farthestmost limits of arbitrary power: “Why do we die?”

Europe has had machinery for war, but not for peace. The nations of Europe could go to war in a minute, but they were not sufficiently supplied with machinery for the adjustment of difficulties that defied diplomatic settlement. And we can not be harsh in our criticism because, until recently, this nation was almost as poorly supplied as the European nations with the machinery for the preservation of peace. Until within three years our best treaties were those known as the “Arbitration Treaties” and they had two serious defects. First, they only ran five years and then died. And when one of these treaties died it had to be renewed by the same formalities required for its negotiation. It had to be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, which meant that though the President might desire to continue it and though a majority of the Senate might desire to continue it, the extension of its life could be prevented if a minority of the Senate, more than one-third, objected. But a still more serious defect was found in the fact that these treaties did not cover all questions—they excepted questions of honor, questions of independence, vital interests and interests of third parties, the very questions out of which wars are apt to grow. When a man is angry every question is a question of honor, every interest a vital interest. Man angry is a very different animal from man calm; when a man is angry he swaggers about and talks about what he *can* do, and he generally overestimates it. When he is calm he thinks about what he *ought* to do and listens to the voice of conscience.

We now have thirty treaties with nations representing three-fourths of the world and these treaties cure the defects of which I have spoken. In the first place, instead of dying at the end of five years they never die. They run on and on until twelve months after one side or the other has asked that they be discontinued. I believe that neither side will ever ask that these treaties be discontinued. I have such faith in these treaties that I believe that a thousand years from now the name of Woodrow Wilson and my name will be linked together in the capitals of the world and that these treaties will preserve the peace of our nation by furnishing machinery by which peace can be preserved with honor.

But what is more important than length of life, these treaties *contain no exceptions*; they cover *all* disputes of every kind and character. Each one of these thirty treaties provides that every dispute that defies diplomatic settlement, if not by some other treaty submitted for final settlement, must be submitted to an international commission for investigation and report. Each one of these thirty treaties also provides that the period of investigation may last a year, and each one of these treaties further provides that during the period of investigation neither side shall declare war or begin hostilities. Here are three provisions, new to treaty-making, which reduce war between us and the contracting parties to a remote possibility.

We do not contend that war is made impossible—I only wish it were possible to make war impossible. But in order to secure the investigation of all questions it was necessary to reserve to each nation the right of independent action at the conclusion of the investigation. If any one believes that war may sometimes be necessary, let him find consolation in the fact that every one of these treaties specifically reserves the right of our nation to go to war. If any desire war, all they have to do is to stir

the people up to fever heat and keep them there for a year; then if no other way out is found, the nation is at liberty to fight its way out. And I so much believe in the right of the people to have what they want that I admit the right of people to go to war if they really want it. But I feel as a North Carolina Congressman expressed himself, that if we are to have war it would be better for the people to vote it upon themselves than to have others vote it on them. If there is any question upon which there should be a referendum vote, it is the question of peace or war which may mean life or death to so many people. And if we have a referendum vote on war, it will only be fair that the women shall vote as well as the men, for women bear the larger portion of the burden in time of war. I believe that the women should vote on all questions, but if they vote on only one, it ought to be at an election which decides the issue between peace and war.

And I agree with the North Carolina Congressman on another matter. He suggests that it would insure deliberation on the part of the voters if the vote was taken with the understanding that those who voted for war would enlist first; and that those who voted against war should constitute a great reserve army which would not be called into service until after all those who voted for war had had a chance to show what they could do. I like the idea and I venture to add another suggestion. I am a journalist, among other things; whenever any one asks me what I am, my answer is, a journalist. I am proud of the profession, though not of all the members of it. If we have war, I shall insist in the name of the journalists of the country that the first battle line shall be made up of jingo editors that they may have the glory of dying before any one else is hurt.

These thirty treaties will, in my judgment, go far toward preserving peace and I believe that the principle ought to be applied to all nations: If the plan is good enough to offer to all nations—and the offer has never been withdrawn; if the plan is good enough to be entered into with nations representing one billion three hundred millions of people; if the plan is good enough to be endorsed in principle by Germany, Austria and Belgium, countries with which treaties of this kind have not yet been negotiated—it is good enough to be used with any country before we go to war with that country.

But I will go a step further; even if we use the treaty plan and it fails to secure a settlement—or if we fail to use it and reach a point where we must decide, either to go into this war or to postpone final settlement of the dispute until this war is over—if we must choose between these two alternatives, I believe it would be the part of wisdom to postpone final settlement until the war is over. First, because postponement would make war unnecessary, and that would be a sufficient reason for postponing it. We would have no difficulty in settling any dispute which we now have or which may arise during the war but for the fear of the effect of the settlement upon the war itself.

But even if a postponement did not prevent war, it would be better to have our war after this war is over than during this war, because it would then be our own war with the country with which we had our dispute and we could not only go into the war at pleasure, but come out at will. But this war is not our war—it is everybody's war—and if we go into it, we can not come out without consulting others, and others would determine also what we would fight for while we were in—and God forbid that we shall ever tie ourselves to the quarrels, rivalries and ambitions of the nations of Europe.

And now bear with me for a moment while I present three reasons why it is imperatively necessary that we shall not enter this war. I shall not present these reasons in the order of their importance, rather in inverse order. First, no one can tell what it would cost us in dollars to enter this war. It is not like any other war and therefore estimates based upon the past would be of little value. Let those who glibly talk of war give us a guess as to what it would cost to take part in this war and then give a warranty that their guess is high enough. Many predictions have been made in regard to this war, but so far none have been verified. Would it cost one billion? One of the jingo papers insisted a few weeks ago that Congress should be called together immediately to vote a credit of one billion dollars in anticipation of a possible war. It would be more likely to cost five billions or ten, but even if it cost ten billions that would not be the greatest objection to war. There are two other objections that are more important.

The second objection is based upon the possible loss of life. How many men would it cost us to take part in this war? A hundred thousand? They have already killed over two millions; one hundred thousand would hardly be enough for our quota in such a war. If we go into this war we can not go in in a stingy way or as a miserly nation. If it is manly to go in, it will be manly to play a man's part and be prodigal in blood and money.

The danger of war with Germany now seems to be passed and the country is relieved to have the American position in the submarine controversy accepted. But while there was a possibility of war—while the question was acute—some of our American papers were insisting that we ought to go to war with Germany at any cost. I do not believe that our people would be willing to send one hundred thousand brave Americans to death because a little more than a hundred took ships that they ought not to have taken into danger zones about which they fully understood. It is not that our people did not have a right to take those ships. Under international law they did have a right to sail on those ships, but great international questions can not be settled on naked legal rights. There are duties as well as rights. Let me illustrate. Every young man, when he becomes of age, has a legal right to leave his home and make a career for himself. He is not compelled to consider either the wishes or the needs of his parents. But, fortunately, most of our young men put their duty to their parents above their legal rights and inquire about the welfare of the old folks before they leave home.

And so every American citizen has duties as well as rights. Do you say that it is the duty of this government to take its army and follow an American citizen around the world and protect his rights? That is only one side of the proposition. The obligations of citizenship are reciprocal. It is the duty of the citizen to consider his country's safety and the welfare of his fellowmen. In time of war the government can take the son from his widowed mother and compel him to give his life to help his country out of war. If, in time of war, the government can compel its citizens to die in order to bring the war to an end, the government can, in time of peace, say to its citizens that they shall not, by taking unnecessary risks, drag their country into war and compel this sacrifice of their countrymen.

In time of riot a mayor has authority to keep the people of his town off of the streets until order is restored. Has not the government of a nation like ours as much authority as the mayor of a city? When the world is

in riot our government has, I believe, a right to say to its citizens: "You shall not embarrass the government in dealing with this question. You shall not add to your nation's perils. You must keep out of the danger zone until your government restores order and compels respect for the rights of American citizens." But suppose it cost us not one hundred thousand men but half a million or a million. That is not the greatest objection to the war.

Great as is the first objection, based on the possible cost in money, and greater still as is the second objection, based upon the possible cost in blood, there is a still greater objection; viz., that we can not become a belligerent and at the same time remain neutral.

We stand at the head of the neutral nations; the world looks to us to act as mediator when the time for mediation comes. If, for any reason, no matter what that reason may be, we enter this war, we must step down from our high position and turn over to some other nation an opportunity such as never came to any nation before and may never come again!

Then, too, we are the next of kin to all the nations now at war; they are blood of our blood and bone of our bone. Not a soldier boy falls on any battlefield over yonder but the wail of sorrow in his home finds an echo at some American fireside, and these nations have a right to expect that we will remain the friend of all, and be in position to play the part of a friend when a friend can aid.

Some nation must lift the world out of the black night of war into the light of that day when an enduring peace can be built on love and brotherhood, and I crave that honor for this nation. More glorious than any page of history that has yet been written will be the page that records our claim to the promise made to the peacemakers.

This is the day for which the ages have been waiting. For nineteen hundred years the gospel of the Prince of Peace has been making its majestic march around the world, and during these centuries the philosophy of the Sermon on the Mount has become more and more the rule of daily life. It only remains to lift that code of morals from the level of the individual and make it real in the law of nations, and ours is the nation best prepared to set the example. We are less hampered by precedent than other nations and therefore more free to act. I appreciate the value of precedent—what higher tribute can I pay it than to say that it is as universal as the law of gravitation and as necessary to stability? And yet the law of gravitation controls only inanimate nature—everything that lives is in constant combat with the law of gravitation. The tiniest insect that creeps upon the ground wins a victory over it every time it moves; even the slender blade of grass sings a song of triumph over this universal law as it lifts itself up toward the sun. So every step in human progress breaks the law of precedent. Precedent lives in the past—it relies on memory, because a thing never was, precedent declares that it can never be. Progress walks by faith and dares to try the things that ought to be.

This, too, in the leading Christian nation. We give more money every year to carry the gospel to those who live under other flags than any other nation now living or that has lived. The two reasons combine to fix the eyes of the world upon us as the one nation which is at liberty to lead the way from the blood-stained methods of the past out into the larger and better day.

We must not disappoint the hopes which our ideals and achievements have excited. If I know the heart of the American people they are not

willing that this supreme opportunity shall pass by unimproved. No, the metropolitan press is not the voice of the nation; you can no more measure the sentiment of the peace-loving masses by the froth of the jingo press than you can measure the ocean's depths by the foam upon its waves.

THE NATION'S PREPAREDNESS

BY

Hon. CLAUDE KITCHIN

(House Leader)

Statement given to Press of North Carolina, November 20, 1915.

Mr. Editor:

The *Seven Seas Magazine*, the organ of the Navy League (the organization which has created, by deception and misrepresentation, the apparently big sentiment for the militarism and navalism now proposed, and which seems to have stampeded many patriotic and usually level-headed people), declared in its October issue that I had the right "to vote for or against" the preparedness measure, but that I had "neither the right nor should he (I) be allowed even to discuss it in the House," etc. I trust, however, that the press of my State, though most of it differ widely with me, will not refuse the privilege which I ask, to express through it to the people some of the reasons for my position and give *some of the facts* with respect to the question which has been withheld from, or certainly not given to the public. I ask this privilege, with confidence that it will be granted, especially in view of the fact that many of the State papers have severely criticized me, some going to the extent of bitterly denouncing me. I have no criticism to make of the press and the people in the State who differ with me. Having heard only one side, and owing to the tons of literature of deception and misrepresentation on the subject being poured out daily to the people by the metropolitan press and magazines—many, perhaps, innocently—and by the so-called "Patriotic Societies," of which the Navy League is the head, it is but natural that a large majority of the people should oppose my position. With your permission, I shall now proceed to give some of the facts and reasons which impel me to oppose the big military and naval programme which will be proposed to Congress.

1. AS TO THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF OUR NAVY.

All the talk and writings by the press and the so-called "Patriotic Societies" about our "utter helplessness," our "dangerous unpreparedness," our "defenseless condition," our "growing weakness," our "having fallen to the third or fourth grade of inferiority in naval strength," etc., is pure tommy-rot, *based not on a single fact*.

Let it be first understood that in the "Preparedness" programme the Navy of Great Britain is eliminated. This was so testified by the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Fletcher, and other naval experts, and even by Hobson, in the hearings before the Naval Committee at the last session of Congress, all declaring that we do not need or desire a navy as strong as hers. Notwithstanding the metropolitan press, magazine writers and the "Patriotic Societies" and our Navy Year-Book (which was exposed in the last Congress, and will be so exposed in the next, as unreliable and misleading), *the fact is*, that we have built and building *the strongest and most powerful navy in the world*, except that of Great Britain (which is eliminated as above stated). *Our navy is stronger than that of Germany, far superior to that of France, more than twice as strong as that of Japan or of any of the other nations.* Admiral Fletcher, the highest active officer in the navy, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, the man who will have to do the fighting if any is to be done (whose judgment on naval subjects the Secretary of the Navy, before the Naval Committee, declared he had sooner take than that of any man in the world), expressly declared, at the naval hearings during the last session of Congress, that we had a navy, "*superior to that of Germany or any other nation, except Great Britain.*" In answer to the question, "If in a war with Germany, could our navy successfully resist that of Germany?" he answered, "Yes." Captain Winterhalter, another naval expert, testified: "*Judge Witherspoon has proved that our navy is superior to that of Germany and I agree with him.*" Admiral Badger, ex-Commander of the Atlantic Fleet (a member of the General Board of the Navy), declared that no one had ever heard him say that "Germany had a superior navy to ours."

The facts of record, the tests laid down by naval experts here and abroad, and the naval authorities of the world (all of which I have before me as I write) confirm the truth of this testimony.

The armored fleet of Germany, consisting of battleships, dreadnaughts and predreadnaughts, armored cruisers and battle cruisers (built and building) in number is fifty-two (to say nothing of the vessels lost since January 1, 1915). The fleet of the United States, of the same vessels, is in number fifty-six, with over 40,000 more tonnage. (Number and tonnage, however, are not the criterion of superiority.) Of twenty of Germany's battleships listed by our Navy Year-Book, sixteen are not able to go more than 1000 miles from base to engage in naval warfare. Not one of the sixteen carries coal enough to go from Hamburg or Bremen to within five hundred miles of New York and return (to say nothing about being employed in a naval engagement). The Oregon, which some of our naval experts say is obsolete, and not listed by our Navy Year-Book (the Indiana and Massachusetts not listed also), in every characteristic of a fighting ship (bigger guns, heavier armor, stronger ship) is far superior to *any one of the twenty German battleships listed by our Year-Book*. Four of the German ships listed by our Year-Book as dreadnaughts are in reality not dreadnaughts, and are shown by one of the highest naval authorities in the world (*Jane's Fighting Ships*) to be *defective, unsuccessful ships*, and so known to be by every student of naval affairs. The last five dreadnaughts authorized by Congress are superior to any six dreadnaughts Germany has, built or building. Our ships are better, larger, stronger and more heavily armored. Our guns are larger, stronger and more effective. Of the big guns of the ships, twelve inches and over, we have 284, while Germany has only 194 (built and building).

If the navy of Great Britain is to be eliminated in the "Preparedness" programme, which our naval experts say it should be, and if we have a navy now *superior to that of Germany or any other nation in the world*, except Great Britain, *for whom or against whom do we propose to prepare* by the fabulous increase of our naval appropriations which the proposed programme requires?

We are prepared.

Instead of "our navy growing weaker," as the metropolitan press, the "Patriotic Societies" and the jingoes and war traffickers would have the people believe, it is *growing bigger, stronger, more efficient and better equipped every year*. In the two years of Wilson's administration the naval building programme authorized is *twice as large and costly as the last two years of Taft's administration and larger and more costly by \$8,000,000 than the entire four years of Roosevelt's last term, and practically as large and costly as the entire four years of Taft's administration*. There is today *over 50 per cent more construction going on for our navy than on the 1st day of March, 1913, or at any other time in the history of our country*. We have nearly 100 per cent more torpedoes, mines, mine layers, powder and other munitions than we had on the 1st day of March, 1913, and steadily increasing them. We have under Mr. Wilson's and Mr. Daniel's administration, *for the first time in years, the full complement of enlisted men authorized by law*.

We are preparing.

In view of the foregoing facts, was not President Wilson right when he said in his message to Congress, December, 1914, in opposing the programme of the Hobsons and Gardners: "*Let there be no misconception. The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national defense.*"

2. AS TO THE ENORMITY OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAMME— WHAT IT IS:

The heretofore large and growing expenditures for our Navy had aroused the people of the country into asking, "Where shall it end?" Secretary Daniels, in his report to the last session of Congress, December, 1914, said (and he was but substantially repeating what had been said in the British Parliament, the German Reichstag, the French Assembly, and by prominent statesmen the world over relative to the armament expenditures of their respective countries for the last several years): "The naval appropriations in our own country *have doubled in a dozen years* and have gone up by leaps and bounds in other countries. *If this mad rivalry in construction goes on the burden will become too heavy for any nation to bear.*" In his report of December, 1913, he says: "The growing cost of dreadnaughts, of powder and of everything that makes an efficient navy gives reason to pause. *The heavy expense commands national and international consideration*. Ten years ago our largest battleships cost \$5,288,000. The next dreadnaught will cost \$14,044,000." (The dreadnaughts hereafter to be authorized will cost from \$18,000,000 to \$20,000,000, and in an interview the Secretary says all ship materials and munitions of war have gone up over 30 per cent.) He asks, "When is this *accelerating expenditure to be reduced?* . . . If it is not hastened by appeals for the peaceful settlement of national differences, the day is not far distant when the *growing burdens of taxation for excessive war and naval expenditures will call a halt.*"

Now, in the face of the deplorable truth recited by the Secretary; in the face of the fact that we have a Navy superior to that of Germany or any other nation, except that of Great Britain; in the face of the fact that our navy is growing larger, stronger and better equipped than ever before; in the face of the fact, as the President declared both in his message to Congress December last and in his recent Manhattan Club speech, "*We are threatened from no quarter*," the proposed "Preparedness" programme at one bound—one year—increases our already immensely large naval appropriations more than our total increase for the last fourteen years; more than the increase by Germany the whole fifteen years preceding the European war, and more than the combined increase of all the nations in the world in any one year in their history (in times of peace)!

The five-year programme increases our naval appropriation over forty times more than the increase by Germany in five years preceding the European war; and \$200,000,000 more than the combined increase of all the nations in the world for the five years preceding the European war; and over \$50,000,000 more than the combined increase of all the nations in the world for the whole period of ten years immediately preceding the European war!!

Add to this the fact that prior to the beginning of the European war we were expending annually on our navy from \$20,000,000 to \$30,000,000 more than Germany or any other nation (except Great Britain) was expending on its navy.

For the ten years preceding the European war we had expended on our Navy over \$300,000,000 more than Germany or any other nation (except Great Britain) had expended on its navy! And yet the metropolitan press, the magazine writers, the "Patriotic Societies" and the jingoes and war traffickers would frighten the country into the belief that we have a little, puny, eggshell of a navy!

The five-year naval programme calls for an increase of \$500,000,000—\$100,000,000 increase a year—which, including the inevitable incidental expenses for expanding the whole naval establishment in order to accommodate the programme, will reach \$600,000,000 or over by the time the five years expire!! This is all *extra*—in addition to the large appropriations we have been annually making.

The army four-year programme demands \$450,000,000 increase, over \$100,000,000 a year *extra*, being an increase of more than 100 per cent. over our annual Army appropriations! All *extra* appropriation, be it remembered. *Extra taxes must be paid by the people, be it remembered!*

Before leaving the subject of the enormity of the proposed programme, I desire to make a further observation:

At the expiration of the five-year period for the programme this country will then be expending on its Navy and Army more than any nation in the world in times of peace ever expended on its Army and Navy; more than England, with her navalism, more than Russia or Germany, with their huge militarism. At the beginning of the European war Germany was expending for past wars and preparations for wars (on its army and Navy) 55 per cent. of the total amount of revenues collected, Japan 45 per cent., Great Britain 37 per cent., France 35 per cent., the United States over 60 per cent. With the proposed military and naval programme enacted into law the United States will be expending over 70 per cent. of its total revenues—that is, out of every \$100.00 collected from the people over \$70.00 will go into militarism and navalism, including pensions, leav-

ing less than \$30.00 for all other functions of our government and for all other benefits of the people.

3. AS TO THE CONDITION OF OUR TREASURY AND ITS REVENUES AND EXTRA TAXATION REQUIRED.

The condition of our treasury and our revenue and the necessities of the government are less able now to permit increased appropriations than ever before. The treasury has felt most heavily the burden of the present war. Our general surplus fund of over \$150,000,000 is monthly disappearing; our deficits are annual and monthly; our revenues have diminished; we have strained the nerves of the government to get sufficient revenue to meet its ordinary expenses; we have been forced to levy an emergency tax; our deficits still exist; our revenues still insufficient. After the expiration of the present emergency tax December 31, 1915, we will be faced with deficits for the coming year of at least \$117,000,000. This is upon the assumption that not a dollar of increased appropriation will be made for any purpose over the last year's appropriation (yet I understand that there will be from \$30,000,000 to \$40,000,000 increase asked other than the Army and Navy increase). This \$117,000,000 deficit is upon the further assumption that Congress will repeal the sugar free list provision of the Underwood Act, which goes into effect May 1st, 1915 (which itself will impose \$100,000,000 burden upon the people). For this programme of militarism and navalism—euphoniously called by its advocates "national defense" or "preparedness" programme—\$200,000,000 annual increase of taxation is required. This, added to the deficit above mentioned, makes \$317,000,000 additional annual taxation (even with the free sugar clause repealed), which must be raised, on the assumption, too, there will not be a dollar increase in any other appropriation over that of last year. This is *three times larger annual increase than was ever required or raised* (and practically all of it must be raised by direct or excise taxes) than at any time in the history of our government; except during the Civil War. No man in the Administration or in the Ways and Means Committee, although for months they have wearied their wits over it, has yet been able to solve even the beginning of the problem of raising this enormous increase of revenue. I have had hundreds of suggestions as to how to raise it. All the suggestions combined would not begin to raise the amount. Every suggestion has been, however, to raise the tax on the other fellow and on the other fellow's business or product and not on his. When the Ways and Means Committee begins to attempt to frame measures for raising the revenue and especially when the people begin to pay the taxes for this enormous increase, they will then, perhaps, realize what the programme means. I have had experience enough with taxation to know that those who are howling most loudly now for the big Army and Navy programme will protest and howl most wildly against any measure which may be attempted or proposed for increase of taxes.

4. THE BIG, OVERREACHING OBJECTION TO THE PROGRAMME.

The huge burden, heretofore unheard of or undreamed of, which this fabulous increase of appropriations for the Army and Navy will place upon the taxpayers can, and will have to be borne, in spite of their murmurs and protests, which will surely come in the future. This of itself to me

is a cruel wrong, especially under the conditions and situation of our country and our Navy, as I have above outlined.

But the big, overreaching objection to this stupendous programme is that this sudden, radical and revolutionary move for big war preparation on our part is going to shock the civilized world, and whatever be the outcome of the present war, will alarm the world again into an armed camp. It will postpone for generations the day of universal peace for which all Christendom has been praying. It will deprive this government, through its President, of the greatest opportunity to serve mankind that ever came to nation or to man, in the final negotiation of peace terms among the belligerents, to lay the basis of perpetual international peace.

The militarists and war traffickers of every nation in the world will point to our conduct as an example and a cause why big war preparations and big armaments should be renewed on a larger scale than ever before, and its consummation will only be limited by the ability of the nations appealed to. If we take this step every nation will suspect—in fact, every nation will feel convinced, and no argument of our government can dissipate such conviction—that our country in this tremendous step has other designs than mere self-defense. Every nation will absolutely know that no such step or measure is necessary. The world will be convinced, in spite of our protestations, that we are preparing, as the *Seven Seas Magazine*, the organ of the Navy League, advocated in its last issue (November) for *Wars of conquest*. This organ of this so-called patriotic society in its same issue boldly broadcasts throughout our country the savage, barbarous sentiment which I quote: “There should be *no doubt that even with all possible moral refinements it is the absolute right of a nation to live to its fullest intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means, such as armed conquest. Such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right and in the case of the United States it is a particular duty.*” This organ of the Navy League, the organization, as I said before, which has, by organized effort, created the sentiment of our people for a big militarism and navalism, is but giving the people of this country and of the world an earnest of what we are to expect when this programme is enacted into law.

The world, even among the belligerents of the present war, is already looking with grave suspicion and alarm upon this colossal step. Since writing the above, in confirmation of it, the morning papers bring to us the speech of Lord Rosebery, made at the London University on the night of November the 16th, from which I quote: “I know nothing more disheartening than the announcement recently made that the United States—the one great country left in the world free from the hideous, bloody burden of war—is about to *embark upon the building of a huge armada. It means that the burden will continue upon the other nations, and be increased exactly in proportion to the fleet of the United States.* I confess that it is a disheartening prospect that the United States, so remote from European conflict, should voluntarily in these days take up the burden, which, after this war, will be found to have broken, or almost broken, our backs.”

5. AS TO THE FEARS OF OUR PEOPLE.

In the hope of allaying to some extent the alarmed state of mind and the fears of our people, provoked by the European war, and aggravated and intensified by the organized efforts of the so-called “Patriotic Societies”

and the war traffickers, I desire to make a few observations. With the experience of the present war, which we are daily observing, even if our fleet were not half as big as it is (and I have shown that it is superior to that of any other nation in the world, except that of Great Britain), it would be impossible, notwithstanding the jingoes and the war traffickers and the press, for Germany or any other country to ever bombard or land a soldier on our coast, provided we were equipped with mines and submarines. With these we are most rapidly equipping ourselves. England has a navy two and one-half times as strong as that of Germany. England and France have a fleet more than three times as strong as that of Germany. Take a map and you will see that the German seacoast on the North Sea is practically at the head of the English Channel, within less than 300 miles of London, and has several miles of seacoast along the Baltic. The bulk of the English and French fleet is now, and has been, within less than a day's run of the German coast. If England could bombard or land on the coast of Germany, on the North Sea or on the Baltic Sea, the war would end in sixty days. Germany would have to withdraw from France to protect her own soil. Why does not the fleet of the Allies, nearly four times as strong, go in and destroy the little fleet of Germany, bombard her seacoast at once, land an army, etc.? Certainly not because of a little German fleet already bottled up, one-fourth as large, but *because of mines and submarines*. Now, look at the map again and see how the Russian coast and the German coast compare and how they adjoin along the Baltic Sea; Germany has control of the Baltic, even against the fleet of the Allies. Germany has a fleet four times as large as that of Russia. What keeps Germany away from the Russian coast? Why doesn't Germany, with a fleet four times as strong, destroy the Russian fleet, bombard her seaport towns and land an army? If she could do this, the war would end in sixty days.

Russia would be forced to a separate peace in spite of her agreement with the Allies. Certainly it is not the little one-fourth size fleet she has, but *because of mines and submarines*. If Germany, with her fleet not one-third as strong as that of the Allies, does not fear the bombardment of her coast or the landing of an army by the Allies, when within less than 200 miles, and if Russia, with her little fleet one-fourth as large as that of Germany, is not afraid of Germany bombarding her coast and landing an army on her shores, why in the name of common sense should any man, woman or child in the United States fear that Germany or any other nation can ever get within gun reach of our shores or land an army on our coast, when they are over 3,000 miles away, provided we are equipped with mines and submarines? Add one thing further, that, in spite of the press, the "Patriotic Societies" and the jingoes and war traffickers, our coast defenses are superior to that of any nation in the world. President Taft, in his speech in Chicago, November 10th, before the National Security League, said: "American coast defenses are as good as any in the world." At the hearings in the last session of Congress (this year) General Erasmus M. Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery, whose duty it is, he said, to "be advised as to the character and sufficiency of our seacoast armament," stated: "My information is that our system of fortification is *reasonably adequate for all defensive purposes, which they are likely to be called upon to meet*"; and further said, "*I have been a close student of the whole subject naturally for a number of years and I know of no fortifications in the world, as far as my reading, observation and knowledge goes, that*

compare favorably in efficiency with ours." General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, considered one of the greatest experts in the country on fortifications and guns, at the hearings, considering the alterations then asked for and now being made, said, "In my opinion these guns with the other advantages which our land defense fortifications have, *will be adequate for maintaining a successful combat with vessels of war armed with any gun which is now under construction anywhere in the world to my knowledge.*"

6. AS TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MYSELF.

We thoroughly understand each other. I know that he is convinced deeply and sincerely that his programme is right. He knows that I am thoroughly convinced that it is wrong. He knows, too, that my convictions on the subject are deep and sincere and that I have given the subject mature study and thought and have reasons for my position. I had a most cordial and pleasant interview with him for an hour and a half on November the 8th. On this question we simply agreed to disagree, both expressing regrets (and, I am sure, sincere regrets) that I could not support the programme. My inability to agree with him and my opposition to his programme do not interfere with the pleasant, cordial relations that exist between us. As he said in his Manhattan speech, and assured me, as well as others, this question is *not a party question but one for the thought and conviction of each individual*. The President knows, too, that in all matters before my Committee, and especially in raising sufficient revenue to finance all appropriations and in every effort he shall make to redeem the pledges our party made to the people, he shall have my hearty and earnest co-operation.

I fear that neither the President nor the Secretary of the Navy, with their other manifold duties, have possibly had the time to give the detailed study and thought to the subject which many of us have. I recall that the President in his letter of July 21st to the Secretary of the Navy (which, by the way, I had not seen until some time after my letter in September to the *New York World*), asked for advice of naval experts, saying: "I want their advice, a programme by them formulated in the most definite terms." I cannot help believing that the military and naval experts have badly advised and misinformed both the President and the Secretary of the Navy. Naval officers or experts are not competent judges of the policy which this country should pursue. Their very training of thought and their ambition are to see only one function of the government—that of the Navy. They know what will gratify their ambition. They know what they want. From the time a man enters Annapolis, as long as he lives, his ambition is to command battleships, the magnificent floating sea palaces, and battleship fleets. This consumes his thought. It is natural, therefore, and inevitable that he should consider the needs of the country in accordance with his wants and ambition. The naval expert knows how to build or superintend the building of ships and how to fight them when built. That is his thought, his profession, his ambition. Since the General Navy Board was established in 1903, every President and every Secretary of the Navy, except one, has recognized these propensities and limitations of the naval officers or naval experts, and every President since 1903, since the Naval Board's first recommendations, and every Secretary, except one, until now, have rejected and declined to accept their recommendations, and no Congress has ever yet approved them. Mr.

Roosevelt did not accept them. Only one of his Secretaries, Mr. Metcalf, did. Neither did Mr. Taft, nor his Secretary of the Navy, accept their recommendations at any time during his four years' term. Both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Secretary Daniels in 1913 declined to accept their recommendations. They declined again to accept their expert opinions in 1914, five months after the European war had begun. They both opposed their recommendations and so did Admiral Fletcher, the highest active officer in the Navy, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet. But now the papers denounce me as an "idiot," as a "traitor to my country; to my party and to the Administration" if I do not swallow at one gulp the recommendations of the naval experts, because the President and his Secretary of the Navy, for the first time, accept them.

7. THE REGULAR, ORDERLY, NORMAL PROGRAMME:

At the last session of Congress (this year), the President, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Fletcher, and other naval commanders, and the Democrats in Congress opposed the programme of the Hobsons, Gardners and other jingoes (much smaller than the present proposed programme). The policy of the Administration was summed up before the Naval Committee in the words of the Secretary of the Navy: "*It would be most unwise for us to act to-day in any particular as we would not have acted if there was no war. My theory is that our country ought to be carrying on its regular orderly, normal programme as to the Navy. With our policies and our American ideas I think the policy recommended in my report and adopted by the last session of Congress (and recommended at this session) is the steady development that is needed. It meets the needs of the country.*" The Democrats supported that policy. It was enacted into law. This same policy, as I have heretofore shown, is *making our Navy bigger, stronger and more efficient than ever before—the strongest in the world*, except that of Great Britain.

It is my undoubting conviction, that it is most *unwise and dangerous* at this time, especially under the present circumstances, to abandon that policy and adopt the big, enormous, revolutionary programme proposed.

8. WHY MY OPPOSITION TO THE PROGRAMME AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND NOT AS MAJORITY LEADER.

It is not a party or partisan question. The President so declares. Everybody knows it is not. It is one for each individual member to decide as to his vote for himself. The majority members of the Ways and Means Committee, in the first instance, make up the committee assignments of the House. I am Chairman of the Committee, which carries with it the position of Majority Leader. I shall not use such positions in influencing in any way any member on the question. Those who oppose my position and those who indorse it will be treated alike as to their assignments to committees and as to all other matters which I, as such Chairman and leader, and the members of the House, individually or collectively, are concerned.

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In conclusion: To differ with the President, to differ with my friends, in and out of Congress, in the heat of the moment to be severely criticized, and sometimes denounced by them, gives me not only exceeding regret, but much pain and distress. However, after having given the subject much study and thought, being one on the Naval Affairs Committee, and inter-

ested for years in naval subjects, I cannot support the programme. In deciding on this course I knew full well that a part of the penalty which I would have to undergo would be the criticism, the ridicule, the denunciation, the misrepresentation and the libeling of myself by the press from one end of the country to the other. Having the approval of my judgment and conscience, after mature study and thought, and impelled by a sense of duty, I take the step, mattering not the consequences, political or otherwise, to myself.

CLAUDE KITCHIN.

November 20, 1915.

The following is, in its entirety, the famous HENRY FORD ADVERTISEMENT, printed in many of the leading papers in the United States on the 23rd day of February, 1916:

CONCERNING "PREPAREDNESS"

TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

The United States, I believe, is confronted by the greatest danger in its history. It is not an external danger. As the President said in New York on January 27: "Nobody seriously supposes that the United States need fear an invasion of its own territory."

Our danger is internal. We are confronted by the danger of militarism.

The very burden that caused thousands of men of all races to come to the United States in search of a haven of peace, to escape the toils of militaristic government, now is being preached throughout the land by men, by newspapers, by magazines, moving pictures and, in fact, every medium of intelligence.

Conscription, the base of militarism, is advocated openly.

And it is all done under the guise of patriotism. The flag is flaunted before the eyes of the people and we are told that our "national honor" is at stake.

The flaunting was started by an organization of men known as the Navy League. It has been taken up by really patriotic men, fearful of the danger which this league first discovered. Other of these organizations started up and made their cry the danger of invasion and the need of preparing for it. The Secretary of the Navy and the other officials were made the objects of attack because they, knowing the true conditions, refused to become hysterical.

Congressman Clyde H. Tavenner delivered in the House two remarkable speeches—"The World Wide War Trust," and "The Navy League Unmasked"—giving startling revelations of an organized body of war traffickers who promote war and preparations for war—"preparedness."

He charged that the Navy League, which inspired and financed largely the present agitation for "preparation," was founded by a group made up largely of war traffickers. He also charged that among the most active members and officers of the League today are men who not only will profit from "preparedness," but who actually hold a monopoly on the

materials for war which the Government must purchase—that these war-trafficking men are in agreement with war munitioners of Europe, barring the possibility of the United States Government purchasing supplies of war at any price but that fixed by the war-traffickers of the United States. Mr. Tavenner's charges never have been refuted.

The very men who pile up the armament of all nations,—and it is true that the same firm will often arm both sides in a conflict—will find an enemy for any country they arm. And they will arm that enemy, too, for the profits on arms are great, and the industry is a monopoly.

This state of affairs has been brought right home to Americans in the past few years in Mexico, where we have seen the same arms manufacturers arming every side. And the President, by raising the embargo on arms, certainly did nothing for the peace of the world.

We ought to realize that it is the people who not only pay the bills of these munitions makers, but pay the penalty also in the death and misery the use of these arms must bring.

Do we need preparedness?

The President himself, in his speeches made recently in the middle west, could find no fear of invasion, and his inconsistencies were pointed out even by the most ardent editorial advocates of the "preparedness" plan. In December, 1914, the President, in his message to Congress, said: "Let there be no misconception. The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national defense."

Since that time the President said he had changed his mind. No personal vacillation, however, can change the facts, and in spite of rumors and suggestions of fear there have been no material facts placed before the people of the country to show that the President had any military reason for his change of mind.

The people should think for themselves and demand to know the facts.

Whatever the standing of the country's safety, this much is due the people; they should be allowed to share the secret terrorizing dispatches the President declared in his recent tour he received almost hourly. The nation is great enough and the people strong enough to bear the worst, to know what threatens them.

Not only that, but it is the right of the people to demand of their President the causes for his alarm. And if that alarm is not genuine, they have a right to know why it was uttered by the head of the nation.

The people of the United States are patriotic. But it is time for all to realize that patriotism does not consist merely of dying for one's country. I believe that patriotism consists more in living for the benefit of the whole world, of giving others a chance to live for themselves, their country and the world. A man is naturally patriotic, and to cry patriotism at him as is now being done throughout the country is more of an insult than a compliment.

I believe, too, that many more men have died because of ambition, avarice and insincerity than ever died in a just cause. I have dedicated my life's work to the education of men on this subject, with the hope that if war comes again men will know before they march against the machine guns whether they are marching for a just cause or for ambition, avarice and insincerity.

It is a regrettable fact that many of the mediums of education in the United States have been swayed to the cry for big armament. Not

only is this true, but it is equally true that these same organs have bred racial hatred by the printing of incendiary news stories and articles, preaching fear of one of the European belligerents, giving prominence to rumors of unneutral acts of violence, and paying slight regard to official denials of the same.

These organs tell us that one of the warring factions in Europe is bleeding to crush militarism, yet in the same pages the assumption of this beginning of militarism is declared to be the solemn duty of the United States.

For a hundred years, with Europe fully armed and strong we have been safe. Now, with Europe locked in a deadly embrace and bleeding to death, we are called upon to fear its invasion of our shores.

The following from the *New York Times* of February 9, printed prominently by the *Times*, but not conspicuously treated by the great majority of city newspapers, gives some idea of the facts:

"Washington, February 8—Testimony that pleased the pacifist element in the House was furnished to the Committees on Military and Naval Affairs to-day by General Nelson A. Miles, U. S. A., retired, and Rear Admiral Victor Blue, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. General Miles said he did not fear an invasion of the United States and that an invading enemy could quickly be driven from the country. Admiral Blue declared the navy now was ready to meet any enemy it might be called upon to encounter in the Pacific."

And, remember, aside from the fact that we are able to do this, there remains still the greater fact that nothing more than generalities regarding the possibility of any attack have been advanced in justification of the attempt to work up an artificial hysteria as a preliminary to inoculation with the rabies of war.

Those who have opposed this militaristic scheme have been characterized as cowards, poltroons and unpatriotic. They are less cowardly than the most ardent militarist, because it is fear that is inspiring those who are not looking for the profits. And this fear is a fear without foundation in reason. Is it unpatriotic to wish for world peace instead of a universal war over commercial rights of a few men or to uphold an unpopular government?

The sooner the government of the world gets down to a business basis the better off the world will be. I cannot conceive how any business man in the United States, after viewing the result of military preparation in Europe, realizing the geographical situation of the United States, and considering the result of the Dardanelles operations, could so allow his fears to be played upon by military bargainers as to approve the plan to make this nation an armed camp. There have been fine words about "preparedness" and "militarism" being totally different, but Europe knows to-day that the only difference is in spelling.

Congressman Kitchin, who has risked his leadership of the Democrats in the House to oppose the "preparedness" measure, calls attention to the fact that the United States has been spending of late years a greater part of its revenue for military equipment than has any other nation in the world. With the billions that would be spent under the proposed extravagant programme, the taxpayers would be giving nearly 70 per cent. of what they contribute to government revenue for the support of an army and navy.

Would any man, preparing to fight a fire in his shops, store those

same shops with tons of inflammables? Yet that is what "preparedness" does. And then, of course, must come the inevitable.

What is the share of the man who pays for all this?

It is the burden of supporting the vast machine until some few men lose their heads and touch the spark to the ready-built kindling-pile. Then he must give his life, or come home a cripple. For those who remain at the end of the sad folly there is high taxes and crepe on the door.

Men sitting around a table, not men dying in a trench, finally settle the differences, anyhow.

If one hundredth of one per cent. of all that has been spent on this kind of "preparedness" had been used to do away with national and international differences built up by a diplomacy originating in the Dark Ages, war would have ceased long ago.

Every man must admit that the method is foolish. And even the old time "glory" of war is dead, the victim of science. Then why continue?

Why not begin now to build a machinery of reason to do the work that the machinery of force has not accomplished? That is the great duty facing those who govern.

In all the maze of argument for "preparedness" the facts are few. But even its most ardent advocates call attention to the coincidence that this is a Presidential election year.

If the cause lies in this fact, and I can hardly believe it, because I am not very well versed in political tricks, it is time for the voters to remind their Congressmen and any other candidates who may seek their favor that the people will not spend their money to arm for invading ghosts conjured up by the President or any other man, be he a real patriot or a munitions-patriot.

Let the President and others who are preaching this doctrine of fear point out the enemy, let them prove the enemy comes upon us, and every American is willing to lay down his fortune and his life at the feet of the President, as Americans have done before.

But the same Americans, a hard-headed business people, will not lay down a nickel if they become convinced that they are paying merely for an election or a re-election to the White House under the guise of defense of home and fireside. And these Americans have a very disconcerting way of showing their practical impatience with fairy tales.

I strongly urge every American who is interested in this subject that should interest all, to write to Hon. Clyde H. Tavenner, House of Representative Office Building, Washington, D. C., for the speeches revealing the motives at the bottom of the "preparedness" agitation.

I strongly urge every man and woman who desires that this country should remain at peace to write a protest against the extravagant programme now in Congress, to write to his Congressman, to the two United States Senators from his State, and to the President of the United States. A sentence or two will do. But make your meaning plain.

Remember, too, that the men now in Congress who have come out strongly against the project need encouragement from home. They face generally a solid wall of ridicule or silence in the press of the cities, and human nature finds it hard to bear up before such a constant hammering, even though the object of the attacks feels that the pressure rings not of sincerity. If you feel that the country's safety is being jeopardized by

political manipulation, then make your protest a political one, so that it will strike the deeper.

I am having this statement printed in the advertising columns of newspapers and magazines throughout the United States. Others will follow. I have no other purpose than to save America from bloodshed and its young men from conscription. I feel that if this militaristic burden is assumed by the country, the United States within 10 years will be in turmoil, its industries paralyzed, and its men, instead of being at work in peaceful industry, will be dying in trenches. And I feel, too, that these men will not be dying to defend their country, as we are now being told, but will perish in the conquest of other men who have a right to live in happiness and peace.

HENRY FORD.
February 22, 1916.

The following is, in its entirety, an address delivered by DR. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER at the meeting to organize a League for the Limitation of Armaments, held at the Railroad Club, New York, December 18, 1914, as published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

THE PREPAREDNESS OF AMERICA

By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

This movement is in the view of all of us an American movement. It is a truly patriotic movement and one wholly devoid of any interest in or relation to partisan politics. The opportunity that to-day confronts the people of the United States and the decisions that are soon to be made by them—indeed the decisions that are now being made in the hearts and minds of the people—are of graver significance and more far-reaching importance than any that have preceded them in a full half century.

We must not permit ourselves to be placed in the position of opposing the fullest possible inquiry by the agents of the people of the United States into their public affairs and into every detail of their public business. For one, I should welcome a properly conducted inquiry into the military and naval expenditures made by the government of the United States in recent years, because I believe that the first result of such inquiry would be to show that under better administrative conditions and under more businesslike management, we should have gotten much more for the money spent—or, to put it in another way, we should have gotten what we need for less money. Such an inquiry is something quite apart from an agitation for greatly increased military and naval expenditures and from the vigorous exploitation of our nation's so-called lack of preparedness for war.

Moreover, we all recognize that it is the constitutional duty of the government of the United States to be in possession of such force as will enable it to suppress domestic insurrection, to enforce the laws and to protect the States from invasion. That duty is placed upon the government of the United States by the constitution. The experience of one hundred years proves with reasonable completeness that we know how to

do all these things and that we have been able to do them without embarking upon a policy of competitive armament building.

The situation that now confronts us is one in which we are invited not to maintain the traditional American policy but to depart from it. And we are asked to depart from it in the face of the most impressive and emphatic lesson that history records that the traditional American policy has been right.

The great war in Europe has produced two kinds of reaction here in the United States. It has produced in one set of minds the reaction of imitation; it has produced in another set of minds the reaction of avoidance. We stand with those who experience the reaction of avoidance.

When we are told in terms of most vivid eloquence that we must be prepared for war, I ask "For what war and for war with whom?" Are we to be prepared for war with the Dominion of Canada, our neighbor to the north? If so, how shall we set about better protecting the long, invisible line that separates the Dominion from the territory of the United States, extending over more than three thousand five hundred miles, than we have been doing for one hundred years? We have protected it so thoroughly that a century of peace has marked the relations of the two peoples on either side of this undefended line. How better can we protect our valuable commerce on the Great Lakes than by adhering with rigid insistence to the terms of the Rush-Bagot agreement, now nearly one hundred years old, by which we limited ourselves to an armed force on the lakes of two small and long since antiquated gunboats?

But if we are not to be prepared for war with Canada, are we to be prepared for war with Europe? If so, with what nation in Europe, and why are we to prepare just now? There would have been some theoretical force five years ago in the argument that we should be prepared to defend ourselves against invasion from across the sea; but to-day, when our friends in every land are bleeding to death before our eyes, when the nations of Europe are exhausting their manhood, impoverishing their resources, destroying their commerce and their trade, bankrupting their treasuries and using up the raw materials of armaments in the construction of the completed instrumentalities of death—why, when the nations of Europe are about to be reduced to helplessness through exhaustion and starvation should we arm ourselves against any one of them? Who is this invisible, this unknown, this unheralded enemy against whose attack we are to prepare ourselves at such great expense? As practical men and women dealing with facts and facing the realities of politics and of life we ask our militaristic friends for a bill of particulars. Are we to arm to the teeth and draw our resources away from that needed social and industrial improvement which thrusts problems upon us on every hand in order to expend them upon useless armaments against nobody?

And whose suspicions are we to arouse? When the whole world is looking to us and when the wise men of every nation are saying to America, "You at least are free from the curse of militarism, you at least are in a position to exercise moral suasion and moral leadership," shall we at such a moment climb down from that high position of consequence in order to prepare ourselves to take part in the terrible turmoil of physical conflict and public murder? I say, no.

We are concerned then not merely with a declaration of high principle and of motive and purpose, but we are concerned with the serious business of the education of public opinion. We must direct ourselves

to the persuasive, constant and persistent instruction of the public mind, to the end that it may see that the realities of this situation are with the lovers of peace and of international amity and that the imaginary and theoretical aspects of it are with those who desire us to prepare for an unknown war.

In a famous book, Mr. Herbert Spencer traced the history of civilization from a period of militaristic to a later period of industrial organization and life. He indicated just what had happened in the world as mankind made this progress and he pointed out in what ways men had advanced and how they had acquired wealth, intelligence, comfort and manifold privileges by shedding the old clothes of militarism and putting on the garments which belong to a life of free and competitive industry. We do not wish to go backward; we do not wish to turn back the hands on the clock of progress and return this nation of ours to the earlier and cruder militaristic stage of civilization. We wish rather to pass on into a new and third stage which opens before us as we speak.

As Mr. Spencer traced the progress of civilization from militarism to industry, so to-day we can almost see the progress of civilization from industrialism to the stage of a new and higher morality, to a new and higher conception of international conduct and to an enforcement by reason and morality of those high standards of judgment and action that mark the civilized man in every country in the world.

For a contest to gain the position of leadership in that movement, this nation is prepared. For such a struggle America is armed. By confining our army and navy—sufficient, competent and well furnished—to the proper limits of their activity in a democracy, we shall then keep ourselves free to build that great structure of wisdom, justice, amity and peace on which the continuance and advancement of civilization absolutely depend.

Therefore, I do not conceive of this gathering in terms of protest; I conceive of it rather in terms of an offering of constructive leadership in a great forward movement. We will not permit ourselves to be weighted down with the discarded armor of the Middle Ages, the only proper place for which is in the museums of battered Europe. We wish to be set free. We wish our children to be free. We wish our minds, our labor and our activity to be free. We wish our nation to be free to continue to build a great and beautiful temple of freedom to which the wise and good of every nation will continue to repair, and toward which the nations of stricken Europe will turn for the friendly hand of helpfulness when the sun sets on those Continental fields of carnage yonder.

The following is, in its entirety:

A MEMORIAL TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS OF PENNSYLVANIA, NEW JERSEY, DELAWARE AND PARTS OF MARYLAND:—

In view of the present agitation and propaganda for a large increase in the military and naval strength of our country, the Society of Friends, through its Representative Body, respectfully presents to you the following memorial:

From its inception this Society has believed that all war is unrighteous, and that military service is contrary to the teaching and the life of Christ; that it is the duty of nations as it is of individuals to practice Christianity by basing their actions on justice, good will and love, which alone can heal the social and economic diseases of mankind. In maintaining this faith many Friends in the past have suffered imprisonment, loss of property, sickness and death, and, we believe, many to-day would not shrink from similar sacrifice if it were required. It is not, therefore, a lack of courage, or an easy security that prompts our appeal, but rather a patriotism that includes the welfare of all the nations of mankind, and an abiding faith in the ultimate victory of human brotherhood. We are willing to sacrifice more than war would call for in the interests of peace.

Basing our plea on this broad Christian ground, we would briefly state some other considerations against committing our country to a policy of military expansion.

1. Advocates of "preparedness" urge national defense as the only justification for their programme. Aggressive warfare by the United States is inconceivable, unless the temper of the people is changed by the existence of greater armaments.

It is our conviction that:—

(a) We are already defended geographically by two oceans, by an unfortified northern boundary of three thousand miles that has proved a sure guarantee of peace for a century, and by a southern frontier where self-restraint and magnanimous patience have maintained peace in the face of extreme provocation.

(b) The citizens of the United States are a composite people of many racial strains. We are connected so intimately by ties of blood and sympathy with all the nations of the old world that public opinion would make a war with any of the great powers practically impossible. These international bonds are a pledge of continued friendship and good will.

(c) The terrible war now in progress is exhausting the strength of the combatants. The inconceivable wreckage and waste of life, treasure, industry, commerce and intellectual and moral force are reducing all the great European powers to a condition from which they cannot soon recover. This is a fact and not a supposition. Japan, the only other power mentioned as a possible antagonist, has shown a consistent desire to maintain friendly relations with our country, and is already heavily burdened by taxes and an overwhelming war debt.

2. A policy of military expansion on a grand scale will commit the United States to militarism.

True democracy and militarism are contradictory. The one must destroy the other.

It is almost impossible to arrest a militaristic policy when once it is launched. Fear is added to fear, false ideals flourish, international friendship changes to suspicion, special interests warp the public mind.

The true greatness of the United States in international affairs has not rested upon naval and military force, but upon candor, and good will, a high sense of national honor and fundamental justice.

3. The great war is abundant proof that great armaments are not a protection against attack. In the hands of a militaristic administration

they may be a fertile cause of war. They are a constant menace on the one hand and an invitation to aggression on the other. They fill the popular imagination, so that if differences arise between nations the people cry out for war, and thus force becomes the basis of settlement rather than justice and equity.

The genius of the United States has been for arbitration and the judicial settlement of international disputes.

These are a few of many reasons against committing the United States to a military policy at this time of popular unrest.

We believe it is a grave moment in the history of our country, and we appeal to you who bear the heavy burden of responsibility, to meet the crisis in the spirit of Christian patriotism. Your action in this Congress may bind the shackles of the old world militarism upon our continent, or free it for true world leadership in the cause of enduring liberty based on justice, brotherhood and peace.

The destinies of the other American Republics are intimately connected with those of the United States. They are anxiously awaiting your action. A military policy adopted by the United States will create suspicion among them, and they will begin to arm against us. Thus fear will beget fear, and suspicion, suspicion.

Instead, therefore, of acting at once and hastily on the question of "preparedness" against dangers probably imaginary, and certainly remote in time, we strongly urge upon this Administration, and upon the Congress now assembled, the calling at once by the United States of a great conference of all the American Republics for solemn council that may guarantee perpetual peace and community of interest in this hemisphere.

William Penn, the Founder of Pennsylvania, conceived a "Plan for the Peace of Europe." If it had been fairly tried, great armies and navies would have disappeared long ago and the present war would have been impossible. We citizens of the Commonwealth where Penn tried his "Holy Experiment," and believers in his religious faith, urge upon you at this time as an act of the truest and noblest patriotism, consideration of a Plan for the Peace of America. A League of American Republics united for co-operation, mutual progress and reciprocity in trade and commerce, and in the things of the mind and the spirit would forever safeguard the peace of this Western Hemisphere, and challenge Europe to imitate the American example. Men of faith and vision agree that this will be a reality in the future. Will there ever be a better opportunity than to-day?

Signed on behalf and by direction of the Representative Meeting.

WILLIAM B. HARVEY, Clerk.

Twelfth Month 10, 1915.

304 Arch Street, Philadelphia.

The following paragraphs are:

Extracts from THE CAUSE OF THE WAR, by CHARLES EDWARD JEFFERSON, Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City.

Published by Thomas Y. Crowell Company, December, 1914.

... "The war is the result of a false philosophy of national life, a philosophy which maintains that the foundation of all power is physical force, and that greatness is to be computed in terms of brute

strength. It is a barbaric philosophy which has been driven from one field to another because of the havoc it wrought, and we now see its operations in a realm in which it is working its ruin on a scale vast and appalling. Out of this philosophy there develops a policy—the policy of armed peace, the policy which bases peace on the fear which is inspired by deadly weapons. The policy was long tried in the realm of individual life. Men went daily armed to the teeth, to protect themselves against one another. The practice led to interminable brawls, and feuds, and duels, until at last it was given up. Only rowdies now carry knives and guns. The policy was then adopted by cities. Cities preserved the peace by arming themselves. Every city had its wall, its moat, its drawbridges. Its armed forces were always held in leash ready for either defense or attack. The history of those days is a disgusting record of deadly rivalries, rapine, and slaughter. The policy was at last banished from the realm of interurban life. Cities situated within narrow limits bound themselves together into leagues, and numerous small states took their place on the European map. These provinces adopted, however, the policy of armed peace, and the result was constant jealousies and bickerings and frequent bloody collisions. The little states grew sick at last of the exhausting strife, and rolled themselves into great states, which became known as world powers. But the old policy of armed peace, which the common sense of men had banished from the realm of individual, and interurban, and interprovincial life, was retained in the realm of international life. Men knew that little states could not wisely adopt it, but they supposed that large states could. They banished it from the administration of little powers, and retained it in the scheme of the great powers. The result is a great war. The war has come out of a false policy, and the false policy came out of a false philosophy. We are to seek, then, the cause of the present horror in the realm of ideas. It is sometimes asserted that it does not make any difference what you believe. The fact is that everything depends on what you believe. When men believe the truth, it is well with the world. When they believe error, darkness falls on the lands.

Let us look a moment at this philosophy. The modern name of it is militarism. Militarism has a creed with three articles. Article one asserts that war is a good thing. It has brought many blessings in the past. It will bring many more in the future. It is indispensable for national well-being. Without war, the virile virtues gradually decay, and the moral fiber of nations rots. This is the plain teaching of all modern militarists from von Moltke to von Bernhardt. Article second is a necessary deduction from the first. Since war is good and indispensable, and sure to come, because it lies in the structure of the great world plan, therefore the supreme duty of a nation is to be ready for it. Equip yourselves with all the necessary apparatus. You must lay in an enormous stock of guns and ammunition. You must have the latest weapons. Old weapons are valueless. You must buy the costliest of them, for only these are effective when the day of battle comes. No matter what the cost is, the nation must submit to it, even if it is compelled to mortgage the resources of generations yet unborn. But weapons are of no value unless men know how to use them. These modern instruments of blood are complicated, and they require a deal of practice. Therefore great masses of men must spend their life in drilling. They must practice constantly war games on the sea, and on the land, and in the air, for "Preparedness" is the one golden motto of a nation. The third article of the creed is that army and naval

officials constitute a superior caste. They are the anointed custodians of the nation's honor, the divine guardians of the nation's treasures, the saviors of the nation's life. Therefore they are the safest counselors of diplomats, and the wisest advisers of presidents and kings. The whole doctrine is tersely put by a rear-admiral in our navy in an article published by him shortly before the opening of this war. The gist of his argument is as follows: The influence of an ambassador of any nation depends on the number and size of the guns behind him. It is by means of guns that a nation exerts pressure on its neighbors. This brings the naval officer into the realm of international diplomacy. He must stand by the side of the civil diplomat and assist him in his work. Indeed, he is the better man of the two, because of his superior training and his longer term of office, and, therefore, the officers of the United States Navy are the only body of men on whom our republic can continuously and safely rely. This is a very frank and modest statement of a militarist who is sure of the divine mission of the navy. Not all officers in our army and navy are militarists. Many of them, however, are, and the creed which they hold is the creed held by militarists the world over: War is good, be ready, and leave the direction of international business to us!

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Militarism, wherever you find it, is cocky, arrogant and brutal. It is everywhere and always the deadly and implacable enemy of mankind.

One of its fundamental principles is, "Strike first, and strike hard." That is the law of all militarists, and that, you observe, is the law of the jungle, it is the creed of the tiger. The tiger always leaps with the swiftness of lightning. Its victim must be crushed in the first attack. Militarism goes back to the jungle for its models. If you are settling disputes by reason, you can take time to consider and sift and weigh; if you are settling disputes by guns, you must be quick as a tiger. There is no time for reason. One of the most appalling features of the opening of the war was the lack of time to consider. Of the one hundred and fifty-nine telegrams and notes in the English White Papers, the one of greatest pathos is that of Sir Edward Gray to Sir Edward Goschen on August 1, "I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained." Time was the one thing essential, and, alas, there was no time to be gotten. The cavalymen were all on their horses, and in an instant they were over the border. You have seen horses dash out of the engine-house when the fire alarm struck. With just such swiftness dashed the armies of Europe into the arena of war. We are ready! That was the shout that went from mouth to mouth around the whole circle of nations. For forty years they had been preparing, standing each one in shining armor, and when the crisis came, there was no possibility of delay. For a generation the genius and the wealth of the nations had been expended on the apparatus of war. They had all prepared for war, and it came. It came easily. It came in spite of the efforts of the diplomats to hold it off. The machinery of peace had secured but scant attention, and it broke down under the strain of the fateful hour. The messengers of peace were just a little late all the way round the circle because the horses of war were on a gallop. One cannot read the White Papers of the various countries without being impressed by the fact that none of the ambassadors wanted this war. They were dragged into it because all the nations were lashed tight to their guns. When once the great masses of steel began to move, their momentum was irresistible. From that instant

Europe began to be ground to powder by the armaments she had created for preserving peace.

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Militarism is the absolute negation of Christianity. The one exhibits a mailed fist, the other shows you a hand that is pierced. The one carries a big stick, the other carries the cross on which the Prince of Glory died. The one declares that might makes right, the other affirms that right makes might. The one says that the foundation of all things is force, the other says that the foundation of all things is love. Militarism is materialism in its deadliest manifestation. It is atheism in its most brutal and blatant incarnation. It is the enemy of God and man. It must be overthrown. Every nation which becomes its devotee is doomed. Militaristic nations are broken to pieces like potter's vessels. So did the Almighty break Ninevah and Babylon, Persia, and Greece, and Rome, and so, unless they repent, will He break in fragments the so-called great powers of Europe. He will, if necessary, convert the capitals of our modern world into dust heaps like those of Thebes and Memphis, and begin the world anew. He will overturn and overturn, until he whose right it is, shall reign. He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit is saying to the churches—and to the nations!

The following is an EDITORIAL in its entirety by HAMILTON HOLT published in *THE INDEPENDENT* of October 18, 1915:

SHOULDER ARMS!

Henry A. Wise Wood is alarmed. As President of the American Society of Aeronautical Engineers he attended the other day one of the "war luncheons" being held every week at the Technology Club of this city, and there made a few remarks. According to the papers Mr. Wood is said to have said:

"Records in Washington show that a certain European nation could land in the United States within forty-eight days 750,000 men, with 250,000 horses and munitions sufficient for a three months' campaign, with half the transports available before the present war. . . . Furthermore similar records show that a nation on the Pacific could land 350,000 troops on the Pacific Coast within sixty-one days with half its transports."

Though it may show a culpable disregard for our national safety, we must defer for the present consideration of the "certain European nation." Whichever it may be, it has sufficient troubles of its own at this moment and we can assume it will not attack us during the next few weeks, certainly not before Congress meets and increases taxes three or four fold so as to relieve our "criminal unpreparedness."

But how about that "nation on the Pacific"? Can it possibly be Japan? If so, we should worry.

Just think how easy it would be for the little yellow men to seize the Pacific Coast, proceed up over the mountain passes of the Sierras and Rockies and thence overrun the corn belt of the Middle West. Indeed, once in the Mississippi Valley there would be no stopping them until the

pie belt of New England and the fried chicken belt of "our beloved Southland" were completely occupied.

In the first place the astute Japanese statesmen, having reversed their historic policy of maintaining friendly relations with the United States, would have to consider how 60,000,000 people could invade territory occupied by 100,000,000 people, 5,000 miles away. Having resolved that this was easy enough, they would then proceed to mobilize their present army of 250,000 and increase it sufficiently so that 350,000 troops could be spared to cross the seas. Of course they would have to increase the army much more than 350,000 in order to have at home enough to protect the Empire in case the United States sailed around the back way and attacked them in the rear.

But before the Japanese armada could attack America, the United States Navy would have to be sunk, for as Napoleon proved long ago, no overseas invasion can take place as long as the enemies' fleet is afloat. But as no fleet can operate 4,000 miles from its base at more than fifty per cent. of its strength, if Admiral Vreeland of our navy is to be believed, Japan, whose navy is now much inferior to ours, could hardly concentrate a fleet a third the strength of the American on the Pacific Coast.

But we know the Japanese are wonderful fighters, so we will assume that they have sunk our entire fleet. Then all they would have to do would be to clear the seas of our submarines and mines. The fact that England, with the greatest navy in the world, has not yet dared attempt to land an expedition on the German or Belgian coast, or Germany upon the English coast, is no proof that the abler yellow-skinned men would not succeed.

It will now be perfectly safe for the armada to set sail and be at our shores in the sixty-one days specified. The fact that some of these days have been consumed in waiting for the American fleet to be destroyed need give no concern. We know there are some four fast liners that go from Yokohama to San Francisco in three weeks. No doubt the 1,000 slower, smaller transports that would be needed could be readily put in commission and convoyed over without mishap within the "sixty-one days." All the armada would then have to do would be to disembark its troops, demolish the fortified coast defenses and take the several lines of trenches that had been thrown up from Lower California to Puget Sound.

We all know how easily the coast defenses can be taken—at the Dardanelles, for instance—and how easily trenches have been captured in the present war, as the men on the firing lines universally attest. No doubt the Japanese would seize our entrenchments with but few casualties. And to make certainty doubly certain, they would unquestionably bring with them sufficient 42 centimeter guns and ammunition, so that they would not be caught napping as the Russians have been. Despite the poverty of Japan and the enormous taxes owing to the Russo-Japanese War, she would find no difficulty in sending over enough ammunition so as to use up a million dollars' worth a day, as is frequently done before a charge by the Germans.

Having, then, with their considerably smaller navy, sunk our fleet, eluded our submarines and mines, and with their army taken our trenches and driven our regular army and militia back over the Rockies, the Japanese would not find it very difficult to dispose of our "contemptible little

army" of 1,000,000 volunteers, that would have been drilling night and day in the meantime.

And thus, in the shake of a lamb's tail, the subjugation of the United States would be complete. Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood deserves the thanks of the republic for his warning. To arms, Americans, to arms!

THE PROS AND CONS OF PREPAREDNESS

The Literary Digest of February 26, 1916, contained the following topics and suggestions for the discussion of national defense, both affirmative and negative, and I quote same here in its entirety, inclusive of introductory captions:

OUTLINE FOR DEBATE

Preparedness is the subject of political discussion and the topic of conversation everywhere, and it will continue to fill the public mind for many months to come. One of the most effective ways of getting a clear view of all the ramifications of a subject is to "brief" it. We believe the following debate, prepared by an expert, will interest our great body of subscribers, and will prove valuable to the vast army of pupils who are studying *The Literary Digest* as a text in their classrooms. The general plan of this outline is in harmony with the policy of *The Digest* to give both sides of great questions without expressing any editorial opinion of its own.

BRIEF FOR DISCUSSION ON PREPAREDNESS

AFFIRMATIVE

I. PREPAREDNESS IS NECESSARY.

(A) War is probable.

- (1) We are now having serious trouble with England over trade and ocean rights.
 - (a) American-owned vessels have been seized by Great Britain.
- (2) We are on the verge of a diplomatic break with Germany and Austria.
 - (a) These countries will not abandon their submarine warfare.
 - (b) We have aroused their enmity by exporting war munitions to the Allies.
- (3) We have set ourselves up as the guardians of international law.
 - (a) *Ancona*, *Lusitania* and *Persia* cases.
- (4) We are usurping the trade of nations that are now engaged in a world-war over the question of trade.
- (5) We must be prepared to defend the Monroe Doctrine against:

- (a) European nations.
 - (i) Germany and other countries have large trade interests in South America.
- (b) Japan.
 - (i) The Magdalena Bay incident.
 - (ii) The enormous settlements in California and South America.
- (6) We are having serious trouble with Mexico, which may lead to intervention.
- (7) The guardianship of the Panama Canal may prove a source of danger.
- (B) We are at present not properly protected.
 - (1) Our Navy is inadequate.
 - (a) It is not large enough to protect our enormous coast-line.
 - (i) Report of Naval Board, 1903.
 - (ii) Admiral Fletcher's report, 1916.
 - (iii) Testimony of naval experts before Naval Committee, printed in Representative Gardner's Manual.
 - (b) The guardianship of the Panama Canal necessitates an increased Navy.
 - (c) Our ships are not equipped with sufficient men.
 - (i) Testimony of Admiral Badger before Naval Committee, printed in Representative Gardner's Manual.
 - (2) Our coast defenses are inadequate.
 - (a) Our fort guns are smaller than those on foreign war-ships.
 - (i) Our biggest guns are but 12-inch guns, while modern dreadnoughts carry 16-inch guns.
 - (b) Our fortifications are not provided with sufficient ammunition.
 - (i) Testimony of General Weaver, printed in Representative Gardner's Manual.
 - (c) We have not a sufficient number of coast forts.
 - (i) Report of Admiral Fletcher, 1916.
 - (3) Our Army is inadequate.
 - (a) Our Army is too small for the territory it has to protect.
 - (i) Report of War Department, 1916.
 - (b) We have no efficient Army reserve force.
 - (i) Report of War College, December, 1915.
 - (c) Our Army is not properly equipped.
 - (i) Reports of Generals Wood and Wotherspoon, printed in Representative Gardner's Manual.

II. PREPAREDNESS IS PRACTICABLE.

- (A) The country is almost a unit in its demands for increased armaments.
 - (1) Both Democrats and Republicans in favor.
- (B) Our resources are unlimited.

(C) Any plan that Congress may adopt can be put into successful operation.

(1) Six plans have already been proposed:

- (a) The Wilson plan.
- (b) The War College plan.
- (c) The plan of Senator Chamberlain.
- (d) The Roosevelt plan.
- (e) The Regular Army plan.
- (f) The National Guard plan.

III. PREPAREDNESS IS DESIRABLE.

(A) It will insure peace.

(1) Our strength will be a warning to our enemies.

(B) It will promote prosperity.

(1) Our commerce will be protected on the seas.

(C) It will cause peace proposals of the United States to meet with the respect of European nations.

(1) These nations will realize that we make peace proposals because we are sincere and not because we are inefficient.

NEGATIVE

I. PREPAREDNESS IS UNNECESSARY.

(A) War is improbable.

(1) There is no reason for war.

(a) All our differences can be settled by diplomacy.

(i) *Hocking* case.

(b) Pan-Americanism will insure a universal respect for the Monroe Doctrine.

(2) We have no entangling alliances.

(3) The strongest nations of the world are bankrupt.

(a) The foremost nations of the world are compelled to borrow from the United States.

(4) Attack is improbable.

(a) The United States is geographically isolated from the rest of the world.

(b) An enemy's ships would find it impossible to secure supplies so far from their base.

(B) Our present armaments are sufficient for our needs.

(1) We have a Navy strong enough to meet the best fleet an enemy could send to our shores.

(a) Testimony of Admiral Blue before Naval Committee, February 8, 1916.

(2) Our Army is adequate for our needs.

(a) Mexico, Philippine Islands.

(3) Our coast defenses are adequate.

(a) We are at present fortifying points that hitherto were unfortified.

(i) Rockaway.

(b) We are building 16-in guns for use in our forts.

(c) The present war has shown the impossibility of capturing coast forts.

(i) The Dardanelles.

- (d) Testimony of General Miles before Senate Committee, February 8, 1916.
- (4) We are able to manufacture more war munitions than any great enemy could transport.
- (a) We are exporting a tremendous supply to the Allies.

II. PREPAREDNESS IS IMPRACTICABLE.

- (A) The cost would be enormous and would impose a needless burden of taxation upon the people of the United States.
 - (1) We already spend more for defense than any other country.
 - (a) Comparison of budgets.
- (B) The sentiment of the people is against any plan of enforced preparedness.
- (C) We would be unable to procure men to give up their occupations for military training where there is no clearly defined need.
- (D) No proper mode of providing the money necessary for preparedness has yet been proposed.
- (E) All the plans for military and naval increase are faulty.

III. PREPAREDNESS IS UNDESIRABLE.

- (A) It would cause us to lose an excellent opportunity for securing universal peace.
 - (1) If the United States should increase its armaments and then make proposals to other nations to disarm, it would cause these nations to suspect our motives.
- (B) It would antagonize other nations and start an enormous building contest.
 - (1) Other nations would be compelled to increase their armaments to preserve a balance of power.
- (C) The money necessary to provide further preparedness could be used in better projects.
 - (1) It could be used to establish a permanent world peace.
- (D) It would provoke war.
 - (1) Other nations would fear that this sudden increase in our military and naval strength would prove detrimental to them, and they would attack us before we got too strong.
- (E) Industrial progress is better than military preparedness.
- (F) It would result in militarism.

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Extracts from Argument of the REV. WM. CARTER, D.D., Pastor Throop Avenue Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., in public debate with the Rev. Washington Gladden, D.D., of Columbus, Ohio, at the Broadway Tabernacle, Fifty-sixth Street and Broadway, New York City, February 8, 1916.

THE NECESSITY OF PREPAREDNESS

War is the world's great anachronism. From the cradle of savagery to the crowning of mind and manhood it has always been an anachronism, for each day marks progress and every evening is better than the morning as man reaches out into higher and to nobler things. Soldiers and statesmen even, who are said by some to make of war a business, by no means love it but long with all the rest of the world for its final abolition. Sherman's laconic saying: "War is Hell," has become historic. Grant had the same hatred for it and Chinese Gordon prayed daily, even in the midst of his campaigns, that its power might be forever broken. Lord Brougham characterized it as "the greatest of human crimes including indeed all others," Charles Sumner spoke of it as "unjust, un-Christian, monstrous," while Warburton called it "the blackest mischief ever breathed from Hell, its demons marching with every army and bivouacking in every camp."

It is not hard then to prove that War is an anachronism and always has been, but in proving it we are admitting that it is an entity, a fact that must be faced and reckoned with in all the affairs of life.

"The time is out of joint: O cursed spite
 That ever I was born to set it right."

That is the hard thing for us who maintain the argument for Preparedness. We know the time is out of joint. We think that our Pacifist

friends were born to set it right just as much as we are, but if they will not do it then we will have to do it ourselves, and by vicarious labor, taking their burdens upon our own shoulders. Men may cry "Peace! Peace! but there is no Peace." War is a monstrous, horrid, bloody fact, and however distasteful the task it is something to which we all must set ourselves if we would hasten its abolishment. (Applause.)

* * * * *

It is not merely the men, however, who have caused Pacifism to fail, it is also their method which is "the dream of the dreamer who dreams that he's been dreaming,"—the method of moral suasion. It is a beautiful theory, it is hard indeed to say anything against it, as everyone would rather speak in favor of it and see it succeed, but the hard, cold facts of history and experience show us that it has failed and failed miserably.

Man is naturally a reasoning being, he likes sentiment, but he likes it in the right place. If a mad dog attacks him and he has a club, he will not sentimentalize with the dog and say "Nice Doggie! Good Doggie! Doggie mustn't bite!" but he will promptly club the dog, and if the dogs about him are particularly inclined to be vicious he will see to it that he always has a club at hand, for even vicious dogs are particularly nice to a man who carries a club and brandishes it occasionally. If you say: "O, Doctor, that isn't a very nice illustration to apply to human beings!" I would remind you of the woman who once said: "The more I see of men the more I like dogs!" and that I am fully within my rights in using such an illustration when you remember Shakespeare's reference to "the dogs of war," and that I am speaking now of war and not of the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals! But to be eminently fair, let me apply the illustration to human beings and say that if a man breaks into your house you do not sentimentalize with him over the moral wrong of his kleptomaniacal proclivities as he tries to brain you, but you promptly use the Muldoon treatment, if you have had adequate preparation, biff him in the solar plexus and "end it all with a bare"—knock out, if you possibly can! (Great applause.)

Now in this world of ours we have to deal with dogs in human as well as animal form, and as St. Paul said, "Beware of dogs!" it is well for us to heed the Apostle's warning and be adequately prepared! Sentimentalism will not do here. We are dealing with the primitive passions of man which are "earthly, sensual, devilish," and that can be controlled only by force and by a wholesome respect for law that is backed by force. Therefore this other group of Pacifists of which I have spoken, in the hopeless minority as far as the house of the Pacifists is concerned, but backed by the great majority in this practical reasoning world of ours,—believes that adequate preparation will bring in the blessings and the victories of Peace much sooner and more permanently than the mawkish sentimentalism that has been so long employed. At any rate, isn't it fair, gentlemen, to at least try it, since the other has proved so disastrous a failure? (Applause.)

Whenever Preparedness is mentioned there rises, of course, that Banquo ghost of Prussian Militarism that will not down, but the ghost fearers make no distinction between Preparedness *for* War and Preparedness *against* War. "No nation," says the Pacifist, and I am quoting, "can speak softly, which carries a big stick." As well say that a father cannot speak softly to his child, for he carries the "big stick" of authority and discipline, as he is told to by the Lord, and is told not to spare it

when necessary lest the child be spoiled. As well say that the Lord cannot speak softly to His children because He carries the rod of authority and says: "If ye will not for all this hearken unto me then I will punish you seven times more for your sins. And I will break the pride of your power and I will make your Heaven as iron and your earth as brass." (Lev. 26: 18-19.) "Big Stick!" "Big Stick!" It seems to me that the Pacifist had better "talk softly" when he talks about the big stick, lest men again laugh him out of court! (Great applause.)

The Pacifist says, and again I quote: "They say that Preparedness will avert War, but Germany was prepared, France was prepared, Belgium was prepared, England was prepared, and yet there was War!" Here again the arrogance and vaulting ambition of the Pacifist has o'erleaped itself, for he knows, unless he is a fool, that though England was prepared as to her *navy*, she was *not prepared* as to her *army*, and had she been, he knows there would have been no war.

For years Lord Roberts, that grand old man of England's military history, had been begging Parliament to increase her army. He had definitely said he was afraid of German aggression. He warned them with prophetic utterance that war would be inevitable unless they increased their army to something like the power of Germany's forces, but all to no avail. The country laughed at him, and I confess that I was one who felt that he was unduly anxious, that in his old age he was having obsessions and hallucinations, but "little Bobs" before he died had the melancholy duty thrust upon him of standing amid the blood and sickening welter of the crushed and mangled bodies of England's bravest sons, "somewhere in France," who had paid the *penalty of unpreparedness*! If England's army had been as well prepared upon the land as her navy was upon the sea there is not a man with an atom of sense but what realizes this awful war would never have been. (Great applause.)

Again, however, the Pacifist rises to remark: "They say that big armies are necessary just as life insurance, but the insurance is never paid!" Isn't it? Ask France if she paid it in 1870! Ask Germany if she isn't using the insurance money collected then for the prosecution of her newer plans in this great war! Ask Belgium if she didn't pay when Germany levied upon Brussels, Antwerp and other large cities that still had gold within their coffers! Ask Germany again how many millions insurance she drew out of bleeding Belgium, not in blood and tears but in good, hard cash, and then "go way back and sit down" when you say the insurance is never paid! (Applause.)

Once more from the tombs a doleful voice as the Pacifist cries: "The man is abroad asking the question, 'Do you believe in a police force?' The answer of the Pacifist is 'yes.'" Then if you do, Mr. Pacifist, you have yielded the whole question of Peace through preparation against War, for that is all that this nation wants today, an adequate police force, not to wage war, but to keep the peace. But the Pacifist cries: "A police force does not exist to fight another police force. New York does not pit her police force against the police force of Boston." No, but she would if the police force of Boston came to New York to try to turn our police force out! There would be a nice little fight on, then you may be sure, and "owld Oireland" would give a good account of herself in her so-long ununsurped place in New York City's Government! "Nor does the New York State Militia," and again I quote, "pit itself against that of Con-

necticut or New Jersey!" No, but she would very quickly if Connecticut or New Jersey rose in rebellion as did the Southern States against the Northern ones in 1861. Your arguments are as empty as a belfry, Mr. Pacifist, save for the bats, and they always roost in vacant places! You are hoist on your own petard! (Laughter and applause.)

But still further says our Pacifist: "We must free ourselves from the wizardry of military and naval experts. They are the last men in the world to act as safe counsellors of nations." Well, if that is so, we ministers must step down from our pulpits and let people who know nothing about preaching preach. The business man must give up his business and let those who know nothing about it run it for him. The lawyer must get out of his office and let a half-baked fool from Matteawan prepare his briefs. The man who knows most about his business is proven by that fact to be less capable of running it, so let us address ourselves to the things that we know nothing about and all will go merry as a wedding bell! Strange sentiments these, are they not? But every one has been literally quoted from the fulminations of the Pacifists as they have appeared from time to time. (Applause.)

The whole trouble with the Pacifist is this intellectual arrogance of which I have already spoken, which has, alas, so little basis—in fact, when the Bertillon system is applied for his intellectual measurements! He knows more about war than Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne and Napoleon all rolled in one! He knows more about naval affairs than John Paul Jones, Lord Nelson, Admiral Dewey and the whole naval college! He knows more about theology than Thomas Aquinas, Tom Hall, Lyman Beecher, and Lyman Abbott all put together! He knows more about statesmanship than Lord John Russell, Pitt the Elder, Pitt the Younger, Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, even if the combined wisdom of these mighty sons of Anak were poured into one Gargantuan cranium and dared to talk against him! Know? Why Hamlet would never have dared to say to him as he said to Horatio:

"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamed of in your philosophy."

for he knows it all! (Laughter and applause.)

One other thing I would say before I finish with the Pacifists, for these be parlous times indeed if we cannot speak our mind against such things as we feel detrimental and inimical to our country's welfare. "Look at the United States," he says, "spanning a continent, guarded on the East and West by God's two greatest oceans." This is the nearest, by the way, that I have ever heard a Pacifist come to a genuine, simon-pure, Fourth of July, spread-eagle speech! Yes, look at the United States! Too long we have talked of these 3,000 miles of ocean on the East and 8,000 miles on the West as though this gave us security and all was well. Do you know, Mr. Pacifist, that according to the actual transport facilities already at hand in these other nations, Russia can land on the coast of this country, 40,000 men within twenty days? Austria-Hungary, 75,000 men within fifteen days? Japan, 95,000 within twenty-two days? France 170,000 within eighteen days? Germany, 400,000 within fifteen days? and Great Britain, 665,000 within fifteen days, if she had the men on hand as she has now? These are not guess figures, remember, but the application of pure mathematics based upon the transport service that these nations already possess. (Applause.)

But the Pacifist says: "Where would our navy be meanwhile?" Well, it would be undoubtedly searching for the enemy, as the enemy would be searching for it, but the enemy on finding it would have guns of a fifteen- and seventeen-mile range that could destroy the whole of our fleet before it got within range with its own smaller guns. "Where, though," the Pacifist still cries, "would be our shore batteries protecting our great coast line?" Well, they would be ready for work just as soon as the enemies' ships came within range, but since they have only an eight-mile range and the enemies' ships would have at least a fifteen-mile range, you can easily see how our shore batteries and forts would be put out of commission before a single shot of theirs could take effect. "Then," the Pacifist cries, "where would be our army of unbeatable Americans?" Well, the 30,000, which is all that we could muster in any one point, together with say another 30,000 of militia, would be lined up on the shore waiting for the approach of that enemy, and if they dared to make a single hostile move, those same great guns would mow them down like wheat before a giant reaper, while the hostile troops were disembarking to finish the awful bloody massacre.

You see now how I have smoked the Pacifist out. By his own admission he feels there must be something to stop invasion which he realizes, with us, is possible. If this be admitted, then it's only a question of means. He thinks the ocean will do it, we have shown it will not. What then will do it, and how can we have the blessings of Peace assured to us? My answer is that we can only have them through an adequate army and navy fully drilled and plentifully armed. (Great applause.)

Figures seem foolish today after so many repetitions of them, but though we are the largest great power in the world today in regard to territory except Russia, with the largest coast of all nations, we have the smallest army and only the third largest navy, with France and Japan rapidly crowding us into fifth place. With an adequate navy it might be possible for us to repel invasion by our fleet, but when we think of our vast coast line and our Island possessions 8,000 miles away, where part of our fleet must always be kept, when we think of the Pacific that must always be patrolled, or the Atlantic in the same way, with a Pacific invasion, it reduces what we have at least one-half. When we also think of our guns outranged both on our ships and in our coast fortifications, it reduces our chance of repelling the invader to an irreducible minimum, as we couldn't well have less and claim that we had any at all. The strength of our navy in ships is 15 dreadnaughts, as opposed to 46 in England, 28 in Germany, with Russia and France owning 11 and 12 respectively, and Japan and Italy 10 each. Many of these ships, remember too, outrange all our guns both on our ships and in our coast fortifications, so that it would be possible for a battle cruiser of the Queen Elizabeth type, of which England has four, to bombard us and actually destroy all New York at a fifteen mile range, while the most powerful guns we have at Sandy Hook, Fort Hamilton and Fort Wadsworth, have only an eight-mile range, with our ship's guns of correspondingly small calibre and power.

Our army, as compared with that of other nations, makes an infinitely worse showing, having only 93,000 men with but 48,000 available for United States service as compared with the peace footings of Russia with 1,200,000 men; Germany, 830,000; France, 750,000; Austria-Hungary, 424,000; Italy, 300,000; Great Britain, 250,000, and Japan, 225,000. Our

equipment as to field artillery is also the smallest, the United States having but 834 guns, as opposed to Russia with 6,000; Germany, 5,000; France, 4,800; Austria, 2,365; Italy, 1,500; Japan, 1,250, and England, 1,000.

As to submarines and aeroplanes, we have 58 of the former as opposed to almost 300 on the part of England and Germany, though the exact figures have not been made known. For aeroplanes we have more definite figures, which are: Belgium, 100; Austria and England, 400 each; Russia, 800; Germany, 1,000; France, 1,400; while America, the home of the Wright Brothers, where the aeroplane was invented and perfected, has the enormous sum of 23 aeroplanes—and they are not all in working condition! (Laughter.)

What Jacob then has stolen in and taken away our birthright? By what sheer stupidity and crass folly have we been brought to such a pass? By the frothy vaporings of the disarmament Pacifist largely! By the thick-skulled arguments that mere possession of a weapon incites the use of it! If such were true, our policemen would be going berserk every day, shooting up the towns they are set to guard and shooting down innocent people by the thousands, because they have a gun and know how to use it. By the same sign, I, as peaceful as I am, having a Winchester and knowing how to hit the bull's-eye as well as the average man, would be on the warpath every day, yet I have never shot a living thing; and hundreds of thousands of policemen, though often under great provocation, have never drawn their guns except for target practice! (Applause.)

Away with such sophistries and weak-minded delusions! Away with them speedily or our country will be taken away from us! We have a duty to perform, a sacred duty to our own, and if we perform it not the Lord God Omnipotent will hold us to a strict account at the last, and meanwhile we will be a by-word and a hissing among true red-blooded men. "If any provide not for his own and especially for those of his own household, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel." (1 Tim. 5:8.) If we would take care of our own, if we would be true to the trust God has reposed in us as the natural guardians of our loved ones, our homes and our native land, we must make adequate provision for it, we must have men and ships, arms and munitions, and inspire that wholesome respect for authority and power which always safeguards peace and keeps all safe within our borders! (Applause.)

How then is this to be accomplished? By taxation on the one hand and universal military service on the other, that will neither burden us with onerous or odious taxes nor with a large and arrogant military class. Surely if Germany with only 60,000,000 population can support an army of 830,000, we, with our 100,000,000 population can support an army of 225,000 without having any fear of Prussian Militarism or a military class that would be a menace to the nation. Surely if England can afford 46 battleships of the latest type with her moderate wealth beside our own, we, the richest nation in the world, can afford the same number when we need them, even more than she, with all our thousands of miles of coast line and our far-flung Island possessions. Yet it's easier to get a million-dollar post office than a torpedo boat—though it costs less! It's easier to get a deepened waterway on the Mississippi or Missouri than a modern coast defense gun that would shoot far enough to do some good! It's easier to get a hundred thousand men to run for office than to get an extra hundred thousand voted for our army and navy so much

in need of men. If Peace is sweet and liberty is dear, we must get those things, however, and get them soon or we will lose all we have and be buried in profound oblivion. (Applause.)

Congress then must give men and measures and that right early if we are to succeed in holding that of which we are so proud and keep America in its present peaceful and secure position. The remedy suggested as to money is not hard to meet with all our wealth that is piling up in such leaps and bounds that the annual increase is four billion dollars, while the total wealth of the United States has reached the enormous proportion of 130 billion.

The remedy as to men is not a hard one to solve when we remember that by the census of 1910 there were 949,876 men of twenty years of age and 889,036 men twenty-one years of age in the United States. Again statistics tell us by the law of averages that we can depend upon at least 850,000 young men attaining their majority each year and an aggregate of many millions being in our public schools and colleges at all times between the ages of ten to twenty-one. Now the plan that would seem most feasible is to adopt that which has already been adopted in Switzerland and has laid no burden upon the people but has given them, with only 3,500,000 population, an army of 470,000 men fully armed and drilled and ready at a few hours' notice to mobilize at their country's call, though they have practically no standing army whatever. That plan is to put universal military training into all schools under competent government instructors, to take the boys to summer camps for further drill and experience, which shall be obligatory only during their school years and part of their vacations, except as the men shall, in their vacation period also, spend a few days with the colors so that they may be kept in condition. With such a system we could at all times have a reserve of a million young men or more fully trained by ten or twelve years' drill in their school experience, and a second reserve of millions of men who have had the same training in their youth and have kept in touch with their military leaders, fulfilling all the easy requirements of the plan. This, with a standing army of 225,000, which is the largest number suggested by military authorities, and an adequate navy to equal that of any navy in the world, would insure peace and preserve prosperity, would give our sons the right training, not so much for *war* but for *peace*, making them healthier, more manly, more aggressive and better fitted for all that life may bring to them in the way of opportunity and preferment. Thus will we inspire respect throughout the world, be left unmolested in our rights and privileges and enjoy the blessings and victories of a lasting Peace, which our own hands and forethought have insured. (Great applause.)

Reply of DR. CARTER to DR. GLADDEN in the Debate on Preparedness at the Broadway Tabernacle, Fifty-sixth Street and Broadway, Tuesday, February 8th, 1916.

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I had expected that Dr. Gladden would use the arguments concerning the bias and interest of the military and naval men and the arms and munitions manufacturers in the subject of preparedness and war because of the financial interest involved. I also fully expected him to touch upon the expense of the whole matter and the necessary burden of taxation that

would be laid upon the people as well as to take up as he did the religious aspects of the case, the un-Christian nature of war and the terrible sacrifice of life, robbing our homes of their noblest sons and the motherhood of the race of their most loved children. I also naturally anticipated his peroration as to the blessings of Peace and the need of it throughout all the world. Therefore, in my reply, I wish to take up these matters and answer them as briefly as possible in the short time that is left to me.

First, as to the matter of the self-interest on the part of the military and naval men and the arms and munition manufacturers, let me say that it is one of the weakest as well as the most prejudiced and unfair arguments that the Pacifist has ever advanced in this whole controversy. To dare to say that men, because they make a profit out of war, would therefore plunge whole nations into it without cause, is one of the most un-Christian as well as illogical arguments that the world has ever heard. (Applause.)

As soon might we say that the undertaker would employ a poisoner, a murderer and a thug to increase his business, or that the doctor would sow the seeds of disease rather than health among his patients that he might profit more by his practice! As I quoted in my opening arguments, soldiers themselves, such as Sherman, Grant, Chinese Gordon and many others, have always expressed their horror of war, and since these men are taking their lives in their own hands in entering war, we certainly ought to give them the Christian credit and fraternal trust that they are doing it not for personal aggrandizement, but for the good of the nation which they love. Arms and munitions manufacturers also, though profiting from the dread disease of war, are profiting no more than the doctor and the undertaker through the evils of bodily disease in their lines of work and are certainly no more to be accused of fratricide, paracide and devilish massacre. The one thought is just as illogical as the other and I have said unworthy to be placed in the arguments of our Pacifist friends. (Loud applause.)

The question of disinterestedness is again brought up by Dr. Gladden, as it is by all the Pacifists when they say that the manufacture of all arms and munitions should be taken out of private hands and placed in the hands of the Government, but here again history as well as logic proves that their arguments are unwarranted. Look back over the history of other nations as well as our own, and you will find that wherever these things have been taken over entirely by the Government there has been less progress than in others and more blunders, resulting oftentimes in great accidents and awful loss of life.

Take as an example the French Government. For over a hundred years it has made all of its own gunpowder, though its gun works have always been under private capital. The French guns, as we know in the present war, are far ahead of those of all the other Allies, and are next to those of Germany, which are made also by private enterprise in the great Krupp works. Her gunpowder, however, has been under question for many years both as to its strength and efficiency as well as to its deterioration and decomposition. So much is this so that the two battleships, the *Jena* and *La Liberte* that were blown up by spontaneous combustion in their powder magazines, were lost, according to the claim of experts, wholly because of the poor composition of the powder and its deterioration. Take the case for and against in our own land and you

will find that in all inventions concerning arms and munitions, America, through the competition of her private enterprise, has always led the way. There is no greater stimulus to any man than the stimulus of necessity and the constant grinding greed of competition. This has evolved unnumbered developments and inventions that would never have been brought forth if left to Government employees in soft berths and with good fat salaries. (Applause.)

Take now the other side of the shield and wherever there is Government control, see how many millions of dollars have been wasted unnecessarily because of the "pork barrel" methods of all of our Congresses.

Do you know, Dr. Gladden, that during the last fifteen years we spent one billion, six hundred and fifty-six million on our navy, while during the same period, Germany only spent one billion, one hundred and thirty-seven million? In other words, though Germany has a navy almost double the size of ours, she spent thirty-one per cent. less money on her navy than we did on the smaller equipment which we possess! Over half a billion dollars more was spent by America than Germany to get only about half of what they now possess! And why? Merely because of what has been called the "pork barrel" method of legislation in America, where every congressman and senator insists upon the chance of favoring his own state or district in regard to Government jobs, irrespective of the price involved and the amount or quality of material furnished. (Applause.)

Some other interesting figures I would like to give if I had the time. As for instance in 1899, \$600,000 expended for an absolutely unnecessary coaling station in Frenchman's Bay, Maine, which has since been dismantled as it was practically unused. Also a dock built at Portsmouth Navy Yard, Kittery, Maine, at an expense of \$1,122,000, that afterwards it was found was utterly impossible to use because the channel wasn't deep enough for any war vessel to reach that dock! and blasting had to be done at an expense of another \$745,000. In fifteen years, between 1895 and 1910, the improvements, machinery, repairs and maintenance of the Portsmouth Navy Yard amounted to \$10,857,000, although there was another large Navy Yard within seventy miles!

At Port Royal, S. C., another dock was built because a certain southern senator wanted it, at a cost of \$450,000, which proved to be absolutely useless, but it was not abandoned until \$2,275,000 more had been expended. So I might keep on multiplying these instances of the "pork barrel" method and the absolute waste on the part of Government employees, but I think I have given enough to disprove the arguments of my worthy opponent and to prove that rather than having greater Government control for these things, it is absolutely necessary to have some of the private personal business methods introduced by which our great captains of industry have built up their own business, in order that the funds of the nation may not be so outrageously expended for absolutely unnecessary things. (Applause.)

Again I might answer the arguments concerning the greater expense involved by saying that since Germany with her great army and navy takes less than three per cent. of the actual income of the nation in taxation for its maintenance, surely we, with our larger income as the richest nation in the world, can afford a taxation that will be practically negligible in comparison with our vast resources. Do you know, Dr. Gladden, that we spend four times as much on tobacco in this nation than we do upon our army and navy, and eight times as much in alcoholic

drinks, while we could build three new superdreadnaughts every year with the amount that we spend on chewing gum alone? Then, too, let us remember that practically every cent we spend upon our army and navy comes back to the people in wages and prices paid for material, so that though the people pay it to the Government in the first place, the Government immediately pays it back to the people again for the things that it requires. The great talk against expense, therefore, is merely a visionary bug-a-boo raised to frighten the unthinking, that our Pacifist and disarmament friends know is not based on fact. (Great applause.)

As to the religious question involved and the cry that it is un-Christian to fight, I have but this to say, that David did not think it un-Christian when he cried in the 144th Psalm, "Blessed be the Lord my Strength, Who teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight." That Moses did not think it un-Christian but that it was directed by the Lord when he said in Ex. 15, "The Lord is a Man of War." That Paul did not think it un-Christian when he said in the 13th Chapter of Romans concerning "the powers that be," that is: present order, authority and law, "For he is a minister of God to thee for good, but if thou do that which is evil, be afraid, for he beareth not the sword in vain." That Christ did not think it un-Christian when he said in the 22nd Chapter of Luke, "And he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one." This latter reference also is very definite and emphatic when we remember it was after Christ had first sent out his disciples without purse or script as well as without any weapons. Now, therefore, when he has come to the last night of his life and is about to send them out again with the knowledge of that former experience upon him and them he says most significantly, "Now he that hath a purse let him take it and likewise his script and he that hath no sword let him sell his garment and buy one." And they said, "Lord, behold, here are two swords." And He said unto them, "It is enough." (Applause.)

No Pacifist, certainly, with this passage before him, can twist it as they have tried to twist so many others to a mere figurative meaning. It is absolute, literal, definite. The physical swords were there. The disciples showed them, the Master saw them, approved of them and said, "It is enough." Christ realized, as we all realize, that there must come a time,—after we have tried, of course, every other method,—there naturally *must* come a time when we are compelled to stand for our principles and show our authority, law and force. For as I have already quoted from the Scripture, "He that provideth not (or doth not take care) for his own is worse than an infidel and hath denied the faith." (Great applause.)

The cry as to the sacrifice of our sons and the bitter bereavement of wives and mothers is not well taken by the wives and mothers themselves, when we remember that just yesterday in an article in the daily press, where a canvass had been taken of the parents having children in a number of our High Schools in our large cities, it was found that eighty-five per cent. of the mothers were in favor of governmental military training, that their sons might be prepared to guard these selfsame mothers, their homes and native land! It is still less well taken when we remember that the Woman's Section of the Belgian Relief Committee that has had most intimate knowledge of the horrors of war, have nevertheless sent out an appeal for preparedness wherein they say: "Our country is come to the parting of the ways. Her isolation is finished and she must soberly choose her place among the nations. Her ideals are essentially those of

liberty and peace. How shall we secure them? The plight of Belgium and the pride of Switzerland are our answer. He is safe who is *prepared*, he only is free who is master of himself!" (Continued applause.)

These wives and mothers know that their husbands, sons and brothers must fight at last if war shall come and they prefer to give them a "fighting chance" through *preparation* rather than that they should be murdered in cold blood. They prefer to have them trained, drilled, developed for whatever may come so that they shall not be helpless when brought face to face with the enemy and be massacred in what then would be the savage butchery of war. (Loud applause.)

We all believe in Peace just as much as our Pacifist friends, and believe indeed that it will come at last, but we believe it will only come as other nations are impressed with the strength and determination of those with which they are surrounded. Such a show of strength, authority and power will make all nations the more ready to join in what the poet long has dreamed of: "The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World." (Applause.)

Such a federation, of course, can only come through mutual agreement. That agreement can never come until there is mutual *respect* for the power and principles of the other nations of the world. With such recognition, respect and agreement, our far-flung navies will be merged in one as a police patrol for all the seas or to bear the growing commerce of the world; our huge opposing armies will be scattered on the fields of industry instead of on the fields of war, and Peace will brood on all our borders because order, law, authority and power have made it possible,—as the human recognition of *God's law, authority and power* brings everlasting Peace to all our hearts. (Loud and continued applause.)

ANSWERS TO ARGUMENTS OF THE PACIFISTS

I make no comments or criticisms upon any of the statements or arguments in the letters of the pacifists printed in this volume, and neither do I comment upon the arguments and statements in the letters of the martialists and advocates of national defense printed here. I let the letters speak for themselves.

I have, however, republished here some of the most notable articles of the most prominent pacifists, published and circulated by them and by pacifist organizations, which I do comment upon.

My object in publishing the arguments of the pacifists in so full and complete a manner is to present both sides of the question of national defense, with absolute impartiality and fairness.

In justice to the reader, I feel that it is incumbent upon me to present here the case for national defense at such length and with such force as to make plain the truths of that side of the question.

For further information and arguments than I have room to present here, I refer the reader to "Defenseless America."

All the points of difference of opinion between the pacifists and the martialists or advocates of national defense—all the points upon which

are based the arguments of the pacifists against national defense—may be summed up under a few heads. I will, therefore, present these points under heads, as nearly as possible in the order of their importance.

HEAD 1.

IS SELF-DEFENSE RIGHT OR WRONG?

Taking the Scriptural injunction, "Thou shalt not kill," as a starting point of their reasoning, and also taking literally the other Scriptural injunction, "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also" as a guide of conduct, they advocate non-resistance to all aggressive force. They believe that might does not make right, and by consequence that the use of might is wrong, even to accomplish right, or to defend the right. If the principle of non-resistance is right, then in all human conduct positiveness should be replaced by passiveness, which, carried to a logical conclusion, implies inertness for action, recession for progression, and finally, death for life.

There are two kinds of pacifists: those who believe in absolute non-resistance regardless of the provocation, and those who believe in some resistance under certain extreme provocation.

It is inconceivable to the normal-minded person how anyone could possibly believe in non-resistance. As a matter of fact, regardless of belief, no one ever did or ever will, or ever could follow such a foolish course of conduct. Experience has proved this time after time.

There are two kinds of minds: those that possess sufficient imagination and breadth of understanding to be rational and logical, and those that lack sufficient imagination and understanding to think rationally and logically.

It is imagination, more than any other faculty, that distinguishes the mind of the normal man from the mind of the fanatic and of the criminal. Imagination is the most distinctively human faculty, and the one which, more than any other, distinguishes man from the brute.

The pacifist who starts out with the premise that "Thou shalt not kill," and that it is one's duty to turn the other cheek, may really believe such conduct would be actually possible when put to the test; but bring a few such pacifists together and restrict them to one another's society for a few days, and what happened on the *Oscar II* is absolutely always sure to happen. The dove of peace quickly becomes a turkey buzzard and the turn-the-other-cheek develops the disposition of the hyena. There being no possible general agreement in their ideas and opinions, each of them, believing in the infallibility of his own ideas and opinions, is naturally intolerant of the opposing opinions and ideas of every other.

Such pacifists, not being able to imagine how anyone could honestly differ from them, immediately conclude that those who do differ from them are not honest. The result is natural and inevitable that their wind of words should blow up a storm of riot at any peace conference between them, and that they should resort to fisticuffs, even if to nothing worse, to maul into one another the beauties of the doctrine of passiveness and non-resistance.

The normal-minded person, on the other hand, is endowed with the necessary imagination and breadth of judgment to realize the truth that every person must of necessity be a martialist and ready to fight in

defense of what blessings belong to him, to have and to hold, and in defense of the blessings that are the rights of others to have and to hold, for whom he feels a measure of responsibility.

There is far more Scriptural evidence to justify this attitude of mind than that of the extreme pacifist.

"The Lord is a man of war." (Ex. xv: 3.)

"The Lord of Hosts is His name." (Is. li: 15.)

"Blessed be the Lord my strength which teacheth my hands to war, and my fingers to fight." (Ps. cxliv: 1.)

"Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword." (Matt. x: 34.)

"And he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one . . . for the things concerning me have an end." (Luke xxii: 36, 37.)

"Son of man, speak to the children of thy people, and say unto them: When I bring the sword upon a land, if the people of the land take a man of their coasts, and set him for their watchman:

"If, when he seeth the sword come upon the land, he blow the trumpet and warn the people;

"Then, whosoever heareth the sound of the trumpet and taketh not warning; if the sword come and take him away, his blood shall be upon his own head.

"He heard the sound of the trumpet and took not warning, his blood shall be upon him. But he that taketh warning shall deliver his soul.

"But if the watchman see the sword come and blow not the trumpet, and the people be not warned; if the sword come, and take any person from among them, he is taken away in his iniquity; but his blood will I require at the watchman's hand." (Ezek. xxxiii: 4, 5, 6.)

"For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." (Rom. xiii: 4.)

Preaching on Christ's teachings on force and preparedness, February 27, 1916, Dr. Newell Dwight Hillis, pastor of Plymouth Church, took for his text, Luke xi: 21:

"When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armor wherein he trusted and divideth his spoils."

Dr. Hillis said:

"Jesus recognized, in His teachings, the doctrine of force in the face of anarchy, with its attendant lawlessness. It is quite true that Jesus taught the doctrine of non-resistance and of forgiveness to one's enemies. It is also true that men like Tolstoi have built up upon these fragmentary statements a grotesque concatenation of absurdities. Did the Russian peasant sow the seed and reap the grain, only to have a tramp loot the storehouse? Did the husbandman plant the vine

and prune the bough, to find that another hand had stolen the clusters? Did the merchant manufacture the goods and put the cloth upon the shelf for sale, only to have the thief in the night despoil him of his treasure? Tolstoi straightway answers: 'Do not resist. And the moral splendor, soon or late, will shame the thief and tramp.' But all this is sheer anarchy. Men will not build if an enemy is to sit by the fire. Men will not sow and reap if their own children are to starve. Tolstoi would do away with the lock on the door, the bar on the bank, the policeman in the street, the jail in the city. Nothing is gained by throwing down the bars and letting the wild beast loose. . . .

"Jesus affirmed the doctrine of force against every form of lawlessness."

Let me refer the reader here to Chapter II of "Defenseless America," especially to pages 42 to 55, and to Dr. Carter's speech, "The Necessity of Preparedness," printed in this volume.

The history of the ancient world was one continuous orgy of fire and sword, blood and murder. Banditry was the only honorable profession, and it is a curious fact that the more powerful and wicked and murderous one of the old bandit kings was the more he became an advocate of non-resistance.

All the red-handed old royal rascals from Rameses and before, down to Attila, Genghis Khan, Timur the Tartar, were staunch advocates of non-resistance, and when their advice was not taken or their will was disobeyed they were also as intolerant and unreasonable as the modern pacifist.

Their method was to approach the walled city of a neighboring nation and demand its surrender, in other words, to advocate non-resistance on the part of its inhabitants. If the inhabitants of the besieged city immediately opened its gates, the bandit king was sometimes kind, considerate and generous enough to spare their lives, merely taking all their property and selling them into slavery.

If, on the contrary, the inhabitants did not take the pacifist advice of the bandit king, but kept their gates closed and manned their walls, a regular siege was instituted by the beleaguers, and if and when the city fell what the old king bandit did to the inhabitants to emphasize the excellence of his advice about non-resistance was a shame to human nature.

Let me cite one example. During a period of five hundred years all Assyrian kings were on the warpath. The historian states:—

"Apparently it was quite impossible for an Assyrian king to be a peaceful sovereign. His State lived by and for the army alone, and if he did not give the army successful employment he was quickly murdered to make way for someone who would lead the troops to conquest and plunder."

Let me introduce to you, dear reader, one veritable old jewel as an Assyrian conqueror. His name was Ashur-natsir-pal III,

". . . whose magnificent palace at Kalah, with its alabaster slabs exquisitely carved in relief, was excavated by Layard in the forties of last century. The slabs are now one

of the glories of the British Museum, where also the statue of the great conqueror stands.

"We have the record of eighteen years of his reign: there is scarcely a year in which he was not at war; and this is the kind of war he made:

* "To the city of Tela I approached. The city was very strong; three fortress-walls surrounded it. The inhabitants trusted to their strong walls and their numerous army; they did not come down or embrace my feet. With battle and slaughter I attacked the city and captured it. Three thousand of their fighting men I slew with the sword; their spoil, their goods, their oxen, and their sheep I carried away; many captives I burned with fire.

"I captured many of their soldiers alive; I cut off the hands and feet of some; of others I cut off the noses, the ears, and the fingers; I put out the eyes of many soldiers. I built up a pyramid of the living and a pyramid of heads. On high I hung up their heads on trees in the neighborhood of their city. Their young men and their maidens I burned with fire. The city I overthrew, dug it up, and burned it with fire; I annihilated it."

What a pal must have been this old Ashur-natsir-pal.

Any philosophy opposed to natural law may be known to be a false philosophy, and any rule of conduct opposed to all human experience may be known to be opposed to natural law, for all animal life and experience must of necessity conform to natural law.

In order to put into practice the doctrine of non-resistance it would be necessary to reverse the natural law that secures the survival of the fittest.

Life is a constant struggle for existence. It is a struggle against opposing forces; and all growth, development, health and progress depend entirely upon successful resistance to environing forces which tend to consume us, but which, through our powers of resistance, we are enabled to use formatively to develop and strengthen us. The martialist, therefore, obeys the law of life, while the pacifist, without knowing or understanding the nature of his own teaching, advocates living by the law of death. If it be wrong to kill, it is also wrong to be killed. The Scriptural injunction "Thou shalt not kill" necessarily implies—thou shalt not be killed, and that one should take the necessary measures of defense to prevent being killed.

When one person is in danger of being killed by another, and knows that he is in such danger and takes no measures for self-defense, he becomes an accessory to the murder.

The truth must be recognized that good as well as evil is a force. We often speak of a person or thing being a power for good.

The Bible is filled with metaphors illustrative of the truth that good is in constant warfare with evil, righteousness with iniquity, angels with the Devil. Milton's "Paradise Lost" and Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress" are two wonderful metaphors or allegories of the warfare of good against evil.

We also have in our own time that marvelous metaphor of good warfare against evil—the Salvation Army.

HEAD 2

QUESTION OF SUBSTITUTION OF LAW FOR WAR

The pacifists advocate the substitution of international law for war, as they put it, and the settlement of international disputes by jurisprudential procedure. They fail absolutely to understand the fact that law being a representative of force, any law without force behind it would not be true law, but would be merely advice.

The extreme pacifists imagine that they will be able to do away with force and compel obedience to international law by the substitution of love and persuasion for force.

Law without force behind it is like a paper dollar without gold behind it.

I refer the reader to Chapter II of "Defenseless America."

HEAD 3

OLD MARS BOTH A DR. JEKYLL AND A MR. HYDE

The pacifists believe that by proving war to be wrong, they prove all military preparations to be essentially wrong. They draw lurid pictures of the horrors of war, imagining that they thereby prove all wars to be wrong. They fail to perceive the truth that there are both good wars and bad wars.

The fact is old Mars has a dual personality. He is both a Dr. Jekyll and a Mr. Hyde. George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and General Grant were soldiers who fought in the cause of the good Mars. When one fights in defense of his home and country, when one fights to free slaves, when one fights against tyranny, aggression and oppression—in short, when one fights for freedom, he is fighting a good war. On the other hand, those who wage wars of aggression and oppression—wars whose objects are to plunder and enslave—are fighting bad wars; in short, all wars against aggression and for freedom are good wars, while all wars of aggression and against freedom are bad wars.

It is the supreme of patriotism and the worthiest of sacrifice to fight for and die for one's country in a war against aggression, and, on the other hand, it is the supreme of the ignoble and the infamous to fight and die in a war of aggression and oppression, in a war of banditry. The noblest of all professions is the profession of the soldier fighting in the cause of righteousness, and the most dishonorable of all professions is that of the soldier of unrighteousness, the soldier of banditry.

HEAD 4

RIVALRY OF PREPAREDNESS AMONG NATIONS

The pacifists hold that preparation by one country for national defense leads other countries to prepare likewise. They claim that such preparation is not a safeguard against war, but an enticement to war; that the very act of preparing has in it the nature of a threat, and constitutes a menace; furthermore, that preparation by one nation starts a rivalry between all the nations, and that the more one nation prepares, the more

all the others are sure to prepare, thereby piling upon the taxpayers enormous expense, without any end to it.

One of the prettiest bits of sophistry under this head is that of Mr. Bryan, in his speech, "The War in Europe," printed in this volume, where he represents three neighbors living around a lake engaging in a rivalry of battleship construction to defend themselves against one another.

Mr. Bryan failed to perceive the truth that three families so situated, under such primitive and lawless conditions as he assumes, would of necessity adopt exactly those measures that mankind has always adopted under similar circumstances.

Let us go back a little in human history to the time when there were three families of cave men living around a lake, and see what those cave men did do. When one family of the cave men made hatchets and spear-heads of flint and bone, the other families also had to make them for self-defense; and when one family invented the bow and arrow, and was able to kill a neighbor at a distance beyond the throw of the javelin, the bow and arrow was necessarily adopted by the other two families; and when one family, with fire and flint hollowed a log, and made a boat or constructed a raft of logs, the other families had to have their raft and their boat; and when they came out of their caverns and built their houses on the shore of the lake, and the members of one family or community surrounded their houses by a common wall, the other families around the lake did likewise, and, still later, when bronze replaced flint, each family had to have bronze weapons, and when steel replaced bronze they had to have weapons of steel; and, finally, with the advent of firearms and gun-boats, each family or community or city or nation had to have its firearms and its gunboats. In short, exactly in pace and in keeping with their intellectual development and their powers of invention, have the people of the world been compelled by necessity to adopt the best available means of defense.

This rivalry has not been a bad thing. It has been a good thing. Nothing could so stimulate the mind of man to invention and discovery as the imperative and ever-present necessity of providing himself weapons for the defense of his home and property against those who always stood ready to take them from him and to enslave him if he did not defend them; and always the measure of such preparation for defense has been proportionate to what at the time appeared to be the need for it. When the need was greater, there was always greater preparation, and when the need was less, there was less precaution and less preparation; and always also the necessity for preparation has been exactly proportionate to the prospective dividends that might be declared after deducting the cost of conquest.

No nation has ever been safe except when it has been so well defended as to make it evident that the cost of conquest would exceed the plunder, and whenever it has been evident that the cost of conquest would exceed the plunder, any nation was safe.

All families, all communities, all nations, have grown up from the simple beginning of the cave-man family.

When the three cave-men families became three nations, living on opposite shores of a lake or on opposite sides of a river or a mountain chain, or on the opposite sides of a thicket or jungle, they were rivals, and were enemies whenever advantage or necessity dictated that they should be enemies, and when they met and fought with their primitive weapons the slaughter was immense, and the slaughter continued to increase with improvements in weapons of war until the maximum was

reached with the Roman short sword. Since that time, especially since the advent of firearms, which compelled armies to line up farther apart and to spread over wider areas, fewer and fewer have been killed with every improvement in the length of range and speed of fire of guns.

Consequently, when the three families in Mr. Bryan's simile of three nations arrived at the point when they built rival battleships, they were pitting dollars against dollars, rather than pitting their lives against one another, as they used to do in the old days before there were battleships.

The reader is referred to Chapter IV of "Defenseless America" for further matter upon this subject.

The question is often raised by the pacifists, where does adequate preparedness end? If we arm, then other nations will arm all the more, and then we shall be required to take on a still larger burden to hold our position with respect to the other nations, and there will never be an end to it.

When we look at this sophistry of the pacifists, we are inclined to think that there is some reason in their argument, but on second thought we see that their contention is very illogical. There is a definite limit to the amount any nation should prepare in order to make itself perfectly safe.

Nations do not go into the business of war except for profit, any more than business men enter business without prospective profit. No man will go into a business knowing beforehand that he is going to lose money in the enterprise. Similarly, no nation will go to war with another nation unless the prospective plunder is likely greatly to exceed the cost of plundering.

One of the best illustrations of the truth that adequacy of preparedness means preparedness up to the point where the plunder does not warrant the expense of plundering, is afforded by the experience of the Swiss just after the Franco-Prussian War.

Bismarck, after that war, looked with covetous eyes upon the Swiss fastnesses, and he straightway planned to take possession of Switzerland and bring it into the German Empire. But the Swiss at that time had a hundred thousand of the best-armed, best-trained soldiers in the world, and a goodly number besides not quite up to that standard. They marched this hundred thousand men down to the frontier, and Bismarck was convinced that the cost of taking Switzerland would be more than it would be worth.

A rabbit in the wood that should decide to substitute the quills of the porcupine for its protection in place of high speed to escape its enemies, would have to be armed with quills long enough, numerous enough and sharp enough to make the cost of getting at its flesh more than its flesh would be worth, even to its hungriest and most fiercely-fanged enemies.

Similarly, it is not the relative size of the fleet of Germany, or of any other nation, that should determine the size of our fleet, for always there is a possibility that the fleets of other nations may double up against us. What we need, and all we need, is a fleet big enough, together with an army big enough, to make the cost of whipping us more than the plunder would be worth—in short, to make the cost of getting at our flesh more than the profit in getting at our flesh would be worth.

Here lies the answer to the argument of the pacifists that if we were to prepare sufficiently to defend ourselves against the great military

nations of the world, we should also become a military despotism—we should become aggressors and attack and plunder other nations.

We surely should be dominated by our myriad-year-old human nature, and should do some plundering of the weaker nations who had not made hedgehogs of themselves by so adequately preparing against war as to make the cost of getting at their meat through their quills more than it would be worth.

This has always been the way of the world. During all history warlike nations have imposed upon unwarlike nations. Poor old China had to shave its head and wear a pigtail for a thousand years.

The time has come for us to choose whether or not we shall submit to degradation by other nations or arm ourselves and trust ourselves not to abuse our power. Of the two evils it strikes me that the lesser evil would be to abuse the other fellow rather than to put ourselves in a position to let him abuse us.

The present war has proved that there are still predatory nations in the world; that these predatory nations are better armed than we are; that they do not respect either treaties or the rights of other nations, but are actuated solely by what they consider advantageous to themselves.

If we remain unarmed our undefended wealth will be an enticement to the predatory powers. Consequently, it is up to us now to decide whether or not we can trust ourselves to carry arms without becoming ourselves predatory, or whether we shall take the risk of becoming a predatory nation rather than take the risk of being victimized by predatory nations.

If it be actually true that if we were adequately armed for national defense we should be tempted to use our arms against other nations not so well prepared as we, this is the strongest possible evidence that if we do not prepare, then those nations that are now better armed than we, will attack us if we do not prepare for defense.

HEAD 5

MERCIFUL WEAPONS OF WAR

The pacifists hold that whereas it is wrong to kill, it is likewise wrong to invent or make munitions of war intended to kill; also that the more deadly and destructive a weapon of war is, so much greater is the wrong in making it.

The pacifists believe also that the more deadly and destructive is an implement of war, the larger the number of persons that may be killed by it, while the exact opposite is the truth.

The quick-firing gun is the greatest life-saving instrument ever invented, because with every improvement in the range and rapidity of fire of guns, armies fight just so much farther apart as may be necessary to balance its added effectiveness.

Before the introduction of firearms, fighting was done at short range, and was correspondingly more deadly. Many times as many men, for the numbers engaged, were killed in wars with spears, battleaxes and the short sword as are now killed in battle with all our modern engineering of death and destruction. With the introduction of improved machinery of war, fighting is necessarily done more by machinery and less by hand,

so that in battle life-destroying machinery becomes labor-saving machinery, and consequently life-saving machinery.

History proves that the supreme necessity of a nation has always been interpreted by that nation as its supreme duty, and that a nation is sure to take advantage of whatever appears to be of supreme advantage to it, and that if it cannot get it without fighting for it, it is sure to fight for it.

Whatever may be the ethical standards of a people, and however much their ideals may be opposed to the doctrine of might makes right, they always in their conduct put the doctrine of might makes right into practice. They always exercise might to accomplish what they believe to be right, and they conceive to be right always what is best for themselves. They justify themselves on the ground that their very possession of the power to accomplish their designs is *prima facie* evidence that they are the special favorites of Providence, and the fittest to survive, and consequently warranted in the exercise of force to get what they want at whatever cost or loss it may be to others, and regardless of whatever sacrifice of life may be necessary to its accomplishment, especially when the loss of life is mainly on the part of the parties plundered.

Therefore, taking the human fighting instinct as a constant or unvarying propensity or characteristic, nations are sure to fight when the conditions above referred to favor a fight, and they will fight with whatever weapons they have, and the simpler and more primitive the weapons are, the greater the slaughter. Therefore, if all the nations of the world were to disarm and actually to forge their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks, and to scrap all their guns and other implements of war, that very act would arm them with far more deadly weapons than they now possess. The pruning hook would be a far more deadly weapon than the quick-firing gun, to say nothing of the farmers' ax and pitchfork.

Had the vast armies of Europe in the present war been armed with only agricultural implements, the actual slaughter would have been ten times as great for the time and numbers engaged. Therefore, disarmament would not be a measure in the interest of saving life—it would be a measure that would, in the event of war, result in enormously increased sacrifice of life.

The reader is referred, for further information under this head, to "Defenseless America," Chapter IV.

HEAD 6

PREPAREDNESS AND INSURANCE AGAINST WAR

The pacifists hold that the munition makers are largely to blame for war, because they work for preparedness or national defense, in order to sell more munitions of war. Therefore, they hold that if the profit for the munition makers were taken out of war, that is to say, if they were prevented from making profits from war, there would as a result be no preparedness and no wars.

They do not observe the point that peace, according to their reasonings, could not be made permanent, even with the ruse of turning the other cheek and the obligation of brotherly love, unless there should be an international agreement among munition makers, because if the munition makers of one country continued to advocate preparedness and thereby

to promote war, they would promote war all the more the easier it could be precipitated, and the less that other nations were prepared the easier it would be for them to make war, and consequently to make profits.

HEAD 7

REGARDING THE REAL DANGER OF WAR

Before the great European War came, the pacifists held that the last great war of the world had been fought; that, owing to the ponderous preparedness of the nations and the evident expense of a war, none of them would dare to precipitate war—that they would see beforehand that the expense would bankrupt them and the slaughter would be so frightful as to depopulate them.

Nevertheless, the great war came, and the expense, though vast, has not bankrupted the nations—in fact, the annual outlay has not been five per cent. of the wealth of the warring powers, while the annual death rate has not by any means equalled the birth rate.

Now that the war has actually come, the pacifists, in accounting for it, say that it was brought on as a result of the ponderous preparedness of the nations for war, exactly the same reasons that they used before the war to prove that this war could not come.

It is not at all true that the European powers were ponderously prepared. Germany and Austria were the only countries that were prepared. France was only partially prepared; both Russia and England were pitifully unprepared.

Under this head, the reader is referred to “Defenseless America,” Chapter I.

HEAD 8

MUNITION MAKERS AND ARMY AND NAVY OFFICERS AS WAR BREEDERS

Under this head, the reader is referred for particulars to Chapter XI of “Defenseless America.”

HEAD 9

THE SIMILE OF THE DUELIST

A very favorite sophistical simile used by the pacifists is that until recent years dueling was a customary method of settling individual differences—that when some dishonorable fellow skillful in the use of sword or gun wanted to get square with some honorable opponent who had aspersed the rascal's honor, the rascal would send the honorable man a challenge, which he was obliged to accept or become the laughing-stock and ridicule of and a thing to be shunned by all his fellow creatures.

The pacifists tell us that when one nation arms to defend itself for defense against another nation, it is a case exactly parallel with the duelist who used to carry a gun to defend his honor, and that whereas dueling has become unpopular and a discarded thing, national defense should also become unpopular and be discarded.

That simile is very convincing when one accepts it as an argument without question, but it does not stand investigation. The case of the armed nation is not at all similar to that of the armed duelist. But let me give a simile which will actually illustrate the position of two nations with respect to their measures of defense, under the following head.

HEAD 10

NEED OF POLICE

Salus populi suprema lex. (The safety of the people is the supreme law.)

"The police power is an attribute of sovereignty and exists without any reservation in the constitution, being founded upon the duty of the state to protect its citizens, and provide for the safety and good order of society. It corresponds to the right of self-preservation in the individual, and is an essential element in all orderly government, because necessary to the proper maintenance of the government and the general welfare of the community. Upon it depend the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation upon which our social system rests." ("A. and E. Ency. of Law.")

Much has been said in recent years upon the subject of an international police force—that is to say, a union of the armed forces of the nations for compulsory international good behavior—an armed force on a large scale identical in nature with what the municipal police force is on a small scale.

I do not know for certain who was the first to recommend an international armed police force. At any rate, I never heard of it having been suggested prior to its recommendation by me about twenty-five years ago, or even prior to its recommendation by me at a Peace Congress Banquet of the Economic Club of Boston on the 20th day of April, 1907.

It is a scientific truism that multiplying the number of a thing does not alter the nature of the thing. An apple is an apple, whether one apple or a million are under consideration, and the same holds true in all things, from mustard seed to man. The same laws govern a million mustard seeds that govern one mustard seed, and the same laws are applicable to a million families of men as are applicable to one family of men.

A community is but a larger family, a state is but a larger community, and any number of states is but a larger state. The state or nation itself is but a larger family; and the same natural laws of behavior and self-preservation hold true with any number of individuals and with any number of families as with a single individual or a single family, and the same natural laws apply to a complex society as to a simple form of society.

The father of the family and his strong boys were the police force that guarded the family of the cave man, and the cave man community

was policed by a union of the male heads of families—by a union of the family guardians.

Later, when the cave man moved from the hill cavern down into the valley, and settled on the banks of lakes and rivers, and protected his community with a wall, the army that he raised to defend his city was a police force that protected it both from without and from within.

The first army was raised purely for protective purposes, but when the police force of one city or community became much stronger than that of a neighboring city or community, the greater power was often abused, and the stronger city plundered the weaker city and enslaved its inhabitants. This was an abuse of police power.

At the present time an army and a navy of a people like that of the United States is purely a police force, and has no other function than as a police force. The people of this country have no desire for foreign aggression. There could be no profit to this country from foreign aggression, and that is the strongest reason in the world based upon the experiential knowledge of all history for the belief that the people of this country would not abuse their power if armed sufficiently for self-defense.

There is absolutely no difference, except in size, between an invasion of a country by a foreign foe and the invasion of a private home by a band of thieves.

We are guarded in our cities from the attack of thieves by our police. An army and a navy purely to prevent attacks of a foreign enemy is in every sense a police force. The conquest of a home by thieves and the slaying of the members of a family who die in defense of their home is merely a war of invasion on a small scale, and a war of invasion of a nation is merely a home invasion by thieves and plunderers on a large scale. It simply means that a larger number of homes suffer and that the number of thieves and plunderers is larger. There is absolutely no difference whatever in the nature or the ethics of the two transactions. Consequently, we have the same reason to support our arguments for preparedness against invasion of this country by a foreign foe as for a police force for the defense of our homes against thieves and burglars.

A truth that has been established by the experience of all history may safely be relied on, and it is a truth so established that the treatment of undefended nations by warlike nations has always been as inconsiderate, unethical and merciless as the treatment of a family by a gang of thieves. When a nation is rich and unprotected, other nations that have guns and the equipment of men and munitions for its conquest are just as likely to invade and plunder the weak nation as a gang of well-armed thieves would be likely to invade and rob an unprotected rich family in any city in the country, if that city had no police force, and thieves and cutthroats were permitted to go about unarrested and unmolested.

Those pacifists who recommend that this country go unprepared should first try the experiment on a small scale. Let some city in the Union, the majority of whose voters are pacifists, disband their police force and see how the thing will work on a small scale before trying it on a large scale with the entire country.

Let us suppose, for example, that a city like Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, should disband its police force, and depend for its security entirely upon the innate spirit of good fellowship and brotherly love of its citizens. How would it work out? Chaos would reign in a day! Thieves, cutthroats and burglars would

immediately rise up in large numbers. No life would be safe and no home secure for a moment. No property would be safe anywhere. Stores would be broken into indiscriminately and plundered.

We are so dependent upon our police force for our security that we have come to look upon it as an absolute indispensable adjunct of every society where large numbers of people are congregated. No one would for a moment think of doing away with our policemen. Thus, we are able to see in a small and simple way why we should defend the country in a larger way. Consequently, it is most evident that we should have a large police force to defend the nation just as we have a small police force to defend the persons and property of the inhabitants of our cities.

HEAD 11

OUR COUNTRY'S DANGER. OUR ISOLATION NO LONGER A PROTECTION

The pacifists claim that all the other nations are friendly to us.

"No nation has any thought of waging war against us. . . . No nation is challenging us; no nation is trying to draw us into war with itself."—*William Jennings Bryan*.

"We are connected so intimately by ties of blood and sympathy with all the nations of the Old World that public opinion would make a war with any of the great powers practically impossible."—*Memorial to Members of Senate and House from Society of Friends of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and parts of Maryland*.

"Let the President and others who are preaching this doctrine of fear point out the enemy. . . ."—*Henry Ford*.

"Who is this invisible, this unknown, this unheralded enemy against whose attack we are to prepare ourselves at such great expense?"—*Nicholas Murray Butler*.

When the evidence of a thing is not what a pacifist thinks evidence ought to be, he blames the evidence and does not allow it to change his belief. Experience is man's surest guide. The history of all times past absolutely proves that just in proportion as a nation is rich and defenseless in comparison with surrounding nations, so are the chances that it will be warred upon and plundered by the surrounding nations.

In support of their arguments, the pacifists point out the fact that the United States during many years has been both wealthy and weak from a military point of view, and has thus far escaped being plundered or seriously attacked.

The undefended Canadian boundary line is pointed out as evidence that whereas fortifications have not been required to defend that line, no fortifications are required to defend any boundary line.

The Canadian boundary line has been used to the limit to carry conviction to the minds of the unthinking and unwary. The reasons we have not needed to defend our Canadian boundary line are that until compara-

tively recent times the Atlantic Ocean was a fairly effective barrier against invasion; that England has been too busy with her European neighbors to permit her to turn against us. She could not come after us because of the danger of being immediately attacked from her rear should she do so. There is also another reason: England did not need any of our territory. Besides, we were her watch dogs, bound to guard her interests in the Western Hemisphere, in order to defend our Monroe Doctrine. Our Monroe Doctrine has made us a constant unwitting ally of Great Britain, and heretofore England has needed us as an ally.

But now the ocean has become a mere ferry across which armies with all the equipment of war may be transported, to the number of millions, much more quickly than an army of equal numbers of raw volunteers could be got together and put in the field. Consequently, when the present European war is over, if England should be relieved of the necessity thereafter of watching her neighbors, she might very likely come after us, and then our Canadian boundary line would need to be fortified; and with England's vast fleet of warships and transports, our so-called splendid isolation would be breached at once.

Should Germany or Austria win the present war, or fight themselves hand free of the Allies, the Germans would be able to land a vast army of war-tried veterans on our shore in a few weeks, with all their equipment.

All the most eminent naval and military authorities are in unanimous agreement that either Germany or England could land enough men and munitions on our Atlantic seaboard in less than a month effectually to invade our territory and capture the entire munitions area between Boston and Baltimore, New York and Niagara, and they are all in agreement that when this territory should be captured we would thereafter be unable to provide ourselves with the necessary war munitions ever to drive them out, and we should consequently be compelled to buy them off at whatever ransom they might see fit to exact.

The reader is referred to the extracts from the testimony of General Wood before a Congressional Committee printed in this volume.

HEAD 12

MISREPRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

One would think on reading the quotations made by Claude Kitchin, Bryan and other pacifists, from the testimony of Army and Navy experts before congressional committees, that this country is amply prepared against any war emergency—that our navy is the strongest in the world next to that of England, and that it would be impractical if not impossible for an enemy to bring an army over seas to invade this country, and that should an enemy succeed in landing upon our shores he would immediately find himself landed upon by us and crushed.

It is a curious condition of affairs indeed when congressmen and members of the cabinet and other civilian officers of the Government are privileged to have perfectly free speech regarding naval and military matters and our needs or lack of needs for national defense, while our officers of the army and navy are gagged and not permitted to express their opinions except when some of them are selected for cross-examination by some congressional committee.

Congressman Kitchin says, in his Statement to the Press of November 20, 1915, given in this volume:—

“Let it be first understood that in the ‘Preparedness’ programme the Navy of Great Britain is eliminated. This was so testified by the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Fletcher, and other naval experts, and even by Hobson, in the hearings before the Naval Committee at the last session of Congress, all declaring that we do not need or desire a navy as strong as hers.”

Nevertheless, the following quotations from Mr. Hobson’s speech in the House of Representatives on February 5, 1915, flatly contradict Mr. Kitchin:—

“We must have a Navy in the Atlantic equal to that of Germany and a Navy in the Pacific equal to that of Japan; and, consequently, we must have a total Navy equal to the combined navies of the two countries. . . .

“The march of history cannot be set aside. America cannot escape her responsibilities, even if she would. As Members we may temporarily ignore them here, but the mighty march of destiny in the progress of civilization and the advance of the race is going to demand that in the interests of humanity America shall supplant Great Britain upon the high seas of the world. (Applause.)

“The present exigencies may involve the Monroe doctrine in an acute stage in Mexico. We are not certain that after the war is over, if Great Britain should be victorious, she would consent to America’s continued paramountcy in Mexico. Our paramountcy in Mexico under the Monroe doctrine and the open-door policy and integrity of China are our settled foreign policies. These foreign policies demand that America should have a Navy as big as the navies of Great Britain and Japan combined. In other words, instead of the British two-power policy it must hereafter be an American two-power policy.”

Again I quote from Hon. Claude Kitchin:—

“All the talk and writings by the press and so-called ‘Patriotic Societies’ about our ‘utter helplessness,’ our ‘growing weakness,’ our ‘having fallen to the third or fourth grade of inferiority in naval strength,’ etc., is pure tommyrot, based not on a single fact.” . . .

Yet President Wilson, on January 31, 1916, said at the Auditorium, Chicago:—

“We have one considerable arm of force—a very considerable arm of force—namely, the splendid navy of the United States. I am told by experts, to whose judgment I must defer in these matters, that the navy of the United States ranks only fourth among the navies of the world.”

Mr. Kitchen continues:—

“Admiral Fletcher, the highest active officer in the navy, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, the man who will have to do the fighting, if any is to be done (whose judgment on naval subjects the Secretary of the Navy, before the Naval Committee, declared he had sooner take than that of any man in the world, expressly declared, at the naval hearings during the last session of Congress, that we had a navy, *‘superior to that of Germany or any other nation except Great Britain.’*”

The following quotation is taken from the testimony of Admiral Fletcher before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, March 2, 1916, and is exactly contrary to the words of Mr. Kitchen:—

“The question naturally arises, and is often asked, How does our Navy rank with those of other powers? I think the committee has ample statistics to show that our Navy now ranks about third or fourth.

“If we consider that dreadnaughts constitute the main fighting strength of any navy, and place navies in the order of number of dreadnaughts now in commission, it would run something like this: England, 48; Germany, 25; the United States, 8; France, 7. That includes battle cruisers. . . .

“It is shown in the report that we have a great shortage in personnel, of both officers and men, to efficiently man the fleet that should be kept in commission. We have little or no reserve to call upon for manning the ships which are not in commission with the fleet. We are greatly lacking in scouts and fast battle cruisers to effectively utilize the power of our battleships. We have not a proper proportion of destroyers to round out the fleet and utilize the power of the battleships.

“This war in Europe has shown that our submarines are not of a type that can effectively operate for any distance or operate with the fleet. They should have greater seagoing qualities and better habitability, in order to have a type that is more suitable for our needs on this coast. These qualities are more essential than high speed.

“Our aircraft, our aerial service, is far behind the developments abroad.

“Finally, our fleet is too small to insure protection to our interests.”

A LETTER FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT

I am no politician. I do not presume to speak with authority upon subjects about which I know nothing. In this I am unlike the pacifists who speak the most authoritatively upon the subjects about which they know the least.

In this present day and generation, when a captain of industry speaks upon an industrial subject, it is customary to attribute ulterior motives to

him, and accordingly to discount what he says. When a railroad president talks about railroads, what he says is for the same reason discounted. When an eminent banker or financier testifies upon the subject of finance, his words are generally weighed in the balance of ignorance and prejudice and found wanting. When a distinguished army or navy officer testifies upon the subject of our needs for national defense, he is suspected of being actuated by ulterior motives—he is suspected of a desire to win promotion and increase his salary, and what he says is discounted.

Above all, when a munition maker testifies about preparedness against war, it seems inconceivable to many minds that he could by any possibility be honest in his convictions: he must of necessity be actuated by ulterior motives, though upon the most superficial examination it may be seen that whereas preparedness against war is an insurance against war and lessens the likelihood of war, and whereas a munition maker makes ten times as much profit in time of war as in time of peace, his advocacy of preparedness against war is also advocacy of preparedness against an opportunity to make profits in his business.

When a man of much wealth speaks upon the subject of our social or economic needs, the very fact that he is a man of means is popularly supposed to disqualify him to speak authoritatively about that concerning which he is the best informed, because he is supposed to be dishonest in what he says.

Thus, it has come about that upon the greatest public questions and concerns of the day, the counsel of the ignorant, the inexperienced and the improvident is accepted by the people as their guide, because the people wish, above all things, to get honest and unbiased counsel.

Recently, I read the following passage from a speech by Elihu Root, which is very well worth quoting in this connection:—

“Measures relating to the great business and the small and multitudinous business of the country have been framed and put into effect under influences which have rejected the voice of those whom they most immediately affect. The railroad man’s testimony of what legislation there should be affecting railroads has been rejected because he was a party in interest. The banker’s testimony about finance has been rejected because he was a party in interest. The manufacturer’s testimony about manufacturing has been rejected because he was a party in interest. The merchant’s testimony about commerce has been rejected because he was a party in interest. The ship-owner’s testimony about the merchant marine has been rejected because he was a party in interest. Knowledge of the business affairs of the country has disqualified men from taking any part in the conduct of the increasing participation of the government in the control and direction of business affairs.”—*Extract from an address by the Hon. Elihu Root, to the Union League, Philadelphia, Pa., March 23, 1915.*

Of all men in the United States competent to speak upon the subject of our needs for national defense, there is no man better qualified by education and experience than Theodore Roosevelt.

Theodore Roosevelt is the most capable, most accurate and honest his-

torian that America ever produced. His knowledge of historical facts is phenomenal. "History as Literature," by Theodore Roosevelt, contains passages unsurpassed in the English prose literature of the world.

The experience of an individual must be that individual's guide; likewise, the experience of the nations should be a nation's guide, and no man who does not possess a good knowledge of history can be qualified to advise a nation what to do regarding the subject of national defense.

A year ago, on the publication of "Defenseless America," I sent out ten thousand copies of the two-dollar edition of the work, with my compliments, free, to students graduating in American universities. The students of all the colleges gladly welcomed the gift, with a single exception—an institution in Boston, the name of which I will not mention here, declined to receive the books, writing me a letter in which they stated, in effect, that they were absolutely opposed to war even though it were in defense of the country. It is to this incident that Mr. Roosevelt refers in his letter, given below:—

Oyster Bay, Long Island, N. Y.,

June 3rd, 1915.

My dear Mr. Maxim:—I thank you heartily for your book on "Defenseless America." It is a capital book and I believe it is safe to say that no wise and patriotic American can fail to recognize the service that you have rendered in writing it. I hope it will have the widest possible circulation throughout our country.

I was glad to see the first-class letters that have been written you by such good Americans as Oscar Straus, Garrétt P. Serviss, Rear-Admiral W. W. Kimball, C. P. Gray, Holman Day and the others. On the other hand, I was saddened by the extraordinary letter sent you by the three young men who purported to speak for the Senior Class of the College of which they are members. The course of conduct which these men and those like them advocate for the nation would of course not only mean a peculiarly craven avoidance of national duty by our people at this time, but would also inevitably tend permanently to encourage the spirit of individual cowardice no less than of national cowardice.

The professional pacifists, the professional peace-at-any-price men, who during the last five years have been so active, who have pushed the mischievous all-arbitration treaties at Washington, who have condoned our criminal inactivity as regards Mexico and above all as regards the questions raised by the great world war now waging, and who have applauded our abject failure to live up to the obligations imposed upon us as a signatory power of the Hague Conventions, are at best an unlovely body of men, and taken as a whole are probably the most undesirable citizens that this country contains.

But it is less shocking to see such sentiments developed among old men than among young men. The college students who organize or join these peace-at-any-price leagues are engaged, according to their feeble abilities, in cultivating a standard of manhood which if logically applied would make them desire to "arbitrate" with any tough individual who slapped the sister or sweetheart of one of them in the face. Well-meaning people, as we all know, sometimes advocate a course of action which is infamous; and, as was proved by the great Copperhead party fifty years ago, there are always some brave men to be found condoning or advocating deeds of national cowardice. But the fact remains that the advocates of

pacifism who have been most prominent in our country during the past five years have been preaching poltroonery. Such preaching, if persevered in long enough, softens the fiber of any nation and above all of those preaching it; and if it is reduced to practice it is ruinous to national character. These men have been doing their best to make us the China of the Occident; and the College students such as those of whom you speak have already reached a level considerably below that to which the higher type of Chinaman has now struggled on his upward path.

On the whole, for the nation as for the individual, the most contemptible of all sins is the sin of cowardice; and while there are other sins as base there are none baser. The prime duty for this nation is to prepare itself so that it can protect itself; and this is the duty that you are preaching in your admirable volume. It is only when this duty has been accomplished that we shall be able to perform the further duty of helping the cause of world righteousness by backing the cause of the international peace of Justice (the only kind of peace worth having) not merely by words but by deeds.

A Peace Conference such as that which some of our countrymen propose at the moment to hold is purely noxious, until as a preliminary we put ourselves in such shape that what we say will excite the respect and not the derision of foreign nations; and, furthermore, until we have by practical action shown that we are heartily ashamed of ourselves for our craven abandonment of duty in not daring to say a word when the Hague Conventions were ruthlessly violated before our eyes.

Righteousness must be put before peace; and peace must be recognized as of value only when it is the handmaiden of justice. The doctrine of national or individual neutrality between right and wrong is an ignoble doctrine unworthy the support of any brave or honorable man. It is wicked to be neutral between right and wrong; and this statement can be successfully refuted only by men who are prepared to hold up Pontius Pilate, the arch-typical neutral of all time, as worthy of our admiration. An ignoble peace may be the worst crime against humanity; and righteous war may represent the greatest service a nation can at a given moment render to itself and to mankind.

Our people also need to come to their senses about the manufacture and sale of arms and ammunition. Of course, the same moral law applies here between nations as between individuals within a nation. There is not the slightest difference between selling ammunition in time of war and in time of peace, because when sold in time of peace it is only sold with a view to the possibility or likelihood of war. It should never be sold to people who will make bad use of it, and it should freely be sold at all times to those who will use it for a proper purpose. It is absolutely essential that we should have stores where citizens of a nation can buy arms and ammunition. It is a service to good citizenship to sell a revolver to an honest householder for use against burglars, or to a policeman for use against gunmen. It is an outrage against humanity knowingly to sell such a revolver to a burglar or a gunman.

The morality of the sale depends upon the purpose and the probable use. This is true among individuals. It is no less true among nations. I am speaking of the moral right. Our legal right to sell ammunition to the Allies is, of course, perfect, just as Germany, the greatest trader in ammunitions to other nations in the past, had an entire legal right to sell guns and ammunition to Turkey, for instance. But, in addition to our legal right to sell ammunition to those engaged in trying to restore

Belgium to her own people, it is also our moral duty to do so, precisely as it is a moral duty to sell arms to policemen for use against gunmen.

Wishing you all possible success, I am

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

Hudson Maxim, Esq.,

Landing, New Jersey.

A SHORT SPEECH OR DECLAMATION ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

I have received many inquiries from high school and college boys for a good short speech on national defense which they could use as a declamation. The following may serve the purpose:—

FELLOW AMERICANS:

Our country is in very grave danger, because rich and defenseless, while other nations are armed to the teeth. The writing is on the wall that spells our invasion and desolation.

Self-preservation is the first law of Nature. No individual and no nation has ever disobeyed that law for long and lived; and it is too big a task for the United States of America.

I am well aware of the fact that nothing I can say is likely to rouse the people of my country to their danger, and make them prepare adequately and in time against the red hell of war.

Pacifism has ringed the nose of the American people, and is leading them, blind and unknowing, to slaughter. War is inevitable. It matters not that if this country could be roused it might be saved. When it is impossible to vitalize the impulse necessary to the accomplishment of a thing, that thing is impossible. So I say war is inevitable and imminent.

The American people could not now be roused sufficiently to avert the impending calamity even by a call that would rift the sky and shake down the stars from heaven!

Fate has decreed that our pride shall be humbled and that we shall be bowed to the dirt. We must first put on sackcloth, ashed in the embers of our burning homes. Perhaps, when we build anew on the fire-blackened desolation, our mood may be receptive of the knowledge that we must shield our homes with blood and brawn and iron.

He who is not ready with his life to shield the woman of his heart and the loved ones of his home from the unspeakable lust of a savage soldiery has not red blood enough in him to blush for shame. He is less a man than the primeval savage whose home was the hill cavern. He is below the gorilla, for the gorilla guards his home. He is a reversion to a type below the ape, far down the scale of living things to some slimy monster wallowing in the ancient ooze.

When there comes a clash of arms between civilized nations, and the sword is once wet with blood, dormant brutehood comes to the surface and submerges pity, mercy, conscience.

To arms, then, for defense, and when the great European War is ended, let us join arms with the survivors of civilization, thereafter to

compel good behavior through an international police force, governed by a central tribunal of justice, representative of all the nations.

Russian, Teuton, Latin, Anglo-Saxon, when you shall have returned your blood-red swords to their scabbards, then join hands over-seas with us Americans, who are kin to all the blood you have spilled, and let us take serious counsel of one another.

But, Americans, though we may turn our faces toward the morning that should come, such posturing cannot, any more than the cock's crow, bring the morning; and until the great world compact shall be made, it is the supreme duty of the American people to prepare with loaded guns and naked swords to stand alone.

TO ARMS FOR PEACE

Anonymous

Now mourning night-airs linger on the day;
The saddened Sun is sorrow all his way;
His goaded light is messenger of pain,
And tortures sense until it numbs the brain.

The smoke of battle leadens every morn,
From Boreal snow to Islam's Golden Horn.
The three Norns hover on the sullen sky,
And weave portending wands and prophesy.

Their gestured menace bids us be aware,
And lest we would be slaves, prepare, prepare.
They beckon into form a battle-yield
Of souls, ascending from the slaughter-field.

These strands of broken life, wanded on air,
Bear fearful import—Lest *we* die, prepare!
To arms! To arms! Blast all the furnace fires—
Forge in our hearts the spirit of our sires—

Forge into swords the steel with cutting edge—
Forge guns to guard our freedom's sacred pledge.
Let all the vulcan furnaces be driven—
Forge thunder-bolts, out-thundering the heaven!

Rear battlements upon the mountain crest
And battlements upon the ocean breast—
Go, fortify the earth, the sea, the air,
And fortify our hearts—Prepare, prepare!



PRAISE FROM PATRIOTS

Extracts From a Few of Hundreds of Letters Praising HUDSON MAXIM'S DEFENSELESS AMERICA

THEODORE ROOSEVELT:

"'Defenseless America' is a capital book. I hope it will have the widest possible circulation throughout our country. The prime duty for this nation is to prepare itself so that it can protect itself; and this is the duty that you are preaching in your admirable volume."

OSCAR S. STRAUS:

"'Defenseless America', coming from an expert, will awaken interest in the most practical method of securing peace by safeguarding our national existence. I am in fullest accord with your Conclusion—an international compact with adequate international force to maintain it, and give adequate guarantee to enforce its decrees."

S. S. McCLURE:

"A most convincing book on an extraordinarily important subject, done in a manner not only convincing but irrefutable."

REAR-ADMIRAL CHARLES D. SIGSBEE:

"I should not have said that the subject could be treated in a way to make it fascinating to the popular reader, yet I now think that is precisely what you have done. May the book bear good fruit!"

GARRETT P. SERVISS:

"'Defenseless America' ought to go into the hands of ten million American citizens before another month passes. You have done a magnificent thing for your country! In God's name, may she turn from the silly twaddle of the pacifist wiseacres, and save herself, even on the crumbling verge!"

PRAISE FROM PATRIOTS

GEORGE VON LINGERKE MEYER:

"It will go a great ways toward aiding the people of this country to realize the necessity of a proper national defense and a preparedness against war."

MRS. JOHN A. LOGAN:

"I wish that every official in the land could read it."

DR. ORISON SWETT MARDEN:

"A colossal, monumental treatment of the subject."

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:

"You have brought the whole question of National Defense to a basis which can be readily understood by the average layman."

LIEUT. BARON HROLF VON DEWITZ:

"In 'Defenseless America' you explode a crater of information on the subject such as has never been detonated before."

COL. BEVERLEY W. DUNN:

"I wish to congratulate you on the conspicuous and valuable service that you have rendered the people of the United States in writing this book."

DR. E. C. BECK:

"I want to thank you from the bottom of my heart for this masterpiece of revelation on your part, this opus which I look upon in the nature of an historical event. May the Lord use your book to pound a little sense into our fellow citizens."

REV. J. F. STILLEMANS:

"I am only one of thousands who would welcome an edition as cheap as possible of 'Defenseless America' so that we could distribute it freely."

CLEVELAND MOFFETT:

"'Defenseless America' is great stuff and ought to be read by every loyal American."

W. SIDNEY JOPSON:

"The direct results of reading 'Defenseless America' were that I went to Plattsburg and applied for admission in our National Guard."



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